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PREFACE

Even a superficial glance at research materials in most public and university libraries would indicate that, where Latin America
is concerned,

the larger and more powerful countries have tradition-

ally been the subjects of greatest interest to both scholars and

policy-makers.

Most recently at my own university, an inflationary

process that has been accelerated by rising oil prices, has tended to
focus attention on energy related topics.

This is understandable

inasmuch as scholarly interest is frequently, and quite rightly influenced by subjects that are of worldwide concern.

It may thus have

come as some surprise to many of my colleagues when

I

decided to

devote my energy and resources to a study of Costa Rica, an economically insignificant nation that has always been far from the center
of world attention.

My interest in Costa Rica began to develop after having familiarized myself with the common themes of Latin American politics and
society:

instability, authoritarian leadership, poverty, violence,
The relative lack of such problems

and uneven economic development.

became the basis for my belief that Costa Rica

possesses a political

significance that belies its international obscurity.

Costa Rica

is afterall a democracy, and that is unusual for a Latin American

country.

If for no other reason

I

thought, this tiny Central American

republic merited more serious scholarly attention.
v

The historical research for this study began at the University
of Massachusetts in 1980.

was conducted in 1981.

Field and library research in Costa Rica

Although the investigation was undertaken

independently of any funding agency,

owe a debt of gratitude to

I

several institutions and individuals, without whose cooperation this
study would have been impossible.

Most importantly,

to acknowledge the support of Charles F

.

would like

Denton, Director of the

Institute for Social and Population Studies (IDESPO)

University of Costa Rica in Heredia.

I

,

at the National

The research facilities and

personal introductions provided by Dr. Denton were of key importance
in the completion of this research.

I

would also like to thank the

Faculty of Political Science at the University of Costa Rica which
was instrumental in making available to me the research facilities
of several public and private libraries.

am also indebted to the

I

Costa Rican Ministry of Labor and the Center of Democratic Studies
for Latin America (CEDAL)

,

both of which offered their full coopera-

tion and many important research materials.

Among the many individuals who contributed in one way or
another to the completion of this research

I

would like to give spe-

cial thanks to Humberto Moya Morux, Luis Fernando and Pricilla Moya

Morux, Geovanny Murillo, and Anabelle Cabezas Alpizar, all of whom

provided valuable material and moral support.

Finally,

I

would like

to express my thanks to Howard Wiarda, Harvey Kline, and Kenneth

Flamm, all of whom read the manuscript and offered several important
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.

suggestions.

Naturally

I

accept full responsibility for the contents

of this volume

vii

ABSTRACT
Structures Of Integration And Labor Relations In Costa Rica:

Democratic Participation or Authoritarian Control
(May

1982)

Ralph Henry Russomando, B.A., American International College
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Howard

J.

Wiarda

For quite some time now, North American scholars of Latin

America have been concerned with the nature and the causes of authoritarian forms of organization.

Preferring to focus attention on the

more conspicuously dictatorial regimes, Costa Rican political structures and processes have not been of great interest to researchers

concerned with these questions.
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature, and the

degree to which labor organizations have been permitted to partici-

pate in an ostensibly democratic political system.
this,

focus has been placed on two questions:

In accomplishing

how the process of

Costa Rican political development has served either to encourage or

discourage labor union organization and collective action; and how
labor activities, and influence, are currently confined by three

structures of integration:

legal structures, bureaucratic structures,

and political parties.

viii

The first chapter of the research explores the apparent differ-

ences between the Costa Rican political system and other Latin

American political systems.

Chapters II and III focus on the develop-

ment of the Costa Rican social struggle and the emergence of labor

organizations as mechanisms of collective self-defense.
The second part of the research is concerned with an analysis
of current structures of integration.

Chapter IV explains conflict

resolution procedures, restrictions on union activity, and the vulnerability of labor organizations to patronal attack.

Chapter V is con-

cerned with an analysis of the relationship between labor organizations and the Ministry of Labor and the decision-making structures
of tripartite organs in four autonomous institutions.

Chapter VI

explains the nature of political party relationships and its effects
on the accomplishment of two important labor goals:

Labor Code re-

form, and a more authentic labor representation in the autonomous

institutions.

Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the research, and draws

comparisons between Costa Rican labor relations and the prevailing

pattern of Latin American labor relations.
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INTRODUCTION

In an area of the world noteworthy for its political insta-

bility, military dictatorships and extreme poverty, Costa Rica has

stood forth as a bold exception.

A small country with few mineral

resources and a climate best suited to the cultivation of tropical
fruits, there seems little reason why Costa Rica should be distinctive.

Yet while the term "banana republic" may be used to connote

poor, politically unstable, dictatorial Central American nations,
it is a reference that has been applied only to Costa Rican agri-

culture; and not to its political system or social structure.

Political, Social, and Economic Conditions

Although Costa Rica possesses no more natural wealth than its
Central American neighbors, it has managed to avoid many of the politi
cal and social maladies that have plagued most Latin American nations.

Small scale family owned farms are still the cornerstone of the Costa

Rican land tenure system; compulsory public education, having been instituted at the end of the nineteenth century, has accounted for one
of the highest literacy rates of any country in the hemisphere;

infant mortality rates are lower than the average for Latin American
countries; and comprehensive public health programs have

all.

but wiped

out infectious tropical diseases, and extended free medical care to
a vast majority of people.

xiv

Besides these social accomplishments Costa Rica is distinguished
by a long standing commitment to democratic principles of government.

Unlike most Latin American countries, political opposition in Costa
Rica is able to organize and function without hindrance.

Throughout

most of the 20th century, political power has changed hands frequently,
fairly, and peacefully.

At the same time, an abundance of political

parties and organizations ranging in ideological orientation from the

extreme right to the extreme left, supposedly insures a liberal play of
ideas; and while the vast majority of people support one of Costa Rica's
two large moderate political parties,

there is an overwhelming agree-

ment that all political, social, and economic philosophies, however radical or reactionary, have a role to play in public debate.

This of course does not suggest that Costa Rica has been com-

pletely free of the pressures that have played such an important part
in Latin American political instability.

Like many other nations in

the region, Costa Rica's population has been expanding at an alarming

rate.

While growth has dropped significantly in the last decade, the

economically active population between 1950 and 1973 more than doubled.
Between 1973 and 1979 it had increased by another 27%.

This has pre-

sented policy-makers with an enormous surplus manpower problem that has

been temporarily solved by the expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus.
Between 1950 and 1975 the number of people working for the government
increased four times.

While unemployment rates during the same period

decreased from 7.3% to 4.9%, this was accomplished largely through continuous deficit spending that has been covered primarily by borrowing
xv

abroad.

At the same time the price of manufactured products, most of

which have to be imported, has

outstripped price increases in Costa

Rica's cash crops and caused a severe balance of payments problem.
A recent currency devaluation has significantly increased the financial
hardships of the Costa Rican people.

Population growth has also taxed Costa Rica's educational facilities, although pressures have been partially eased by a reduction in
the population growth rate, and an extraordinarily high drop out rate

that has principally affected rural areas.

1970

's

Statistics compiled in the

have shown that while 90% of Costa Rican children enter the first

grade, only 52% reach the 6th grade, and only 14% possess some high

school education.

The result has been an increase in illiteracy that

belies Costa Rica's reputation for having one of the highest literacy
rates in the hemisphere.

A no less important concern to Costa Rican policy-makers has

been the productivity of the agricultural sector.

Primarily based upon

banana and coffee production, agriculture is Costa Rica's most important
source of jobs and foreign exchange.

The distribution of land has also

had an important social and political function inasmuch as the current

land tenure structure has contributed to the illusion that Costa Rican

farmers are owners rather than tenants.

While it is true that the

vast majority of farmers cultivate their own property, the average size
of individually owned farms is less than 24 hectares.

The National

Agriculture Institute has estimated that 43% of the farms that fall into

this category are too small to be economically viable; and in many
xvi

cases owners have been forced to find employment on larger farms.
It might also be supposed that this tendency has accounted for the in-

creasing school drop out rate.
In recent years agricultural diversification has established

beef and sugar as foreign exchange earners; however the impact of sugar

exports has been diminished by a drop in prices.

On the other hand

while beef production has become a more important source of foreign
exchange, it has not significantly eased unemployment problems in rural

areas; and the resulting exodus from the countryside has created unem-

ployment problems in the cities.
Nevertheless, while this description seems to fit

a

Latin American

mold, it would be a mistake to suppose that economic and demographic

pressures in Costa Rica have either reached the same extent, or produced
the same results that they have elsewhere in Latin America.

The quality

of life for the majority of people is still much higher in Costa Rica

than most countries in the hemisphere; and there has been a continued

commitment to representative democracy, gradual change, and civil liberties

.

Historical Setting

If

Costa Rica has been considered to be a model of political

and social development, it owes this distinction to an historical

experience that has set it far apart from other Latin American nations.
The early colonists of Costa Rica, like colonists elsewhere in the region, had hoped to discover gold and fabulously rich Indian cities.

xvii

.

Having discovered only a few poor though fierce Indians, and
having
found no appreciable deposits of valuable minerals, early
immigrants

were forced

to

dedicate themselves to the cultivation of the land.

A few small commercial enterprises were established; but owing to the
lack of transportation facilities and a rugged mountainous terrain,

commerce was limited, and Costa Rica was forced to remain largely outside the Spanish mercantile system.
In this connection the productive potential of colonial Costa

Rican agriculture was limited by the absence of a large and docile
Indian population that could have been used as a cheap source of labor.

Large landholdings consequently did not emerge, as they did elsewhere
in Latin America.

The small family owned plots that would become

the cornerstone of the Costa Rican land tenure system, produced barely

enough to satisfy the nutritional needs of the owner.

Possessing few

manufactured items, and separated by heavily forested mountains, Costa
Ricans led a hard, crude, isolated existence, and learned to survive
on their own meager resources
The common poverty of colonial Costa Rica was shocking to early

travelers and governors.

One representative of the Spanish Crown com-

plained that Costa Rica was the poorest, most miserable province in all
of America.

An eighteenth century Bishop was even more appalled when

he discovered that the women of Heredia literally had nothing to wear
to Church.

But the privations of Costa Rican life proved in the long

run to be a blessing.

In other Latin American countries the exploita-

tion of mineral resources and the subjugation of whole Indian

xviii

populations produced tremendous disparities in wealth and
small
oligarchic castes that preserved their economic power with
political
power.

This state of circumstances contributed greatly to the
fre-

quent occurrence of military dictatorship and political
instability
that has come to characterize Latin American politics.
a common

By contrast,

poverty that extended even to the Spanish colonial governors

of Costa Rica, helped to form a tough,

free, and independent people

who, as one sociologist noted, had been born for liberty and equality.

Modernization and Popular Discontent

Despite this characterization, traditional land ownership patterns changed considerably toward the end of the nineteenth century

owing to the development of the coffee industry and the integration
of Costa Rica into an international economic system.

The concentra-

tion of land, as in so many other Latin American nations, created a
large class of propertyless farmers and a small agricultural oligarchy
that used the political system to protect its economic power.

The

years between 1906 and 1936, during which Ricardo Jimenez Oreamuno
and Cleto Gonzalez Viquez took turns occupying the presidency, were

thus characterized by laissez-faire economic policies and infrastruc-

tural improvements facilitating an expansion of the coffee commerce.
The pattern changed considerably during the administration of Leon

Cortes Castro between 1936 and 1940 when the world depression called
for a more active state role in the solution of economic problems.

xvix

This, however, was primarily a response to the needs of Costa Rican

businessmen, not Costa Rican workers.
It was in the period between 1906 and 1940 that the social con-

sequences of agricultural development and economic depression came to
be manifested in Costa Rican society.

Previously independent small

landowners, who had migrated to the cities, formed a large class of

unemployed workers.

Thousands of others who found employment on

coastal banana plantations endured low salaries and deplorable working and living conditions.

The result of these developments was an

attempt to give organizational expression to popular discontent.
Thus in San Jose, the General Confederation of Workers was organized
and later transformed into the Christian democratic Reformist Party.

Somewhat later, communist labor organizer Manuel Mora formed the

General Union of Workers on United Fruit Company property.
The repressive measures that were applied to these worker or-

ganizations underscore the degree to which Costa Rican governments

served business interests.

Although no labor organizations were in-

voluntarily dissolved, labor leaders especially during the depression
years, were frequently interned for disturbing the peace or undermining free trade.

At the same time, demonstrations and strikes through-

out the period between 1906 and 1940 were forcefully broken up by

public security forces.

While several labor-management disputes pro-

duced modest material gains, collective action was usually accompanied by threats, beatings, and sometimes death.

xx
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Labor and the Social Welfare State

The informal though repressive relationship that had existed

between the state and labor organizations through the administration
of Leon Cortes changed dramatically in 1940 with the election of Rafael

Angel Calderdn Guardia, a Christian democrat who, despite an early
reliance on conservative support, was committed to the task of social
reform.

Between 1940 and 1948 Calderon undercut conservative backing

and, along with Church and communist party supporters, initiated a

series of reforms that not only eased the material burdens of the
lower classes, but recognized the legitimacy of working class collective action.

Profiting from legislation explicitly guaranteeing the

right to organize, labor leaders began an intense union organization

drive that culminated in the formation of two large confederations:
the communist oriented Confederation of Costa Rican Workers

(CTCR)

and the Catholic inspired Costa Rican Confederation of Workers
Re rum Novarum (CCTRN)

The CTCR and the CCTRN succeeded in grouping together several

previously independent unions and federations.

At the same time lead-

ers from both confederations cooperated in the organization of non-

unionized workers.

Consequently membership levels in both organiza-

tions increased dramatically between 1943 and 1948.

This union de-

velopment, however, came to an abrupt end in 1948 when a hotly contested election between Calderon Guardia and conservative candidate

Utilio Ulate Blanco precipitated a rebellion that resulted in the
xxi

proscription of the communist party, the involuntary dissolution of
the CTCR, and the protracted decline and eventual dissolution
of the

CCTRN.

Despite these harsh measures, the progressive social legislation of Calderon Guardia was not overturned in the subsequent period
of Costa Rican political development.

Labor legislation still guar-

antees union rights; minimum salaries are adjusted yearly by govern-

ment organs that incorporate labor representatives; workers continue
to enjoy better living and working conditions, and more comprehensive

medical and sickness benefits than their counterparts elsewhere in
Latin America; and numerous new labor organizations have emerged in
place of the CTCR and the CCTRN to defend working class interests.

Statement of Purpose

Since 1948 Costa Ricans have reaffirmed their commitment to

democratic principles of government.

The large National Liberation

Party (PLN) and the coalition of anti-PLN forces have taken turns

occupying the presidency.

Control over the Legislative Assembly has

changed hands even more frequently.

Both these tendencies have com-

bined to create an impression of political liberty and democratic
stability.

This impression is at least partially justified, but on

the other hand the length of time that the tools of formal democracy

are employed should not be confused with the content or quality of

democracy; and if Costa Rican democracy is to merit a full measure of
credit, it must combine a commitment to formal democracy with an
xxii

equally strong commitment to free competition among political and
social groups.
In this connection one must wonder, inasmuch as the rebellion
of 1948 was led largely by conservative elements that opposed

Calderon Guardia's labor legislation, whether or not current labor
guarantees and worker benefits disguise various forms of control and

repression that are more in keeping with the Latin American tradition
of authoritarian rule than the liberal democratic tradition that

Costa Ricans profess.

How labor organizations are permitted to defend

their interests, and if labor relations are conducted on a more liberal

basis than other Latin American nations will determine to a large
degree whether or not Costa Rica actually is an exception to the rule.
In general terms it is to this question that the following re-

search has been dedicated.

considerations including:

Specifically this has involved several
the role of labor development in the rebel-

lion of 1948, and how the rebellion affected labor union structure;

recent interpretations and applications of labor legislation, how

union formation and conflict resolution procedures either encourage
or confine union organization and activity; and how labor organizations

have been able to affect labor legislation.

The analysis has been

made with a view to determining the similarities and differences

between the Costa Rican labor relations system and the common pattern
of Latin American labor relations.

In accomplishing this objective attention was focused on legal

and representative structures.

Where the representative structures
xxiii

are concerned, emphasis has been placed upon
organizational form and

modes of participation.

For lack of space and time, much less atten-

tion has been devoted to policy analysis, although this
has been a

consideration in the most important of these institutions.
The ways that labor organizations have been permitted
to par-

ticipate in decision-making bodies, rather than policy, have thus

been the primary basis for comparison to other Latin American countries.

The structures that have been analyzed in the research were

selected with a view to identifying labor's most important contacts
in the political system.

Throughout the research an attempt has been

made to point out the relationship among structures.

Whether or not

labor is permitted to function freely or participate effectively in
one institution or structure has an important bearing on its ability
to act effectively in another institution.

Furthermore, the nature

of these interrelationships can be used to determine the extent of

labor liberty or control.
It ought to be noted, nevertheless,

that similarities in the

structures that integrate labor should not be confused with labor
relations practices.

Widely differing policies between Costa Rican

bureaucratic organs, and the bureaucratic organs of other nations in
the region have in fact accounted for vastly differing material con-

ditions among the corresponding working classes.

Where comparisons

have been made, it has thus been my intention to draw distinctions

between the concepts that underlie Costa Rican and Latin American
labor relations and the way these concepts have been applied.

xxiv

The magnitude of difference between labor
relations theory and

practice in Costa Rica and other Latin American nations
such as El
Salvador and Guatemala cannot be overstated.

Most importantly, labor

leaders in Costa Rica do not run the risk of assassination
or torture
as they do elsewhere in the region.

Nevertheless Costa Rica's widely

applauded democratic stability and liberty will face the challenges
of population growth, high unemployment, declining
prices in agricul-

tural goods, shortages in staple foods, and an energy shortage
that
has caused widespread inflation.

With this as an economic and social

setting, any similarities between Costa Rica and other more oppressive
and violent Central American nations, in either labor relations

theory or practice, are bound to be important.

The possibility that

such similarities exist has been the inspiration for this research.

xxv

CHAPTER

I

AUTHORITARIAN MECHANISMS OF INTEGRATION AND THE CASE
OF COSTA RICA
Industrialization and modernization in Latin America have
produced new interests that have made strong and persistent
demands for
a greater share of national wealth and greater
participation in pro-

cesses of decision-making.

Governments, far from ignoring such pres-

sures, have sought to bring these new interests into their fold
in
an effort to minimize social and political disturbances.
It was

originally thought that the emergence of new social

groupings, along with rapid industrialization and urbanization, increased literacy, the expansion and improvement of communication net-

works, and all those structural, and cultural characteristics commonly

associated with modernization, would produce sound foundation posts
for the development of pluralistic, democratic political and social

institutions.

However, rather than creating a basis for the evolution

of stable, participant political systems, where independently organ-

ized groups would provide support for large mass-based aggregative

parties, industrialization and politicization

,

have often produced

crises in participation, concensus and distribution.

Governments

have responded to these pressures by creating or adapting institutions that would structure and limit, rather than give full expres-

sion to various group interests.

1

Where labor organizations are concerned, a variety
of author!
tarian mechanisms have been used both to recognize
and guarantee gro
rights and interests, and to harness working class radicalism
while

regulating the flow of material demands.

The application of these

controls is clearly revealed in the reaction of Latin American
execu
tives to the emergence of workers associations around the turn
of
the century.

It is even more strikingly revealed in the legislative

responses that governments made when these associations were later

converted into large, combative labor organizations that threatened
to disrupt the social and political arrangements that supported the

interests of traditional agricultural elites and newer commercial
and industrial elites.
The threats,

the demands, and in general terms,

the power

capabilities of labor organizations were, in the first instance, lim
ited by the erection of legal frameworks which, while enumerating

collective rights, also created obstacles that tended to curtail fre
dom of association and independence of action.

The labor laws of

the Latin American countries possess several important characteris-

tics that have been designed to accomplish these objectives.

first is legal dispositions which make union formation
and risky undertaking.

a

The

difficult

Stanley Davis and Louis Goodman have argued

that bureaucratic procedures that must be followed by unions in the

process of formation are time consuming, expensive operations that
require careful planning.

The low level of unionization in Latin

America has been attributed to the problems such procedures cause

for labor leaders hoping to form
unions.

2

But perhaps even more

fundamentally, bureaucratic problems,
annoying as they may be, are
often complicated by the vulnerability
of labor leaders to unsympathetic employers whose actions are
not sufficiently regulated by labor

legislation that ostensibly exists in
order to guarantee the right of
association.
Secondly, regulations concerning the
formation of unions are

often accompanied by membership requirements
and by dispositions affecting internal union organization.

Davis and Goodman have found

that in many cases factories cannot
unionize unless they employ a

certain number of workers.

Labor leaders must meet several require-

ments, and severe limitations are placed upon
union activities during work time.

Elections are closely regulated, and finances are

carefully examined.

3

Besides these, Labor Codes frequently place

bottom limits on the number of people required to
form

a

union, and

contain extensive specifications on the structure and
responsibilities of the organizations' directive organs.

Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, Latin American Labor
Codes, as ineffective as they may be in guaranteeing labor
rights,

and as burdensome as they may be in their specification of union

formation requirements, are even more regulative in the prohibitions
they place on union activity.

Robert Vernengo

,

for instance, has

compiled a variety of legal restrictions which, by prohibiting col-

lective action in certain sectors of production or among certain categories of workers, have limited the use of the strike in most Latin

American countries.

*

Davis and Goodman have similarly shown
that

in some countries the use of the strike
may even be suspended alto-

gether for unspecified periods of time.

5

Along with legal dispositions that seem to
limit unionization
levels, and confine labor union activities,
structures of participa-

tion in some Latin American countries have
served more to regulate

rather than articulate demands emanating from
popular organizations.
Carrol Hawkins has shown, for instance, that the
independence of

Mexican labor organizations has been severely limited by
their relationship with the PRI.

The once powerful and influencial CROM was

destroyed when labor leader Luis Morones attempted to steer an
independent course.

The current Confederation of Mexican Workers,

Hawkins maintains, is heavily dependent on the goodwill of PRI government executives.
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Not the least of labor's problems has been the illwill of Latin

American governments, especially during periods of military dictatorship.

Robert Alexander has shown that the Peruvian labor movement

has been greatly affected by the nature of governments at any given

period of time.

Since the beginning of the century dictatorial

regimes have forced labor to operate clandestinely.

Similar circum-

stances have obtained in several other Latin American countries such
as Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile where military governments

have persecuted labor and have made independent activity an impossibility.
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Even in those cases where dictatorial
regimes were not hostile
to

the labor movement, organizational and
operational structures and

procedures were created which, while perhaps
designed to be more supportive of labor interests than managerial
interests, nevertheless

established patrimonial bonds between government,
management, and
labor that prohibited the independent settlement
of labor disputes,
and encouraged or required workers to look to
the state rather than
the union, and to the political leader rather
than the labor leader,

for the protection of their socio-economic interests.

The Estado

Novo (New State) of Getulio Vargas, for instance, has
had an enduring

effect on the nature of labor relations in Brazil.

Corporate repre-

sentative structures, in this case, established the dominance of
the
state in all aspects of labor organization and activity.

The basic

unit of this structural scheme was the industrial union.

All workers

in a given industry were organized into single unions, federations,

and confederations.

The organization of unions outside the state

apparatus was an impossibility inasmuch as all organizations required
the official approval of the Ministry of Labor.

Once established,

all forms of labor union operations, including elections, and the use
of union funds were strictly controlled by the ministry.

No less

importantly, legal provisions removed collective bargaining from the

realm of labor activity.

All disputes, whether of an individual or

collective nature, were resolved through the labor courts.

While

the Estado Novo has long since disappeared, Robert Alexander maintains
that the experience of the corporate state has left government with

.

wide ranging controls over the relationships
between workers and
employers
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In a similar way, labor organizations
in Argentina both prof-

ited and suffered from state dominance during
the Peron era.

While

the socio-economic position of the working
classes may have been pro-

tected by justicialismo, the organizational
and operational indepen-

dence of labor organizations was severely limited.
of the labor movement,

Owing to a purge

unions by the end of the Peron regime were

little more than tools of the political dictatorship.

Moreover, it

was during this era that labor organizations became
accustomed to
resolving their disputes in the Ministry of Labor.

The negotiation

of nearly all contracts, Robert Alexander says, was
centralized in

the ministry, and involved the heavy participation of Senora
Peron.

Strikes were forbidden, except for political purposes, and individual

grievances involving violations of the law were handled through the
labor courts.

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, workers

were taught to believe that the protection of their socio-economic
interests would come from a state benefactor rather than from collective and independent union activity.
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The Exceptional Cases

Corresponding to the persistence of dictatorial regimes, the
implementation of political, bureaucratic, and juridical control
mechanisms, and a realization that industrialization and modernization in Latin America were not producing the liberal, pluralistic

institutions that they had in the United States,
a large body of literature emerged that sought to reconceptualize
Latin American develop-

ment in terms of the adaptation of traditional
corporate structures.
In his study of the Iberic and Latin American
labor relations systems,

for instance, Howard Wiarda argued that with
few exceptions early

labor charters and labor systems, while perhaps being
created by

regimes that were motivated by different objectives, had
in common
a set of

controls and provisions that were in keeping with a long

Latin tradition of centralized, state-directed, and Catholic
inspired
authoritarianism, or natural corporatism.
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Along with Wiarda, several writers conceptualized Latin
American development in terms of unique cultural attributes.

Richard

Morse asserted that any changes in Latin America, occurring as a result of industrialization and modernization, had to be accommodated
to

the enduring principles of Latin culture.

Glen Dealy attributed

authoritarian organization to the persistence of Catholic monism and
the organic social theory of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Claudio Veliz argued

that industrialization, rather than forming a sound basis for the

formation of liberal-pluralistic structures, provided occasion for
the reestablishment of the paternal-centralist structures that had

been set during the colonial era.

Similarly, Richard Adams asserted

that the only change to have taken place in Latin America was the

expansion and centralization of vertical structures of organization.
Whereas in the past, government controlled the peasantry through the
hacienda, it now established its dominance through peasant leagues;

and in the cities, working classes were controlled through
state sub-

sidized and directed labor organizations.
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On the other hand, a large group of writers have attributed

Latin American authoritarianism to the inequalities created by
capitalist economic penetration.

According to the most radical of these

theorists, Latin American social and political structures were the

result of an alliance between foreign capitalist interests and domestic capitalist interests.

Inasmuch as the terms of this alliance

caused wide-ranging economic problems that called for authoritarian
solutions, Latin American nations, while having passed through many

historical stages, were linked by one enduring premise:
dependence and economic exploitation.

external

Following from this conceptual-

ization, the wide variety of controls that had been placed upon labor

were an economic necessity dictated to national leaders, either directly or indirectly, by foreign interests.
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Both of these conceptualizations have merit, but at the same
time it ought to be suggested that not all Latin American countries

have been developing within an authoritarian framework, or at least

not apparently.

That is to say, while most nations in Latin America,

owing either to cultural motivations or external pressure, have

adapted or developed authoritarian control mechanisms

to deal

with

the disruptions created by emerging labor groups, nations such as

Costa Rica and Venezuela, with their apparently liberal, pluralistic

political institutions, stand as bold exceptions.

In the case of

Venezuela, democratic institutions emerging after the overthrow of

dictator Marcos Plrez Jimenez have achieved a
high degree of legitimacy
and stability.

Costa Rica, on the other hand, is especially
distinc-

tive in that it has been blessed by a relative
absence of the social

and economic dislocations that have produced
authoritarian regimes in

most Latin American countries.

Like Uruguay and Chile until recently,

Costa Rica, by maintaining a long history of democratic
rule, has been

considered to be exceptional.
Just as Uruguayan labor legislation had been excluded from dis-

cussions of the patrimonial aspects of Latin American labor relations,
and just as Chilean democracy had been seen to be the basis of a labor

relations system characterized by a high degree of direct negotiations
and limited government interference, it would seem that the long tra-

dition of democracy has accounted for a conspicuous lack of scholarly
interest in Costa Rica's labor relations system.
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What attention

North American scholars of Latin America have devoted to the study of
Costa Rican politics has been intended more to praise its democratic

system of government than to criticize its political and social structures.

While Uruguay had been viewed as a political Utopia, and a mode

of democracy for South American nations,

Costa Rica has been seen to

be a Switzerland among Central American nations with its freely functioning multiparty system, long tradition of individualism, and strong

respect for the democratic transition of power.

lk

Understandably, while much of the research in Latin American
politics has been concerned with the patrimonial and authoritarian,
or the dependent and authoritarian aspects of development, Costa Rica's
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plural and liberal democracy has been treated as a given.

Little at-

tention has been given to the critical examination of the nature and

evolution of Costa Rican political and social structures, and even
less attention has been devoted to the study of the Costa Rican
labor

relations system, even though these subjects have been of keen interest to Latin American scholars of varying ideological hues and conceptual predispositions.
In view of this neglect, and the installation of authoritarian

regimes in countries such as Chile and Uruguay, both of which have
also had strong liberal traditions, a systematic study

designed to

trace the development of Costa Rican democracy seems now to be opportune.

Inasmuch as the emergence of new social groupings during per-

iods of industrialization seems to have been a critical moment in the

development of Latin American political and social structures, the
subject of this research is subsystem autonomy; the focus is the struc
ture and operation of the Costa Rican labor union system.

The spe-

cific purpose is to examine the nature and extent of labor inputs into

decision-making centers.

The goal is to criticize the quality of

participation in order to determine the autonomy or dependence of labor organizations in deciding matters that affect not only their own

immediate future but the course of national development as well.
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The Appe arance and Reality of Costa Rican
Democracy

There are many reasons why Costa Rica might qualify
as a par-

ticipatory democracy.

Elections are regular and honest; civil liber-

ties apparently are carefully guarded, political parties
function

freely;

there is an abundance of organized interest groups spanning

the entire social spectrum; and between the two major political
parties, power since 1948 has changed hands frequently and without dis-

ruption.

Yet there is some evidence to suggest that constitutional

guarantees and a Labor Code that had been designed to enumerate and
protect basic labor rights, belie a political process which, while

providing liberal rights and benefits to interest groups representing the professions and business, has offered only control and patri-

monial concessions to the working classes.
Charles Denton has argued, for instance, that the democratic

political system that emerged after the 1948 rebellion has been able
to

meet many of the demands of the prestige class.

Lower classes,

on the other hand, have experienced more regulation than in the pre1948 period.

Only once in the country's history, Denton has con-

tended, has a prestige group solicited the support of working class

groups.

The result was a "revolution"; and since the National

Liberation Party is now securely entrenched, it no longer needs the
support of the lower classes.

Participation for most Costa Rican

workers is thus restricted almost exclusively
voting.

to

the formal act of

Supporting a similar view, Jacobo Schifter has asserted
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that the Costa Rican political system enforces
an effective repres-

sion of worker demands in order to maintain the
economic satisfaction of the middle sectors.

Schifter has indicted Costa Rican social

science literature, which, because of its ties to the PLN,
has ignored
the problems of the Costa Rican laborer.
is

He argues that unionization

largely confined to the middle sectors which have important
ties

in the political party system.

uous demand satisfaction.

Such ties, or inputs, insure contin-

Working-class groups, on the other hand,

do not have the same prerogatives.

Furthermore, bureaucratic organs

such as the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Public Security use
legal dispositions to keep the working classes under control.
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The opinions of Denton and Schifter nevertheless are not the

result of major research concerned specifically with the problems of
labor organizations.

However, the amount of Costa Rican social sci-

ence literature dealing exclusively with either the development of
labor unionism or the nature of the labor relations system would seem
to vindicate Schifter's criticism.

Even in Costa Rica, too little

attention has been devoted to this aspect of political development.
Nevertheless some major works, which have been concerned with various
aspects of labor relations, have produced valuable results.

Vladimir

de la Cruz has written an important historical work that focuses on

the early development of labor organizations and the corresponding

emergence of class antagonisms.

In an equally important investiga-

tion, James Backer traced the interest of the Catholic Church in the

social question, and provided a thorough account of Church inspired
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labor unionism in Costa Rica.

Where the juridical integration of

labor organizations has been concerned, Bernardo Van der Laat has

written an article-by-article critique of Labor Code prohibitions
on the right to strike.

Outside of these investigations, the most

important studies have consisted of historical works that have made

passing reference to the role of labor organizations in the rebellion
of 1948.
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The research of de la Cruz, Backer, and Van der Laat, have

produced much in terms of the reaction of early nineteenth century
Costa Rican governments to the emergence of labor organization, as

well as current prohibitions on labor activity.

No less importantly,

the historical literature that has been concerned with the rebellion
of 1948,

as well as the testimony of Denton and Schifter,

seem to

support the hypothesis that the Costa Rican labor movement reached
its peak of development, in terms of organization and high level

decision-making input, in the years immediately preceding the rebellion of 1948; and that since then, its size, its independence, and
in general, its ability to participate freely and effectively in a

democratic decision-making process, has declined sharply.

The Framework of Analysis

With these interpretations in mind, the task of this research
is

to identify the points of contact between labor and structures of

integration, then to analyse the nature of that integration in deter-

mining the restrictions or lack of restrictions on labor's participation.

Three structures of integration are considered in the
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analysis:

the Labor Code, government ministries
and tripartite pub-

lic institutions, and political parties.

Where Costa Rican labor legislation is concerned
the most im-

portant subjects of consideration are requirements
on the initiation
of collective conventions,

limitations on the use of the strike, the

consequences of failure to gain juridical approval
for union activities,

the manner in which the code is interpreted
by the labor courts,

and in general terms the extent and consequences
of government involve-

ment in the resolution of labor-management conflicts.

With regard to the centralized ministries, the independence
of
labor is analyzed in terms of the procedures required of
unions
in the process of formation,

the incentives for gaining official recog-

nition and the consequences of failure to gain official status, the
function of financial assistance to labor organizations, the role of
the Ministry of Labor in the resolution of labor-management disputes,

and the possible confluence of interest between public functionaries
and management.
As far as tripartite public institutions are concerned, par-

ticipation capability is analyzed in terms of the number of seats
made available to labor in the various directive bodies, especially
in relation to the number of seats that are made available to busi-

ness and government representatives, the selectorate responsible for
the placement of labor delegates and the methods of delegate selection,

the decision-making discretion of government delegates, and the possi-

ble confluence of interest between government and business delegates.
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The ability of labor to participate
effectively in political

parties is determined in a way similar to labor's
participation in
tripartite autonomous institutions.
clude:

Objects of consideration in-

labor's voice in the formulation of party
programs, selection

methods for party leaders and electoral candidates,
and the number
of labor leaders in the governing organs of
the parties in question.
As an indicator of labors ability to influence
both party decision-

making and public policy, a no less important subject
of consideration is the success,

through their political party contacts, that

labor organizations have had in affecting legislative actions.
The following preview indicates that the research is basically

divided into two parts.

Chapters two and three are concerned with

the historical development of the Costa Rican labor union structure

and the present distribution of labor forces.

One of the objects

here is to determine the causes and effects of the 1948 rebellion in

relation to the development of the Costa Rican labor union movement.
For this reason a great deal of attention has been given to the germin-

ation of class confrontation in the first part of the twentieth century, and its crystalization in the alignment of political forces
in the decade of the 1940s.

In this connection a considerable degree

of importance has been attributed to the immediate and long-range

effects of the alliance between the Catholic Church, the Marxist Popular

Vanguard Party, and the National Republican Party of Dr. Rafael Angel
Calderon Guardia.
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The second part of the research is concerned
with the form
and the effects of the formal and informal
relationships that exist

between organized labor and certain structures of
integration that
have an important bearing on the ability of labor to
function in-

dependently and participate effectively in an ostensibly
democratic
political system.

Chapter IV is concerned with the manner in which

Costa Rican labor legislation protects labor liberties, and
either

encourages or prohibits independent union activity.

The last part

of this chapter includes three case studies that describe how
free-

dom of action is conditioned by the way in which labor statutes are
interpreted.

Chapter V opens with an analysis of the nature and the

effects of the relationship between labor organizations and the

Ministry of Labor and continues with

a

discussion of the form and

quality of labor participation in the tripartite directive organs of
four autonomous institutions.

Finally Chapter VI will examine the

formal structural relationships between labor organizations and two

political parties:

Liberation Party.

the Popular Vanguard Party and the National

Apart from this, considerable attention has been

given to the balance of power between conservative and progressive

leaders in the PLN, and the effects of informal labor-party relationships

.

Without question, this study is not intended to be the final

word on the ability of Costa Rican labor organizations

to

either func-

tion freely, or participate effectively in important decision-making

structures.

It is hoped, however,

that the investigation will raise
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important questions about the quality of Costa Rican democracy,
questions which will both help to condition or change current
conception
of Costa Rican government and politics, and provide material
for fu-

ture research.

.
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CHAPTER

II

THE SOCIAL STRUGGLE BEFORE 1948

The development of the Costa Rican labor movement
was not

immediately accompanied by the establishment of
juridical or bureaucratic mechanisms that intended either to protect working
class interests or control labor union activities.

It was only after communist

labor organizers had established a strong union movement
on United

Fruit Company properties that any serious legal attempts were
made
to recognize the existence of a labor union movement,

the parameters of union activity.

and to define

However, the subsequent implemen-

tation of constitutional amendments recognizing basic labor rights,
and the Costa Rican Labor Code, rather than being viewed as legal

mechanisms of control and cooptation, were considered to be radical
innovations that were calculated to transform social and economic
structures in a way that would disrupt the power of agricultural,
commercial, and industrial groups.

The role of Marxist elements in

the formulation of what was seen to be radical labor legislation,

the influence of communist party functionaries in Costa Rican govern-

ments between 1943 and 1948, and the prospect of further radical

reform in the following presidential administration precipitated a

coalition of conservative and progressive opposition forces that
dedicated itself to the removal of Marxist elements from positions
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of power.

Circumstances surrounding the rebellion of 1948
indicate

that the Costa Rican labor union movement,
after having been either

ignored or repressed by a series of liberal
governments in the 1920s
and 1930s, had achieved an unprecedented level
of influence which

would not be reconstituted in the period after
1948.

Early Unionization

The first Costa Rican labor organizations, were
created around
the middle of the nineteenth century for the purpose
of mutual aid.

Some of the earliest of these guild associations were the
Societies
of Aid, organized by a group of craftworkers for the purpose
of provid-

ing assistance to incapacitated workers;

the Society of Artisans, a

professional association that established savings accounts, schools,
clubs, and libraries; and the Mutual Society of Bakers, organized with
the participation of both workers and employers.

Outside of some

isolated activities by European immigrants involved in the construction of the Atlantic railroad, labor organizations in the nineteenth

century did not venture to defend their socioeconomic interests either
by questioning a political and economic system that served capitalist

interests, or by challenging employers who enjoyed virtually unlimited

control over factory or farm work forces.

1

An interest in the excesses of capitalism, the exploitation
of the working classes, and the feasibility of labor organizations
as a means of self-defense was first expressed in the 1890s when

Bishop Augosto Thiel Hoffman published "El justo salario de los
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jornaleros y otros puntos de actividad que relacionan con
la situation
de los destituidos de bienes de fortuna."

Bishop Thiel recognized

the inflationary tendency created by external economic
dependence

and the financial burdens this placed on the laboring classes.

In

his publication Thiel emphasized the Christian right to financial

renumeration sufficient for the support of a worker and family, and
suggested that government should take an active part in protecting

workers from the abuses of capitalism.

Toward this end he proposed

the creation of a joint commission of workers and employers that would

have the responsibility of regulating salaries, and he justified the

creation of labor organizations as a means of socioeconomic selfdefense

.

Thiel

's

interest in the problems of the working classes has

been seen to be motivated primarily by a desire to create a political

organization powerful enough to unseat a liberal government that was
responsible for a series of anti-clerical legislation that severely
limited Church activities.

With the intention of building a base of

support among day laborers and artisans, he formed the Catholic Union
Party:

a

short-lived electoral vehicle based upon the liberal papal

encyclical "Rerum Novarum." 2

Despite his motives, and the brief

history of the Catholic Union, Thiel can be credited with having been
the first spokesman of popular interests, and the first critic of a

political and economic system that served the interests of the Costa
Rican coffee oligarchy.

His opinions on economic dependence, the

social responsibility of employers, and the role of the state in

.
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insuring the well-being of the working classes
would be recalled two
decades later when increasingly severe social
problems called into

being a more permanent opposition to the liberal
state.

Although Thiel's activities failed to win anything
concrete
for the laboring classes, either in terms of
organization or economic

benefits, economic and demographic changes between the
end of the

nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century
created
an urgency for social reform and an incentive for the
development of

labor organizations.

The population of Costa Rica increased from

146,000 in 1870 to 300,000 in 1900.

At the same time the concentra-

tion of coffee production combined with a fall in coffee prices cre-

ated a new class of propertyless workers, and an excess labor supply
that produced both an exodus from the country and a high degree of

unemployment in the cities.

Out of this crisis the League of Workers

was organized in September 1900 in order to support the candidacy of

legislative deputies sensitive to the interests of the working classes
However, owing to compromises with traditional parties, the League

accomplished little; but around the same time, other organizations sue
as

the Union of Carpenters, and the Union of Bakers were created in

1905 along with the Union of Shoemakers, the Union of Bricklayers,

and the Union of Typographers.

The purpose of these organizations,

in contrast to the guilds of the latter nineteenth century, was to

defend worker socioeconomic interests by demanding concessions from
employers

3

By the beginning of the twentieth century labor leaders had

gained valuable organizational experience, and, owing to contact with
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European immigrants, they had begun to develop an
awareness of contradictions between the factors of production.

Also important in

this connection was the creation of the Centre
Germinal (Promotion

Center), an educational institution dedicated to the
purpose of

"imparting a sociological vision" to workers.

4

This combination of

developments contributed to the union of several labor groups
in
the General Confederation of Workers (CGT)

a conflict oriented

:

organization, created in 1913, that established shorter work days,

higher wages, and checks on inflation as its principal objectives.
The confederation stated that,

The union of the workers is an imperative necessity in
order to accomplish objectives that are not within the
reach of isolated groupings.
The union of different
groups of workers requires the creation of a representative body as much to direct difficult labors and to
solve problems that damage the interests of our class
as to provide an awareness of public subjects that
are of interest to the collectivity. 5

The CGT draws significance from two facts.

It was the first large

combative labor union in Costa Rican history.

In that sense, it

offered itself as a possible counterweight to the power exercised by
employers.

No less importantly, it brought a higher degree of organ-

ization to a labor movement which up to that time was noteworthy only
for its disorganization and isolated activities.
a

much higher stage of organizational development.

It thus represented
6

The existence of a class consciousness, as well as the capacity
of labor to coordinate activities, was demonstrated when the carpenters

.
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and cabinetmakers of San Jose initiated a
strike at the beginning
of 1920.

On January 26, shopworkers, dissatisfied
with salary re-

ductions, submitted a petition for higher salaries
and an eight hour

workday, and served notice that a strike would
commence on February
in the event of non-compliance.
the strike was initiated.

2

With the rejection of the petition

During the course of the day, workers

paraded before other factories in San Jose exhorting employees
to join
Shortly after the movement was initiated twenty-five factories
repre-

senting a variety of industries were closed down, as more than one
thousand workers demanded higher wages and shorter workdays.

The CGT

declared its solidarity, and helped sustain the strike by providing

material support.

On February

4,

after an audience with the President

the government decreed an eight hour workday and a twenty percent

increase in salaries

7

With drastically different results the Workers Federation of

Limon declared a general strike in protest of low salaries and a
United Fruit Company cost-cutting policy that involved a massive
release of workers.

The company refused to concede and asked for

protection of company property.

The government dispatched security

forces which promptly arrested strike leaders and burned down federation headquarters.

The CGT once again declared its solidarity with

striking workers and contributed valuable financial assistance until
a

border dispute with Panama prompted the confederation to recommend

a

termination of the movement.

8

27

Paralleling the emergence of labor-management
conflicts in
the early 1920s

two important reform movements were created
that

would have an enduring effect on Costa Rican labor
development.
The first was the Centro Socialista (Socialist Center),
instituted

by Marxist Aniceto Montero in 1919.

Montero studied Marxian

Socialism in Europe and returned with the determination that
Costa
Rica would follow Europe down the path of socialism.

He called for

reductions in the price of ^ood and manufactured items, reduction
in interest rates,

lower taxes, display of all international agree-

ments, and a government returned to the people.

His long range

revolutionary goals were expressed in this way:

The people of Europe are challenging the foundation of the
old society.
The fire of reform is invading the universe
and it is necessary that we too study and solve our social
problems
The movement is sure.
The reactionary
bourgeoisie is met by the rebellion of the proletariat,
precursor of the revolution; to the despotism from above,
the heroism from below
for private property,
expropriation
The nation asks for social reform
Costa Rica is arising from the ashes of a shameful past,
thanks to the orientation that socialism is giving to the
popular forces of the nation. 9
.

.

.

.

.

Montero'

s

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

ideas however, would not have as much impact on the labor

movement of the 1920s

as they would on a generation of labor

leaders that would emerge in the 1930s.
The second important movement had its roots in the progressive

papal encyclical "Rerum Novarum" and the Catholic Union Party of

Bishop Augosto Thiel.

Father Jorge Volio first showed an interest

in social reform in 1902 when he established the Catholic periodical

:
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"La Justicia Social."

Volio's criticism of the capitalist system

soon passed beyond the endurance of a conservative
ecclesiastical

authority and he renounced his vows in order
more actively.

to

pursue social reform

Volio indicted Costa Rican government and society

in these terms

This democracy is a farce, that the rich should devour
the poor
who agonize in poverty, hoping that they will be given
crumbs
out of compassion, as though they had been given souls
out of
compassion, as though they were less than dogs. 10

Despite the tone of his rhetoric, Volio's reform proposals did not

contain the fundamental changes propounded by Montero, although, as
one writer commented, his thinking ranged far beyond that which would
fall within the realm of respectability for a Christian of that
epoch.

11

Nevertheless his ideas were firmly based upon the principles

of Christian democracy as they had been expressed in the papal

encyclicals of the preceding century.

Unlike Montero

's

Centro Socialista the ideas of Volio would

have a much more profound effect on the immediate structure of Costa

Rican labor.

At least during the 1920s

his political movement suc-

ceeded in establishing itself in the minds of the Costa Rican laboring class as the embodiment of progress and the mechanism of social

redemption.

His influence among Costa Rican labors was most strikingly

revealed when on January 25, 1923, the General Confederation of

Workers took the decision to dissolve the confederation and form
the Reformist Party with Volio as its head.

12

The party program,
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published one month later, stated that the
inefficiency of personalist
groups inhibited the progress of the nation
by producing a wave of

corruption that saturated Costa Rican government
from top to bottom.
Political leaders lacked vision, and as a
result, government lacked
vision.

More importantly, the party accused Costa
Rican governments

of provoking a crisis in political life
through their complicity with

the privileged classes.

This called for the creation of a well-

organized and permanent political party that would
replace idols with
ideas.

The reformista policy platform possessed fifteen
points in-

cluding the introduction of the referendum as a
constitutional right,
laws covering workers accidents, municipal autonomy as
a means of en-

couraging communal development, political rights for foreign
residents,

correction houses for minors, the nationalization of subsoil and all
natural wealth,

the devolution to the state of all land left unculti-

vated for more than fifteen years, intensification of rural education,
the expropriation of land needed for public use, the construction of

centers of popular culture, the creation of cooperative societies,
the condemnation of houses deemed uninhabitable, agrarian reform, and
the promise to pursue social reform without compromising principles

for the sake of political alliances.

13

This basic party policy of rejecting any and all political

alliances was ignored in 1924 when Volio, as the reformista presidential candidate was sent against liberal candidates Ricardo Jimenez

Oreamuno and Alberto Echandi Montero.

A deadlock among the three candi-

dates prompted Volio to enter into a compromise with Jimenez.

Volio

30

supported a move to make Jimenez president
with the promise that

reformistas would be appointed to the posts of
Secretary of Education and Secretary of Development, and the
assurance that Jimenez

would support certain reformista reform proposals.
seemed to have represented

a

The agreement

victory for social reformism but in

forming the alliance Volio abandoned the party
principal of nonalliance.

Again in the presidential campaign of 1927, Volio

agreed to support the liberal National Union Party under
Cleto

Gonzalez Viquez in exchange for acknowledgement of the
reformista

program and the promise that Viquez would encourage social reform.

11*

The compromises made by Volio disillusioned the rank and
file
of the Reformist Party.

A movement that had begun with great aspir-

ation failed to produce enough in terms of concrete benefits to sustain the image that it was the only party that was capable of satis-

fying the needs and desires of the working class.

In the early 1930s

the communist party began to challenge the Reformist Party for con-

trol of the progressive movement.

By betraying its social convic-

tions through the collaboration with conservative candidates, the

party left itself vulnerable to communist deputies who never hesitated to draw attention to the legislative ineffectiveness of Volio
and to the lack of ideological clarity to which these failures were

attributed.
dates,

Largely owing to its collaboration with liberal candi-

the party rapidly declined after 1928.

Other reasons account-

ing for its dissolution were associated with the timing of its

emergence and its policy program.

In the first place,

the campesinos,
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who were still insulated from the radical
thought of Aniceto Montero'
Centro Socialista, as well as the
anarcho-syndicalist ideas brought
over by European immigrants, were not ready
to accept new ideas.

One writer commented that the Costa Rican
people at that time didn't

want to think about change, national renovation,
or revolution.
Also,

15

there was a lack of understanding between Volio
and the ecclesi

astical hierarchy.

Even though Volio had strong Catholic sentiments,

he never succeeded in winning the support of the
Church.

Furthermore

from the right, Volio was opposed by both the cafetaleros,
and an

emerging class of industrialists who committed their support to
the
liberal administrations of Jimenez and Viquez.
left,

Finally, from the

the party was heavily criticized by a newly created communist

organization which viewed the Reformist Party as

a

basically bourgeoi

movement that obscured the fundamental conflict between employers and
the state on one hand, and the workers on the other hand.

16

Nevertheless the importance of the Reformist Party in the development of Costa Rican labor should not be underestimated.

Most

importantly, the party was the first reasonably stable political

movement to challenge the foundations of a liberal political, and
economic system.

17

There was little in the reformista critique of

capitalism that differed from the old Catholic Union, but Volio
was much more dedicated to the task of reform than Augosto Thiel.
Because the movement was able to survive over a decade, through
several presidential elections, it can be considered to be Costa

Rica's first progressive, if not radical political party.

By virtue
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of its relatively long life,

the party was able to publicize the

inequalities of Costa Rican society much more
profoundly than any

movement that had existed up to that time.

Secondly, and no less

importantly, the dissolution of the party,
provided the opportunity
for the communist party to establish a
dominion over the social re-

form movement.
Despite his failure to win either the presidency
or a legislative majority for his party, several important
reforms emerged
from the 1920s
efforts.

and early 1930s

that can be attributed to Volio's

An eight hour workday was established, along with
minimum

wages; accident insurance was instituted; and perhaps
most importantly,

the office of Secretary of State for Labor Affairs was
cre-

ated in 1928.

The creation of the labor office at least represented

the recognition of labor as a social group that either
deserved some

form of representation, or merited some form of control.

Previously

there was no constitutional or institutional acknowledgement of labor

organizations.

As one historian noted, the relationship between

the working classes and government was practically non-existent.

18

The Economic Crisis of the 1930s

Between 1920 and 1929 Costa Rica enjoyed a period of economic
prosperity.

Although the price of coffee declined on the interna-

tional market after 1927, production levels, except for one dramatic

decline in 1923, registered a fairly steady climb.

At the same time,

foreign exchange earnings for the decade more than tripled.
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TABLE

COSTA RICA:

Years

1

COFFEE EXPORTS IN KILOS AND DOLLARS, 1920-1929 19

Crop in Kilos

1920-1921

Dollars

13,336,381

3,835,134.88

1921-1922

18,616,803

6,677,760.00

1922-1923

11,088,400

4,709,136.42

1923-1924

18,210,760

8,427,472.52

1924-1925

15,352,863

8,403,354.16

1926-1926

18,249,045

10 623 969 39

1926-1927

16,153,980

10,611,178.76

1927-1928

18,841,798

12,379,558.38

1928-1929

19,676,115

12,225,517.66

However,

1930s

the repercussions of the world economic crisis of the

were dramatic, most particularly between 1930 and 1932.

De-

spite a modest increase in production between 1932 and 1933, the

price of coffee showed a consistent decline, except for a partial

recovery between 1933 and 1934.
accordingly.

Foreign exchange earnings declined

Furthermore while coffee production never fell below

the 1928 level,

dollar earnings between 1938 and 1939 were scarcely

higher than the revenues from the 1920-1921 crop.
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TABLE

COSTA RICA:

2

COFFEE EXPORTS IN KILOS AND DOLLARS, 1929-1939 20

Crop
Year

in Kilos

Dollars

Price
Der Kilo

1929-19 30

23,536,645

10,419,445.96

0.41

1930-1931

23,014,687

10,115,640.58

0.41

1931-1932

18,499,038

5,

395,069.40

0.27

1932-1933

27,777,939

7,971,117.41

0.27

1933-1934

19,062,662

7.516 406 32

u

.

Jo

1934-1935

24,238,534

5,541,018.06

0.27

1935-1936

21, 326,158

5,089,961.94

0.27

1936-1937

26,519,984

6,106,026.00

0.27

1937-1938

24,981,132

4,938,053.00

0.23

1938-1939

20,244,531

4,644,401.00

0.26

The crisis in coffee earnings was paralleled by a disaster in
the banana sector.

Production, which had been declining since 1913

was practically wiped out by Panama disease.

Except for a recovery

between 1924 and 1926, production decreased until 1937 and again after
1938.

The United Fruit Company subsequently transferred its opera-

tions to the Pacific Coast, thus precipitating a serious unemployment

crisis in the Atlantic region.
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COSTA RICA:

1

BANANA EXPORTS, NUMBER OF BUNCHES AND DOLLARS, 1920-1939"

Year

Bunches

1920

8,652,473

Dollars

H

,
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,

4U6

8.318 581
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1922

7.171 619
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1927

7,869,175

5
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1928

7,
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5

49? 611

1929

6,112,170

k

584

1

1930

5,834,045

4

175

S

19 31

5,079,944

3

174 965

1932

4,313,379

2

450 784

1933

4,293,383

1

981

1934

3,210,169

1

602 106

1935

2.908 836

1,493,512

1936

3,887,677

2,073,163

1937

5,509,673

3,049,969

1938

5,033,424

2,806,547

19 39
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1921

1924
1925
1926

,

ZUU j4j
ni
4U1

n^ c
0 ,Udj

,

,

zoi

,

,

t ZU , Do

/,

/

zy

8R1

27

561

.

36

The economic crisis affected both importers
and the state

apparatus, whose operations depended largely on
funds derived from
customs duties.

The government was consequently forced to
take a

series of remedial measures including a three
year suspension of
the American and English debt, the emission of
bonds, and a restric-

tion of credit.

The most significant social consequences of the

crisis were increases in the rates of unemployment, and
a corresponding increase in human suffering.

In 1932 the number of unemployed

reached 8,863 or about six percent of the economically active
population.

This however did not take into account the large number of under

employed, for which there are no statistics. 22

These developments,

by sharpening class antagonisms, encouraged popular receptivity to

social and political criticism,

and provided communist party organ-

izers with an opportunity to mobilize the vast numbers of unemployed
and underemployed, who constituted a new forum for radical Marxist

rhetoric
The communist party was organized in 1931 by Manuel Mora and

Jaime Cerdas under the name the Bloque De Obreros Y Campesinos (Worker
and Farmer's Block).

Its historical antecedents go back to the Centro

Socialista of Aniceto Montero, but it was more directly inspired by
the Revolutionary Association of Worker Culture (ARCO), an educa-

tional association founded in 1929 by Gonzalo Montero Berry for the

purpose of disseminating socialist ideals.

The association evolved

into a center for Marxist studies that became the nucleus of the com-

munist party.

Also important was the CGT, which although part of

Volio's Reformist Party came increasingly under communist influence.

.
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Shortly after the party was organized, Mora and
Cerdas began organizing workers in the banana zone.

Despite company opposition, govern-

ment suspicion of communists, and ethnic divisions
among workers,

Mora and Cerdas managed to create the General
Union of Workers on

United Fruit Company property.
the Bloque. 23

The UGT would become the core of

In fact the entire zone would become the exclusive

dominion of communist labor organizations for decades
to come.
The Bloque' s first program demonstrated a radical revolutionary position, and an implaceable opposition to reformism
that was

reflected in a sharp indictment of Volio's Reformist Party:

Reformism says that the redemption of the worker can be obtained
gradually as capitalists made concessions; communism sustains
that these concessions must be wrested from capitalism.
That is
the difference in theory.
In practice, your Party, in addition
to having no ideological orientation, would be a good example:
ten years of parliamentarianism without any practical result for
the workers, ten years of shameful collusion with the monied
classes 2 k

The Bloque attributed social injustice to a dependent and semi-

colonial economy that was controlled by the United States and England,
The solution to this state of affairs called for the abolition of

private property, and the socialization of the means of production.
At the same time however,
a long

these goals were understood to be part of

range plan that would be achieved only after a social revolu-

tion had occurred in the large industrialized nations.
its

As part of

short range plan, the party developed an extensive policy pro-

gram that included the creation of worker and peasant councils; the

38

creation of a social security system that would provide
funds for
unemployment, accidents, sickness, old age, and maternity;
abolition
of work for children under fifteen, and the regulation
of working

conditions for women— along with equal pay for men and women
performing similar functions; the obligation of work for
everyone over
eighteen; an eight hour workday for non-burdensome work and a
six

hour workday for people involved in unusually difficult jobs such
as mining;

a minimum wage board controlled by workers and peasants;

public housing; public health facilities; the expropriation of un-

cultivated land;

the nationalization of the means of transportation;

increased state intervention in economic and social matters; the

nationalization of subsoils; state control of utilities; tax reform;
and importantly, laws guaranteeing labor rights.

25

The revolutionary proposals of the Bloque and the efforts
that were being devoted to the organization of the labor force pro-

voked a two-pronged response from the Ricardo Jimenez government:
the repression of what were judged to be communist inspired labor

demonstrations, and direct government involvement in the solution of
labor disputes.

The combination of those two countermeasures under-

scored a carrot and stick approach to labor unrest.

The extent and

nature of labor activities, and even the right of labor organizations
to exist,

depended entirely on the disposition of governments which

before 1940, usually interpreted worker demonstrations as threats
to the social peace.

The flowering of Costa Rican laissez-faire

liberalism, as historian Oscar Aquilar Bulgarelli has noted, occurred

39

during the administrations of Gonzalez Viquez
and Ricardo Jimenez,
who, in addition to being the leaders of
public opinion between 1906

and 1936, were the principal defenders of
the upper classes.

26

Along with its clamor for recognition, and the
independent

development of organizations that presumed to channel
and articulate
the demands of labor,

there was a corresponding attempt on the part

of Costa Rican government to establish itself
as the patrimonial

caretaker of the working classes, a tactic whigh might
be seen to
be designed to counteract the influence of frequently
radical labor

leaders.

Consequently, the consistent use of repressive measures

against labor organizers and leaders, along with an occasional and

partial acceptance of worker demands, distinguished itself as the

most important feature of labor disputes.

The immediate commitment

of security forces during strikes and demonstrations, arrests fol-

lowed by direct appeals to executive power, presidential audiences,
and executive decrees became routine strike resolution practices.
A wave of labor unrest associated with the effects of the world

depression demonstrated this sequence of action.

In 1933, unem-

ployed San Jose workers initiated a demonstration.

were immediately dispatched.

Security forces

Clashes occurred after which police

opened fire in an attempt to disperse workers.

At the same time,

communist party leaders and labor organizers were arrested, communist
clubs and offices were closed; and a government order prohibited the

formation of groups larger than two.
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In a much more serious confrontation
at the beginning of 1934,

workers in San Jose issued an ultimatum
to the owner of La Renaciente
shoe factory.

Production decreases between 1930 and 1934
prompted

management to initiate a three day work week

Salaries were reduced

forty percent and many workers had been fired.

At the same time,

the cost of living had increased, and the
lack of government action

permitted the development of deplorable living
conditions.

Manage-

ment on this occasion had reduced the salary of
an individual worker;
however factory workers, supposing the reduction to
be general, sub-

mitted a petition expressing three points:
was financially unbearable;

that the salary reduction

that the lack of forewarning was unjust;

and that the salary reduction should be removed.

was ignored, shoe workers went on strike.

28

When the letter

The movement in its

initial stages involved four hundred workers from La Renaciente
factory, but participation was broadened with the involvement of

workers from other shoe factories who had presented similar demands.
Shortly after the movement was initiated, the shoeworkers of Limon
sent a message of solidarity, and the Federation of Graphic Arts

Workers provided financial support.

29

The Secretary of the Department of the Interior granted an

audience with strike leaders who complained that while hours and
salaries had been reduced, factory owners had not lowered the price
of shoes.

30

In this instance,

the President encouraged factory

owners to partially accept worker demands; but with the refusal of

employers to either remove the salary reduction or negotiate with

worker representatives the movement
continued and subsequently expanded with the participation of shoe
workers in Grecia, San Ramon,

Guadalupe and Cartago.

By February 10

the Tapia, Bravo, Brenes,

Carlos Guevara, and Francisco Hernandez
shoe factories capitulated
to worker demands.

One week later the shoe workers in
Cartago and

Guadalupe triumphed, raising the number
of shops
demands to twenty-five.
refused to capitulate.

31

By February 17,

to

accept worker

only four establishments

La Renaciente factory, where the strike

originated, was the last to accede to worker
demands.
The Bloque De Obreros Y Campesinos was
instrumental in pro-

viding financial support and organization in the
shoe worker strike.
Later that year

it

led the banana workers of Limon in a major cam-

paign against the United Fruit Company.

The immediate cause of the

strike was the silence of the company to a list of demands
submitted
by labor leader Carlos Luis Fallas.

A strike was called involving

ten thousand workers that paralyzed the entire industry.

An accord

was reached between the Jimenez government, the workers, and the

company, but when United Fruit failed to comply with the agreement,
the strike was reinitiated.

32

The list of worker demands included

salary increases, hourly wages for dock workers, payment every two
weeks, free housing, provision of tools, the application of work acc
dent laws, emergency medical treatment, parity between commissary

store prices, and local store prices, annulment of the banana contract with the Jimenez government, elimination of coupons as a means
of payment,

and the recognition of the Union of Atlantic Workers, as

42

well as all other unions.
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Jimenez dispatched troops.

With the commencement of the new
strike,

Violent confrontations occurred between

strikers and government forces.
up,

The movement was eventually broken

but not before workers were able to
gain some minor concessions

including higher salaries, to be paid through
wages or by contract;
payment by the month, with the right to ask
for advances; company

housing on fincas with work camps; transferral
of sick workers to
hospitals in Limdn or San Jose; construction of
emergency clinics
on each finca; price parity between commissary
stores and local
stores, along with the construction of new
commissary facilities;

prohibition of company reduction of the value of coupons
awarded to
workers; preferential treatment for Costa Rican workers;
and the

recognition of the Union of Atlantic Workers.

34

Four years later the

United Fruit Company transferred its operations to the Pacific
Coast, but almost immediately Bloque labor organizers were
instru-

mental in the formation of the Federation of Pacific Banana Workers.
Despite the frequent use of public security forces to break
up strikes, and the internment of communist labor organizers,

the

Jimenez administration was much more tolerant of union activities
than the subsequent administration of Leon Cortes.

Historian Manuel

Rojas Bolanos asserted that increased state economic intervention

after 1936 was paralleled by increased repression of popular forces.
During the Cortes administration, various measures were taken to
induce an economic revival.

The International Bank was converted

into the National Bank of Costa Rica, and the superintendency of
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banks was created for the purpose of
regulating capital, reserves,

and credits of private banks.

35

But during the same administration

union leaders were frequently interned,
and rank and file union members were fired by public order.
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Catholicism and the Social Question
Owing to the conservatism of the Catholic
hierarchy after

Augosto Thiel, the Church paid only enough attention
to the social
struggle to condemn any attempts to enflame class
antagonisms.
so doing,

In

the communist party had become the unchallenged
leader of

the social reform movement.

The success of the Bloque in mobilizing

popular support led to a rethinking of the social role of the
Catholic
Church.

The Church hierarchy didn't show a serious interest in labor

organizations until the tenure of Archbishop, Victor Manuel Sanabria

Martinez in 1940, but a concern for the deprivation of the lower
classes began to emerge from the rank and file clergy in the early
1920s.

In 1923 Padre Carlos Meneses asserted that:

the actual times ask that a priest know how to defend the
economic interests of his parishioners.
If a priest doesn't
know how to organize a union or point out the general bases
for a rural union, or a consumer cooperative, or a society safe
from the accidents of work, to the most steadfast of his
parishioners, sooner or later, will come the socialists and
they will know how to do as atheists what couldn't be done by
priests. 38

In August of 1924 Padre Manuel Zavaleta recognized the rising cost
of living and the need for higher salaries.

He expressed particular

concern for the rural worker, who he insisted, did not receive

a

.

44

sufficient salary.

He stated that the workers could
accomplish their

objectives through organization and the
use of strikes.

In September

of the same year, Padre Matias
Cornelio Rojas called attention to

the utility of the non-conflict
oriented labor organizations that

had been emphasized in the encyclical
Rerum Novarum, and pointed out
the importance of savings accounts
and societies of mutual aid.

In

November 1924, Padre Carlos Borge spoke of
papal justifications of

worker organizations, and like Rojas,
supported the idea of mutual
aid societies.

Moreover, he lamented the image the Church had
as

an enemy of the people.

The next month Padre Emeterio Martinez indi-

cated the importance of agrarian unions, and
especially mixed unions,
as a means of incorporating people into Catholic
life.
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The more vocal of these socially critical priests,
especially

Carlos Meneses, were scolded by the Catholic hierarchy,
but during
the course of the 1930s when the Bloque established
itself as a major

social movement, emphasis was placed upon the need to create
some

form of organization that could offset communist influence.

Never-

theless in 1931 Padre Alfredo Hidalgo attacked the Bloque program

saying that it upset the order created by God.

He defended private

property, and social hierarchy, and asserted that because there would

always be poor people, communist revolutionary propaganda deceived
the people by raising false hopes.

Hidalgo's opinions, as James

Backer has noted, reflected the maintenance of conservative attitudes

within the Church hierarchy.

No reference was made to the need for

any type of positive action, and a strong emphasis was placed on

resignation and passive acceptance

k 0
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A few years later however El Mensajero Del
Clero

began to show

a greater interest in Catholic social
responsibility and Catholic

social organization.

In 1935,

la question social,"

attention was given to an employer's responsi-

in an article entitled "Lecciones sobre

bility for the well-being of contracted workers.

Employers were ex-

pected to respect the human dignity of employees, and
not make slaves
out of their own brothers.

They were seen to have an obligation to

provide financial renumeration sufficient for a workers family

and a

moral commitment not to injure the poor either through violence,
fraud,
or usury.

It was also stated that work loads should not exceed
the

capacity of workers either in intensity or duration.

The length of a

workday depended on the tasks that were being performed.

In this con-

nection, women and minors merited especially favorable conditions.

1

*

1

In 1936 Jose Miglia published an article attesting to the social

function of wealth.

Asserting that the wealthy must use their money

in a way that would do the greatest amount of good for the greatest

amount of people, Miglia argued that capital could be considered

to

be used justly when it satisfied the necessities of the people, and

unjustly when workers were given to extreme necessity.

Miglia also

proposed limits on private property, and suggested that while small

property should be encouraged, the power of acquisition should be limited.

Moreover, the wealthy had the special responsibility of using

their resources to construct, maintain, and improve public facilities.

Society, Miglia believed, should be constructed in a way that would

permit everyone to enjoy a relative well-being

2
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One year later El Mensajero Del
Clero published a commentary

justifying the existence of labor
organizations, asserting that they
were a product of and necessity in
contemporary society. At the same
time however a great deal of attention
was given to the need to cre-

ate organizations that would promote
rather than upset social harmony.

Labor organizations, it was stated, had
been converted into

machines which were used in an unjust struggle
that encouraged class
hatred and threatened to destroy society.

Unionism was justifiable

when it was based upon Catholic truth rather
than individualistic
egotism or communist collectivism.

It should be supported not by

class hatred but by justice and love.

The Mensajero proposed an

integral conception of unionism that would

consist in the stable organization of workers in the
same profession, established and governed in accordance with
the principles of faith, Christian morality; that would be an
instrument
of harmony and peace through its use of mixed
committees that
would form a bond between classes.
It would be formed by
Catholics, and would have as its objective the study, promotion,
and defense of worker interests. 3
1*

Labor organizations, it was argued, should at each moment regulate
their actions according to moral principles.

The Church confirmed

the right to form such organizations, separate as well as mixed.

However, it was added,

the Church rejected unlimited individualism

as a concept that damaged the position of the weak.

On the other

hand socialism and communism subjected the individual to the needs
of the state.

This signified a loss of liberty that would inhibit

the development of the personality.

Private property was still
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defended by the Church, although with the
qualification that it should
not be used exclusively for personal
benefit.

Regarding salaries,

employers were obliged to provide a form
of enumeration that would
enable workers to develop personal values.

A relationship of mutual

responsibility that had its basis in the
concepts of solidarity and
brotherhood, was seen to be the only way to
satisfy material needs

without sacrificing spiritual values.

1

*

1
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Throughout the 1930s the Church broached the
subject of labor

organization with reservation, and qualification.

There was a reluc-

tance to address the conflict of interest between
classes and a failure to acknowledge a need for combative worker
organizations.

The

Church recognized the utility of unions but only
reluctantly.

An

emphasis was placed upon solidarity, brotherhood, and mutual
concern

which reflected the conception that there existed a natural
harmony

between classes that was perhaps more fundamental to the question
of
social justice than material well-being.

But after the installation

of Victor Sanabria as Archbishop in 1940,

the Church took a much

more critical view of social relations and began to show a serious
interest in the organization of labor unions.

Santiago Arrieta

Quesada correctly asserted that Sanabria was the only Bishop who

attempted to mold the policies of the Church to the realities of
the modern world.

He believed that the physical world was the instru-

ment of human liberty, and he hoped to mend the breach between the
spiritual and the temporal.

Though firmly anti-communist, he didn't

believe that communism could be combatted through political or legal
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action, but through social justice.

He succeeded Quesada said, in

awakening the interest of the people,
the government, and the Church,
to serious social problems that
required quick solutions. 45

The Catholic-Communist Allian ce
The preceding analysis indicates that
labor had demonstrated
a power capability in the 1930s.

Early in 1934, the shoe industry

of the Central Valley was paralyzed.

Later in the year, banana pro-

duction in the Limon area came to a stop.

Workers showed their unity

through declarations of solidarity, sympathy
strikes, and financial

donations to strike committees.

But despite these demonstrations of

collective action, labor remained in the wings of the
political
system.

Through the course of the century some legislation of a reformist or integrative nature had emerged.

In 1901 minimum wages

were established for workers involved in commerce; in 1912 minimum

wages were established for laborers and servants; compensation for

overtime work was instituted in 1920; a social security office at
the National Bank was established in 1925;

the office of the

Secretary of State for Labor Affairs was created in 1928; minimum
salaries for all occupations were instituted in 1933; in 1936 working conditions were regulated in accordance with age and sex; and
in 1937 employers were obliged to pay workers in cash rather than.

coupons."46

At the same time the Bloque guaranteed some worker

.
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representation in the National Assembly.

Nevertheless the relation-

ship between labor and government had
not been formalized by this

legislation.

Labor was unintegrated juridically,
and for the most

part, politically as well.

Moreover, the informal relationships

that did exist, as the strikes

of the 1920s and 1930s had shown,

were most usually repressive in nature.
to an

However in the 1940s, owing

alliance between Christian and communist forces,
a series of

reforms were introduced that completely changed
the relationship

between labor, employer, and government, at the
same time threatening the power of the cafetalero and emerging
industrial elites.
In 1940 Dr. Rafael Angel Calder6n Guardia came
to power at

the head of a conservative movement that was financed
by members of
the oligarchy.

1+7

But besides being a conservative candidate sup-

ported by capitalist and conservative elements, Calderon enjoyed
immense popularity with the popular classes.

Like Jorge Volio, he

had studied at the Lovaine in Belgium, and having been thoroughly

imbued with the principles of Catholic social justice, maintained
a commitment to the problems of

the lower classes, and a determina-

tion to find a Christian solution to social, political, and economic

inequality

Calderon criticized liberalism for marginalizing the lower
classes and creating a situation of social injustice.

His ideas

were guided by the encyclical Rerum Novarum which held that capitalism,
as the product of a society imbued with liberal political,

economic thinking showed little concern for the weak.

and

Repudiating

laissez-faire capitalism, his thinking
embraced the idea that the
state should have the capacity
to safeguard individual
well-being.
The Costa Rican political, social,
and economic system denied the

majority of people their legitimate,
natural, and legal right to
benefit from natural wealth.
It condemned people, through low
salar
ies and perpetual inflation to
a state of servitude.

thought never implied radical change.

CalderoVs

Jorge Salazar contended that

he was not a revolutionary, but a
reformer who sought to eliminate

social injustice and reduce class
antagonisms by offering Christian
social democracy as an alternative solution
to the social problem.
His thinking blended principles of
Christianity, socialism, and

liberalism.

From Christianity it took the ideas of equality,
jus-

tice, solidarity, peace, harmony, and
social coexistence.

From

socialism it incorporated the ideas of state
intervention; and from
democratic liberalism, the principles of civil liberties,
individual
dignity, and the parliamentary method.

1

*
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Circumstances in the 1940s were propitious for the creation
of a political alliance that would group communist
and non-Marxist

reform movements.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union, and the

substitution of bourgeois liberalism with fascism as the principle
international villain, provoked a change in communist rhetoric and
tactics.

The Bloque softened its criticism of bourgeois democracy,

and suspended its proposals for radical revolutionary change.

cialism became a long-range objective.

So-

The immediate task was to

work within the parliamentary system and collaborate with any
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political movement that was disposed
to initiating reforms
intending
to strengthen the social,

lower classes.

economic and political position of
the

Accordingly Manuel Mora emphasized
the similarities

between Marxist and Christian thinking.

In one address before the

National Assembly he contended that
"socialism is not the enemy of

democracy but a realistic defense for
democracy.- 9

And in a response

to an attack issued by conservative
deputies he asserted:

"It is

upon misery that you are trying to build
the human personality.
The individual can not develop his
potential until his economic

problems have been solved."

"We are not against individualism; we

are against the egotism that passes for
individualism." 50

Mora drew

upon the Christian concept of integral humanism
by making frequent

references to the links between man's material,
moral, and spiritual
needs.

He said:

"We want to free the spirit of man from the
unbear-

able burdens of economic depravation." 51

And in response to the

criticism that socialism was based upon a hierarchical
conception of
political organization, he contended:

"We want hierarchy, but a

moral and spiritual hierarchy, not a hierarchy based upon
gold." 52
At the same time, CalderoVs Catholic social thinking impressed

Sanabria and progressive members of the Church hierarchy.

Upon tak-

ing power El Mensaj ero del Clero stated that:

On the 8th of May of 1940 Costa Rica experienced a legitimate
triumph upon receiving as President the young Dr. don Rafael
Angel Calderon Guardia, elected to the presidency by an immense
majority of the Costa Rican people on the 2nd of February. 53

52

Calder6n, for his part, encouraged
Church support by defeating
anticlerical legislation.
In 1942 he abolished
restrictions on Church
educational activities and legislation
prohibiting the presence of

religious orders.
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Relations between the Church and
the Calderon government were

further strengthened when, between
1941 and 1942, a series of laws

creating the Caja Costarricense de
Seguro Social (Costa Rican Social
Security Institute-CCSS) caused an
erosion of Calderon's conservative support.

The Caja provided insurance for
sickness, maternity,

invalidity, and death.

Its funds were derived from contributions

from workers, employers, and the state.

But in addition to being

an important development in the history
of Costa Rican social reform,
it precipitated a strong reaction
from commercial and agricultural

groups who were afraid of losing paternalistic
control over their

employees, and who were forced to shoulder a
significant financial

burden for the Caja's operations.

James Backer maintained that the

fact that workers now had the right to state
medical assistance

signified that they were no longer compelled to solicit
aid from
their employers.

Nevertheless, Calderon's legislation won the

complete support of Sanabria who considered the creation
of the
Caja to be a concrete expression of Catholic social doctrine.

Shortly after the institute came into existence the Bloque

published its revised political program.

The party called for the

development of national industrial potential; the creation of a
National Council for Industrial Promotion; banking reforms

to

7

.
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facilitate industrial credits at low interest;
the protection of
domestic industry; modification of contracts
with foreign based companies;

the nationalization of public services;
a moratorium on

external debts; the expropriation of uncultivated
land; the creation
of cooperatives;

Labor Code.

limitations on land tenure; and the editing of a

At no point did it criticize the parliamentary
method

or call for reforms calculated to destroy existing
socioeconomic

structures.
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Later that year a group of capitalists visited Manuel

Mora and broached the subject of a possible coup d'etat
against the

Calderon government.

Up to that time relations between the commun-

ist party and Calderon had been cool and it was supposed
that a coup

d'etat might be able to count on Mora's support.

Mora not only re-

jected the idea, he revealed the plans to Calderon and offered to

strengthen his government with the full support of the Bloque de
Obreros Y Campesinos

5

Having committed the support of the Bloque to the Calderon
government, Mora resolved to reduce tensions with the Catholic
Church.

To accomplish this the Bloque was dissolved in 1943 and

the Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) was created in its place.

Mora

then wrote a letter to Sanabria expressing his hope to create a

powerful progressive block, and asking if there was any reason why
Catholics should withhold their collaboration.

5

Sanabria

responded in the following terms:

The Party first decided to dissolve itself as a party, and then
to form a new grouping, that neither in its name nor in its program, contains anything that might signify the word Communist.
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Nor does it pretend to impose a
dictatorship of the proletariat
so stated Mr. Mora two nights
ago, nor is
an enemy of priva^
property nor does it promote, nor
does it persecute religion
0r the
proclaims to be an
IuthenMcall Costa
authentically
r
R 1C an Party, and that its only
objective is
to end misery and ignorance
in Costa Rica.

U

"

Can

I

condemn the new party?

tion, and I
"and"";

2
don't
have them. fi

Later that year Trabajo

,

No, I can't.
And if I were to
Ve
reaS ° nS f ° r that "ndeLa-

the communist party organ, explained
that

"Christian doctrine is not incompatible
with the needs of the workers.

If

the two have ever been separate,

it has been because of

interference from reactionary political forces." 60
Having constituted an alliance between his
own National

Republican Party (PRN)

,

(the Block of Victoria),
a series of

the Popular Vanguard Party and the Church

Calderon announced a proposal to initiate

constitutional amendments.

The Social Guarantees, as

they have been called, both enumerated individual
socioeconomic

rights, and acknowledged the right of the working classes
to act

collectively in the defense of those rights.

Equally importantly,

especially in the long run, the Guarantees named the state as
the

protector of the working classes.

In specific terms the Social

Guarantees declared the responsibility of the state for stimulating
production, and distributing wealth adequately; the family, as the

most fundamental element of society, merited the special protection
of the state; work was declared to be an individual right and a

social obligation.

The state was responsible for providing all citi-

zens with honest, useful, and duly renumerated work that would not
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degrade the individual; all workers
received the right to a mini™
salary that would be fixed periodically;
patrons as well as workers
were given the right to unionize;
collective conventions were given
the force of law; workers had
the right to declare strikes;
workers

fired unjustly had the right to
indemnization;

the state was respon-

sible for encouraging the creation
of cooperatives; labor courts

were established; and the state would
provide low cost housing for
workers.

51

The Guarantees were a prelude to the
much more comprehen-

sive legislation contained in the
Labor Code.

Formulated with the

heavy participation of PVP functionaries
in the Calderon Guardia

government and put into operation on Independence
Day in 1943,
calderonistas, communists, and Catholic workers
launched a demonstration in support of what they called the
second day of independence
for Costa Rican labor.

Integration and Organizational Growth

Owing to a shift in the balance of power in the Catholic hier-

archy in the 1940s, the Church prepared to initiate an intensive
labor

organization drive.
impelling force.

In this connection Archbishop Sanabria was an

His dissatisfaction with the social indifference

of the Catholic Church was expressed in 1938 when he said:

social question!

A word of transcendental value today.

'"The

What has the

Church done to resolve this question and what can it do now.'" 62
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n0t Place itself at the margin
C ° m P lexit
»uch because
'
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It deal
?
fundamental
questions of justice, of charity and
of Christian equality, as because,
message that it is of peace
among men, it is concerned with
anticipating and curing the
causes of dissention among men and
proposing for these grave
S01
to say, the solutionis

of th^

1
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T
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Three years later he made an
unprecedented reference to the right
of workers to demand social justice,
and of the obligation of the

state to assume the responsibility
for the well-being of the lowerclasses.

The workers had the right to demand,
he contended, a form

of renumeration sufficient for the
support of a family.

who imposed too low a salary did violence
to the worker.

The employer
The state

must therefore protect the working class
by directing, urging, and

punishing when necessary.

61*

It is clear that Sanabria's subsequent
organizational initia-

tives were attributable to a serious concern for
the economic deprava-

tion of the lower classes, but it was in large part
a reaction to the

organizational advances of the communist party.

The labor strug-

gles of the 1930s, the repressive measures employed by
the state to

discourage labor activity, as well as the modest gains that had
been
achieved through united action, served both to enhance feelings of
class loyalty, and encourage the sentiment that positive gains could

only be achieved through struggle.

Class and party were replacing

the Church as objects of loyalty, while conflict and militancy were

replacing Christian harmony and brotherhood as bases for collective
action.

.
,
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But if economic depravation and
communist intrusions were

important factors in redirecting Church
thinking, there can be no

doubt that the Social Guarantees and
the Labor Code provided the
stimulus for action.

The constitutional amendments and
the code

integrated labor juridically.

They provided a measure of legitimacy

and legal authorization of unionization
efforts.

A subsequent in-

crease in the number of unions, both Catholic
and communist, is
testimony to the importance of these two
documents.
Between 1942 and 1943 Sanabria ignored conservative
advice
and authorized Padre Benjamin Nunez Vargas to
begin organizing

Catholic labor unions.

At the same time the communist party began

a major organizational drive in the Central
Valley.

The Comite

Nacional Sindical de Enlace (National Union Coordination
Committee)

established at the beginning of 1943, was shortly converted
into the
class conflict oriented Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
(CTCR)

During the same period Nunez created fifteen unions, and in
September
the Center for Costa Rican Unions

— Rerum

Novarum was established

with Nunez as President of the Junta Directiva (Directive Committee).
Nunez stated that the Center was intended to be for people of all

political and religious dispositions.
socialist, but personalist.

It was neither communist nor

Its intention was to communicate ethical

norms and morals that were common to all religions.

Furthermore

it was created not to debilitate class cohesion or to create a basis

of opposition to non-Catholic unions, but to promote cooperation

among workers.

Nevertheless in dedicating itself

to

this task,

7
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religion could not be excluded, inasmuch
as the well-being of the
working classes, Nunez contended,
could not be permanent if action
did not have a religious basis. 65
The Center immediately began
incorporating independent

federations and unions and in April
1944, Center delegates agreed to

establish the Costa Rican Confederation
of Workers-Rerun, Novarum
(CCTRN)
.

to

In May the CCTRN, with five thousand
members belonging

ten federations was officially
constituted for the purpose of

coordinating and amplifying a union of forces in
order to insure the workers of the promotion of their
economic and social
well-being, in defense of the rights, and in
accordance with
Christian principles of social justice. 66

The Constituent Acts of the confederation
professed a respect
for the right of the Catholic Church to intervene
in social affairs,

but the confederation declared its independence
from ecclesiastical

authority and declined

to

promise that it would commit itself to the

Church in the prosecution of its socioeconomic ends.

It asserted

political independence, with the qualification that it would not
be

indisposed to either proposing policies intending to improve the

socioeconomic conditions of the working classes or supporting any
political party of a reformist disposition.

6

In an address to the

General Assembly Sanabria nevertheless asserted that Rerum Novarum

would be guided by Christian principles of social justice.

It was

neither anti-communist, anti-socialist, anti-left, nor anti-red; but

pro-social justice.

Its purpose was to promote spiritual as well

as socioeconomic
interests

a
ASk1
" 8 the «».bership
to accept
•

i

Christian solutions
to the social
S0Clal

1««ion

he asserted:

"The Papal

Encyclical are not
exclusively Catholic
^ or Christ!
Christian Hdocuments
but
numan
documents as well." 68

The agreement that
had heen reached
between Sanabria and
Mora
became the basis tor
for *n
alian alliance between
Catholic
nouc and
a nH communist
„
labor
organizations that consi^PH
consisted of a
synchronization of activities
between the CCTRN and
the CTCR.
CTCR
Rn
Both
confederations agreed to
respect each others
dominance in factor^
factories where
h
unions had already
been established,
while in
iD n0n " un
ed factories,
workers would
choose between the
two confederations
ions.
The loser
In
was then given the

^

m

-Sht

to organize

lionized

f aetor y
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unions-without inter!
ereuce-in another non.

At the same tlme>
the

^

de

dntelligence Committee, was
established in order

to hlunt shoc.s

between conizations
and to facilitate
information
X-

-rms

e xc han g e.

of unity, and
political i n£lu ence,

the period between
and 1 948 must he
considered to he the hi
8 hpoint in Costa Rlc an
labor development.
The labor force was e
q ually divided between two
lar 8 e organizations
that may have been
hased upon different
world
views but as the
alliance between the CCTRN
and the CTCR shows
Catholics and
were able to a ree on
8
basic objectives, and
combine their activities
in brin 8 i„
g 8 reater organization to

»«

;

_ists

-r k ing

the

classes.

During this period the
vast majority of unions
and
federations belonged to one
of the two confederations »
WMle there
.

60

can be

UttU

doubt that the ideological
dlfferences betueen Cathoii
^
and communists had
not dlsappeared> these
differences
into a competition that
SCrengthened che ln£iuence

^

^

as the

CC™

^^^^

and the CTCR subsequently
devo£ed eMrmous

organization o £ non-unionized
workers.

Bet „ efin

^^

membership increaqpH from
f r „„ e
flve thousand t0
£i£ty thousand
sion was equally dramatic.
.

^

^
^

ctcr

^

The political consequences
of these developments,
having been

based upon reform
the Church,

legislate made possible

by the alliance betKeen

the Popular v anguar d
Party and Calder5n Guardla
s
,

were of enormous importance.

^

Between 1940 and 1944
Calderdn's reli-

ance on Catholic and
colonist support increased in
proportion to the
defection of conservative
support.
The reward for this loyalty
was
the appointment of colonist
and CCTRN representatives
to high ranking positions in the Caja
Costarricense de Seguro Social
and the newly
created Ministry of Labor and
Social Security as well as
several other
public bureaucracies.
The Calderon government
actively encouraged
labor unionization, and on
frequent occasions, interposed
itself in
a paternalistic fashion,
between employer and worker
during labor
conflicts.
But the difference between
the paternalism of the
1940s
and the paternalism of
preceding administrations was that
the state
was now taking the side of labor.
With the institutional influence
that labor had gained in the
public administration, the personal
in-

fluence that labor leaders enjoyed
as presidential advisers, and the

commitment of the executive office
to social reform, it would not be
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an -aggeration
to contMd
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caider5n

a pertod of intense
union activity during
„ hlch

^^

ubor

unprecedented degree Qf
poiit±cai tnfiuenca _
le doubt is the
fa
that
labor through CCTRN
and Popular Vanguard
functionaries not only
uiu-y in
i n the CalH
Calderon government but in the
subsequent Teodoro
eoaoro Pxcado
Pir.Ho government,
was sufficiently strong to give
rise to
t-n a
a
rxse
coalition of opposition
forces that
was held toeetheTu
8
only by
its opposition

-

;

-
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,
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^

hensions of increasing
communist political
influence.

^^

Opposition to the Block
of Victoria
victoria came
r,™ from
f
two principal
sources:
the conservative
National Unification
Part y ( P uN ) under
Journalist Otiiio Ulate
and the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) under
Jose Figueres.
The PUN »as formed
from the
ue defection
"erection of commercial,
cafetalero, and industrial
elements
xements that h*A
had k
been responsible for
launching CalderoVs
political career.
The smaller SDP on the
other
hand was composed of the
Balance of reformist
elements, most particularly students, who
viewed Calderon as a corrupt
and ineffectual
demagogue, whose style of
leadership represented a
continuation of
the old Ricardo dimene;
form of personalistic
leadership, and whose
party was no more than
a personalistic following
that would not be
ahle to sustain a social
reform initiative once Calderon
retired from
political life. Ab ove all
the SDP called for the
opening of a new
era of Costa Rican democracy
through the creation of a
doctrinaire
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decades earlier, upon
ideals rather than idols.
The SDP, organized in
1945, had lts orlglns
the Study of National

Problem (Centre),

^

^

^^

a g roup or students
and

Professors forced in 1940
for the purpose of
investigate and proposing solutions to
fundamental political and
social problems.
The

Centre professed three
objectives
jeccives.
•

political and social problems,
torical reality and

3)

2,

1

Who
the

l)

scientific study of

the discovery of Costa
Rican his-

the perfection of the
democratic system.'"

Curiously, the policy
propositions that the Centre
propounded through
the course of the decade
were identical to those
being undertaken
by the Block of Victoria.
The centristas were much
more critical
of the style of Calderon's
leadership than his political
beliefs or
policy initiatives. Accordingly
the ideological propositions
of the
Centre incorporated the same
criticism of capitalism as
Calderon's
Christian reformism.
Early in Calderon's
administration the centristas
blamed liberal economics for
the high concentration of
capital and
Its attendant problems of
low consumption levels among
the lower
classes, unemployment, and
individual misery.
The centristas argued
that economic anarchy, social
disequalibrium, political insecurity,
and moral damage to the working
classes had historically been replaced
by disciplined and authoritarian
political orders.
Economic liberalIsm,

in their view was the cause of
communism and fascism.

But the

injustices of the liberal state, they
contended, could not be corrected by authoritarian solutions
of either the right or the left.

1
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Their answer to the
social
al „qu estron

replacement of liberalism

Uy
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thfi

perfectlon
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tv,

** MChin «^

°f
democratic system
must be brought into
the service of
society
lety bv
b y ensuring
economic

any viable alternatives
for socia,
socxal rpf
reform, and lamented
that the
great tragedy of
Costa Rican politics
was tnat
that the campesinos
had
been left with no
choice but the
th* communist
party since it had
traditionally been the
t-ho only
«„i
movement dedicated to
the solution of
rural misery. 7

respite the interest
that Calderon
t-

-ese problems,

Mediately began

to

show

the Centro contended
that social reform
nouXd not

he accomplished
democratically unless it
was carried out by a
doctrinaire political party.
The logic behind
this contention was
that
"hen a group agreed to
institute programs serving
the collective good
it was necessary to
have a plan based upon
log ical conclusions
derived
SCient iC
°f *
Once the solution had
been
specified, the group
proposing the reforms
needed to have some sort

"

of organizational
infrastructure that could
take control of the
state

-binary

and put its program
into operation.

permanent structure was to
impose

a

solution of serious public
problems.
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But more importantly,
ln thls connectloni
an histories! and
nationai reality.

e

^ ^ ^^
^

^

lt was not only
that was important,
t, but also
pl«n the past
inasmuch as the future
consisted of a synthesis o
f the two,Io the centrlstas

^^

Political development had
reached a stage at wbich
doctrinaire
political psrties could no
longer be avoided.

The reasons for the
opposition of conservstives
w as much more
objective.
In
Caldero n declared
Germny

mi

m

_

^ ^

that time had been Cn^ta
Costa p,Voi
R lca s major coffee
customer.

Costa Rica
exported 600,000 sacs of
coffee to Germany a year,
cottee
as opposed to only
200,000 sscs to the United
States,
The closing of trade
Mediately

c™.

incurred the hostility of the
cafetalero elite.

The subsequent creation of the Caja Costarricense
de Seguro Social further
alienated the
cafetaleros as well as commercial
and industrial sectors.
Capitalistic groups also began to
develop apprehensions about
Calderon's
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owing to the loss
of the German
marketC
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bespread eormption
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The balance of tr
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governnient
responded to

bonds and tncreasing
taxes
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the publi c deficit
t0

and admlnlstrative
dtsorde

rMomed

us

the result of PRN
reform projects.
proiects

^

^

corruption a

^

caide

^

administrative

«!«
Several
new administrative

departments and publir
public i-nat-**
xnstxtutxons came into being
during this period
such as the Ministry
of Labor and cne
the caja
Caia Costarricense de
Seguro
Social.
Equally important was
the
6 runds
funds that were devoted
to public
facilities and low cost
housing
conservatives m a y have heen
justified in leveling their
crlt i cism agains£
mlsnanagement
and corruption, deficit
s P endi„ g and increased
taxes were a by -prodoct
of the social welfare <?t-pt-p fh*+
state that was bexng
created by the PRN.
This
was at the root of
conservative opposition.
•

tw
rW

^
i_

.

^

.

The reform-oriented
centristas leveled the same
criticisms
against the Calder6n
government.
Lamenting the demise of public
ethics
they also complained:

n a

U

1

le

lnCre Se

l

~^

«*
»
in\ri;„\nro
ng on
n tne
throa
B
part of th
h
those who
occupy public posts

«

cacquxsm, and at each moment
public opinion is ignored.

ue
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in response to the
public debt the y complained

"

_

Justify the £act that „
hUe

high deficit, the

Curiously in

«,

governs

should see

^

thefe

suffering

_^^

^^

£u ^

^
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la «er criticise, the
Centre lgnored the flscal

implications of policies
which had heen proposee
in

its

o

m

pro -

gram.

After the congressional
elections of 1942 it became
clear that
Calderon could no longer
count on the support of
the bourgeoisie.

Historian Manuel Rojas Bolanos
imputed great significance
to the
elections inasmuch as the
ne rKN
PRN
,

nn to
t-n that
up
time was trying to run a

middle course between social
reform and conservative
support.
It
became apparent however
that the opposition
Cortesista party was
drawing support both from
capitalistic sectors and the
At the same time the
communists showed their electoral
strength by

polling more votes than any
other opposition group.
with two alternatives:

This left Calder6n

either to abandon social reform
and reforge

the links with the conservative
elements that brought him to
power,
or to accelerate social
reform and look for a new base
of support. 78

Choosing the latter alternative
the PVP-PRN alliance was formed.
Shortly after the Social Guarantees
were instituted followed by the
Labor Code, and several other
important social reform projects.
The Labor Code added a new
dimension to the conflict between

calderonista and opposition forces.

Administrative incompetence,,

corruption, the creation of the CCSS,
deficit-spending, and tax increases were burdensome to capitalist
sectors; the Labor Code

»
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however, represented
a direct threat to
patronal power.
Bef ore the
-de was instituted,
employers established
salaries
les and working
hours
unilaterally. Workers
were
C ° mplete dis
P°-l of employers.
The Labor Code
however, establ-i*^
established a state
agency composed of
government official
emPl0ye "' Snd
•
that fixed salaries
periodically. Morenvpr
oreover, rndemnrzation
claus£s

S

prohmted

^
^_
^

between government and
the United Frult
Conpany
-CO was a g „ ver »en t within
. gov
t

_

.

_

^

more the employers
yers of the
t-ho company
o~
than servants of the
Costa Rican
government.
Shortly
J after th»
the „„j
node was implemented
Calderon communicated to all g0 vernment
offi clals th at in
conflicts between the
company and its employees,
they were henceforth
expected to protect
fhe weaker side.Historian Samuel Stone
placed transcendental
on the implementation
of the code, saying
that it represented the culmination
of a sixty year
process that hegan at the
end of the nineteenth
century when a succession
of liberal anti-clerical
governments began to wrest
political power from the
cafetalero
oligarchy,
was during the
Calderon-Picado-Mora period that
their
economic and social power
was being threatened .«

stance

u

The centristas showed
ambivalence to these progressive
reforms.
Before the Block of Victoria
had been constituted they
reacted

favorably to Church criticism
of capitalist economics.
When
Sanabria published his Pastoral
Letter on "just salaries" they
argued that such reforms
represented only the beginning of
the
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confrontation to a series of aa
dlV

-

" Se

Pr ° ble

-

^

«"««i„g

implication was that
reforms affecting
soclal
stations had to be accompanied
by reforms affectlng
-«*«*-.. When the Soo ial
Cuarantees

^

_

the

nation."

^

^^

democracy, but thay
disclaimed any suooorr
f
rt
support for
the government that
instituted the reform
adding that:
we believe th a t the
iuridir-ai ,„ c
ncerni
must be accom anied--if
P
not IrlrlZT ?,°
ment of popular
orientation with r r " *
nal
wlll impel and promulg^L
thele «fo rm::-°

^

^

s

°c"l material

P°"tical moveth

"

»

-s

the eentristas h a d
a criticism of Costa
Ri ca n society
the lack of a wellorg ani 2 ed,

it

professionally-led, ideologically-

based political party.

This was the most
consistent theme of Centre

publications throughout the
Calderon administration.
however,

After 1943

this was accompanied
by harsh indictments
of the communist

Party and apprehensions
of the administrations.
„illi„ g „ eS s to respect
democratic liberties. One
month after the labor Code
want into effect
the Centre reasserted
its support for the
content of CalderSn's reforms, inasmuch as they
represented an attempt to
transform social
and economic structures
in a way that benefited
the lower classes.
"Nevertheless," it stated,

while we support these
coincidences with our own thinking
we
deSPi
"a"
1
*l°Sans
thrift."*
used against us by the
ul
vanguardistas, to use the rricht
8h off
1C
th
CltlZen f 3 ieL
holds
as
the° first
°
o
his rights, to affirm
ff
our opposition to extremism,
be it

Zt^T-

T la^hl

r

-"?

^

communist or faqri<=t-. ~
r P
011
Politics and
° f anti -P^riotic
persoLiistic po
Jf
anything in the
°^ os± ^on to
present or 11 tl'
that signifies fiscal
8 adminis tration
disorder thf
People, nepotism, the
° f the
d ef eat o f
le S la
cerning education,
eondisrespect for sTfl
silence the liberal
t0
awareness
t
People, and any other
unspeakable excesses. 83
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The centrists
critlci2ed the comuntsts

consistency Khlch they
thQught betrayed

^

Ueoi

^

^

a

^

that was calculated
to serve
servP i-h*
i the ultimate
purpose of instituting
•

revolutionary changes in
Cost-*
Costa Rxcan SOC1 al
and political structures.
Communism was seen tn
to ho
be a^ ™
movement under foreign
direction that
threatened democratic
liberties
oerties wMnh
which,
the centrists view,
had
already been badly abused
by the Calderon
administration.
Their

m
•

-strust

of communism was
stated in a publication
that indicted the

PVP for being

\

°™ dete ™™ation or
in obedience to a
orejgn order t Change
its
name to accomplish
and its
', °
d
°PP°rtunistic group that
Places little importance in Jl,
black, provided th
lled
"serves their objective
b""
of dominating the
country, disorient,
l k,
PlaCi " 8
stability an
'
0nal
*
awareness
and morality of the
Costa Rican

™

^™

^""^

"

" "
M"

peopjef"

Corruption and mismanagement
between 1940 and 1944 had
been
an important source of
opposition to the Calderon
government. However
it should be carefully
noted that the increasingly
strong ties between
the PRN and the PVP and
the suspicion that the
democratic right of
suffrage would not be respected
in the presidential elections
of

C3USed
°

revolutionary

PP0Sitl

™

-

£hat

—-

_ ^^^^ ^

democracy in order to
redirect m,„

"

^^

Block of Victoria
as .
o

C ° UrSe
° f -"°nal development.
Shortly before the
election,
actions, th.
the c
Centre launched a
strong attack
gainst government forces,
asserti„ 8 that demagogic
leadership
Ues, irresponsibility,
and sectarianism
were threatenin to
8
-sta RiC an social peace,
destroy traditional
political institutions
-d deny the li be ral play of
contrary opinions.^
To the centrlstas
-ere was more at stake in
the elections than
honest government and
eoonomic stability; the
parliamentary system and
democratic civil
liberties hung in the
balance. To
canity
10 capitalistic
sectors the election
presented an opportunity to
overturn the progressive
policies that
affected them, or to at
least postpone and
dilute future reform
legislation.
To the Block of
Victoria, on the other
hand, a victory was
needed in order to
consolidate the gams
gains of the
t** previous
four years.
Manuel Mora stated that

L.

'

the leg-

The Block of Victoria
offered its record of legislation
as a
political platform.
It
proposed to consolidate and
broaden democracy by giving it an
economic content that would
guarantee the wellheing and liberty of people
from all social classes.
It
promised
to respect and execute
the principles of the Social
Guarantees and
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the Labor Code; to raise
living standards and
tQ

^^

support to the Just
aspirations of workers and
peasants

.„

In the subsequent
elections Leon Cortes led
a coalition of
bourgeois and c a mpesino
elements against BlocK of
Victoria candidate

Teodoro Picado.

Picado won
n by
oy a

2
Z

to 11 ma
margin ubut the opposition
•

accused the government of
electoral fraud.

Jose Pigueres counted
after the election that
the First Republic of
Costa Rica had died
Asserting that the nation
needed a rehirth, he
promised that a second
republic would open up a new
epoch in Costa Rican democracy,
stating
that, "If we are dignified
men, we win re turn the
blow that these
Incompetents have dealt to the

fatherland.""

The defeat of Cortes
precipitated a movement toward
the unity
of opposition forces.

The Centre which up to
1944 had rejected any

direct political action
became the core of the Social
Democratic Party
With respect to government
institutions
it
called for:
the creation of a doctrinaire political
party; constitutional reforms
limiting executive power; a
prohibition of the reelection of
deputies;
a stronger Judicial branch
of government; and electoral
organs independent of executive authority.
In the area of agricultural
reform
it

proposed:

the creation of an agricultural
school; increased

agricultural production; the creation
of cooperative farms; the incorporation of the campesino into
political life; and better rural
living conditions.

It

also proposed to protect and refine
the

Labor Code, and to nationalize
public services.
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Toward the end of the P-ir>^~ j
Picado administration
the SDP counted
on the support of
the CCTRN.
What
wnat is r»ri
n
curious
about Rerums' desertion from the Block of
Victoria is that the rh
u
Church
maintained an
of fl c ial position o£
cooperatlon „ ith the comunist
•

.

^
,

«hc led the Church
hierarchy, and Benjamin
Nunez
were thus at cross

^

^ ^
^

.

sa

^

ria

who led the CCTRN

^^

Partially explained hy the
contributions the Centre made
to Catholic
unionization efforts. A
great m*ny CCTRN leaders
were drawn fro.
centrists ranks. Of greater
importance however, were the
conflicts
that emerged between the
CCTRN and the CTCR, despite
the Comite de

Intelligent.

Problems began to arise
when the CCTRN intruded on
the CTCR by initiating
unionization drives on United
Fruit Company
Property.
The Catholic confederation
defended its action by asserting
that it was applying che
prlnclple of

^^

ever only reinforced the
communist argument that Rerum
Novarum was
impeding labor unity.
The problems between the
confederations were aggravated by
the dissatisfaction
action of
the* CCTRN
pptpm to
t-~
or the
increasing communist influence
in the Picado government
vernmen t. 90 By 1948
tqa a the
<-u
communists had gained im•

portant posts not only in the CCSS
and the Ministry of Labor but
in
the police force, the army,
the Ministry of Public Works,
the
Electric Railroad to the Pacific,
and the postal and telegraph services.
These developments were noted by
the American Embassy in a

memorandum which stated that:
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^
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^

M« »

'the situation of
uncert-a-inhv ^ a
r lty that
Rica is in many
aspects :taiLr'o"h:r
H ch
, Prevails
"h
Europe today. Although
in Eastern
\
thi
»ight be worthwhile to
"grated,
it
point out that H
P
Haya de J*
in a recent
la Torre of Peru,
declaratlon to
'the Czechoslovakia
of the western

1°

"

J^'J"

Spher"^

These apprehensions
were combined with
public pollcl es that
contravened the economic
interests of conservative
sectors.
In 1946
«- legislature approved an increase
in property taxes
affecting
Urge farms, mcome tax
scaies were aiso
readjusted.
This provoked
a strong reaction
from the Chambers of
Agricuiture and Livestock
Coerce, industry, and coffee
and sugar producer
associations, aid
of Which threatened
to withhold the
payment of taxes. Manue!
Roj as
Boianos described the
attitude of capitalist
sectors during this
Period by saying that the
imposition
o£

_

taxes

^

situation of national
producers who had been
exhausted in recent
years by such reform
as holidays for
workers, advance notice
and
severance pay for employees
who had been fired,
vacations, salary
increases, shorter workdays,
social security, and price
tn 1947 capitalists
translated their opposition
into the

"Huelga de Brazos Caidos,"
a national boycott
that was supposed to
express popular dissatisfaction
with the Picado government.
However,
the "boycott" was organized
by conservative Otilio
Ulate, who had
on several occasions been
indicted by Manuel Mora for
his anti-labor

policy positions.

Mora complained that in Ulate

view the political participation of the
workers should be confined to
the staple
act of voting:
that their only function
was to work and collect a
's
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salary,"

ln any case the strike

-susses,
lently,

The government reacted

£urther alienatlng both

^^^^
^ ^ ^ ^ ^_
conservattve

Md

^^^^^^

sides of the opposition.
In the

gressive SOP,

s.
Ud

year opposition forces,
consisting of the proh y dose Pigueres,
the oid Democracic
Party of

^

Cortes, and the National
Union Party, fen by
Otilio Uiate, convened
a political convention fnr t-u^
for the purpose of
sen<Jing a single candl<Ute
against Caideron in the
1,48 elections. Af ter
lengthy deliberatlons
conservative Otiiio Uiate
was endorsee as the
opposition presidential
candidate,
ft. progressive-conservative
coaiition represented a

hodgepodge of politicai forces,
whose attitudes on social
policy
were diametrically opposed.
Tho-i^ „
i
Their
y opposed
only
point of agreement was that
the PRN and the PVP had
to be removed from
power.
In the subsequent
elections Uiate defeated Caideron
by a sub-

stantial margin.

The electoral tribunal
then declared Uiate the

president-elect; but claiming that
there had been significant
procedural irregularities in the
elections, Caideron submitted
a proposal to annul the results.
The legislature, which was
dominated
by PRN and PVP deputies,
immediately approved the proposal,
shortly
thereafter, opposition forces
took up arms, and after a brief
but
costly rebellion, the Picado
government was overthrown, and Jose
Figueres was placed at the head
of a revolutionary junta.
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Concluding Remarks
The constitution of
opposition forces, and the
sources of

dissatisfaction with the Bloc,
of Victoria, were so
diverse, that
any generalization
concerning the causes and
sources of the revolution m ust necessarily
he unsatisfactory.
Samuel stone interpreted
the revolution to he
the result of liheral
social policies that
threatened the power of the
coffee oligarchy. The
social reform,
he argued,

s

production.'"

«""ty

increased considerably the
costs of

Similarly, Manuel Rojas BolaHos
contended that the revolution
must
be understood to be the
result of an intense period
of class antagonisms, which, in addition
to partially breaking the
hegemony of the

oligarchic classes, eliminated,
at least for several years,
the possibility of a strong and independent
proletarian political organizetion
On the other hand it would
be possible to argue that class

conflict was not as important as
the struggle between a movement
that was paternalistic, personalistic

,

and traditional in style of

leadership, and a movement that
proposed to bring a higher degree
of organization and rationalism
to democratic political structures.

According to this view, the revolution
issued from a tendency toward
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institutionally

a„ d structural
sophistlcatlon

^
^^

Both
tations have aerlt, but
where labor is concerned,
there ca „
aoubt that the rebenion
introduced . period of
organljational ^_
clina during „ hich labor
organl2ations uere euher
coQptad
°r vengefully repressed.
How and to what
dL extent
axtant this
tM. occurred will
be the next subject of
discussion.
.

^
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CHAPTER

I J i

DEMOBILIZATION AND REALIGNMENT
Where labor organizations
ware concerned, the
period between
1948 and the mid-1960s „ as
charactered b y stagnation
and decay
The Revolutionary dunta,
in a decree that
prohibited the existence
of parties with
programs, methods, and
antecedents thought to be
antidemocratic.
c, forrpH
i-h<* jj
torced the
dissolution of the PVP.
Party leaders
"ere either exiled,
Jailed or executed. At the
same time, the CTCR
was accused of violating
a prohibition on
political activity. The
matter was deferred to the
labor tribunals by Benjamin
Nunez, then
Minister of Labor, where a
decision was rendered to
dissolve the
confederation.
i

1

In the void that was
created by the disappearance
of the CTCR,

Rerum Novarum was given an
unprecedented opportunity to
establish
absolute control over the labor
union movement, but instead
of taking advantage of this
position, the confederation
entered a prolonged

period of organizational decay.

The reason for this was partly

associated with Rerum's rapid
growth in the early years.

Dramatic

increases in membership in the
1940s were not accompanied by gains
in organizational stability.

The movement was held together
largely

by the charisma and prestige
of Benjamin Nuhez, but during
the late

1940s and early 1950s both Nunez
and several other important Rerum

13
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Novarum leaders left
1pf> ru„
u
the labor
movement to take
->

£ ° rmed

NatiOMl

Ub "a "»

between th. CCTRN and
the

—
-—
„ m
^^
^^
^^^
^

pQsts

^

n

^

0£ the relationship

„

^

fae

_

but at this point it Qhn„u u
snould be noted thatthat <-u~
the inexperienced
and in
cases incapahle secondary
leaders
these
•

-*

^^^^

allowed personalistic
and procedural
confUcts Cq
sion and disciDlinp
L J-f-Line or
n f t-v,^
the movement. 9
By the n id-l,50s
the

proofs

0£ lncompetent

^

leadership
with the appearance of
peronlst tendencifis
affiliate,. Various leader
s proposed t0 change
the lnternaUonal
affiliation of the CCTRN
fro m the damocratlc
Interamerlcan
ation of Workers (C!T) to
the Peronist Latin
American Union Workers
Croup (ATLAS)
The suose q oent battle
culmlnated fa
expulsion
several i mportant leaders

-bined

^

^

.

^^

National Confederation of
Workers (CNT)

it disappeared.

^

Qf

.

^

^

The CNT never b aca« an

Ultimately, it served only to
weaken to CCTRN.

But the Peronist exodus
was oniy one of several
significant

defections that occurred In
the 1950s.

The National Pederatlon
of

Workers, and the Independent
Pederatlon of Banana Workers
(FETRABA)
chose to follow independent
routes; and In the late
1950s the
National Pederatlon of Puhlic
Works Workers with three
thousand mem hers and the National Agrarian
Federation with eight unions left
the

CCTRN
.

By the late 1950s RN
membership, which at its high point

had numhered upward of fifty
thousand was reduced to a mere four

85

thousand members.

M

The major
inr complaint
of defecting un
ons
chat
the CCTRN had placed
the interests of
the PLN ah
tne
above the
interests of
the workers.
Historian James Backer,
Backer i„
in placing great
significance
on this tendency
asserted that the PLN
was composed primaril
y of
>

.

,

,

.iadle-class elements who
were not interested
in the problems of
the working classes.
Owing to their mistrust
of labor anions, the
y
had little to ^j-iCL
offer thp
a Kn . m
3
me labor
movement.
i

Also associated with
the decline of the
CCTRN was the growing conservatism of
the Catholic Church
after the death of
Sanabria
in 1952.
Sanabria was replaced by
Archbishop Ruben Odio Herrara
a conservative who
placed more emphasis on
the straggle against
communism than the problem
of the working classes.
Oaring Herrara's
tenare the Church became
more interested
religious socialization
than social activism, and
correspondingly began to
emphasize the
traditional virtues of obedience
and resignation.
The few activist
priests who did emerge after
the revelation were scolded
by the Church
hierarchy.
I„ l 960 Herrara was
»
sacceeded by Archbishop Carlos
Humberto Rodriguez Quiros,
who althoagh expressing more
of an interest in social problems,
was nevertheless preoccupied
with the spiritual functions of the Church.
This succession of conservative
prelates combined with a heavy
financial dependence on wealthy
farmers to caase a loss in
relevance among the popalar classes.

„

Churchmen once again propounded
the virtues of a rural life in
which
country people accepted poverty
in exchange for assarances of
heavenly
gain.

5
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Government Suppression
Despite the persecution of
communist labor organizations
after
1948, the President of the Revolutionary
Junta, Jose Figueres, followed a policy course aimed
at lessening the economic
burdens of
the lower classes.

Taxes on wheat were suspended
in order to reduce

the price of bread, and
salaries were increased for sugar
and coffee

workers.

In the same stroke, Figueres
placed a ten percent tax on

capital over fifty thousand colones
and nationalized the banks.
Curiously, despite the fact that
the revolution was precipitated
by
the unwillingness of the Block
of Victoria to permit the installa-

tion of a conservative President,
Figueres' policies, while at the

head of the Revolutionary Junta,
represented a continuation and an

expansion of the social reforms that were
instituted in the previous
eight years.

Importantly, the Social Guarantees, and
the Labor Code

were left in tact.

But in 1949 the junta was dissolved and
conserva-

tive Otilio Ulate was installed as
President of the Second Republic.

Beginning in the latter half of the Ulate
administration and extending through the decade, a series of labor
struggles underscored the

anti-union attitude of post-rebellion governments
and revealed a
consistent pattern of carrot and stick tactics that
would characterize labor relations for decades to come.

Several important strikes

occurred in the San Jose region, but the most significant
of these

confrontations occurred in the banana zones and involved labor
organizations that were thought to be under communist influence.

The union that would take
part in most of these
struggles,
the Federation of Banana
Workers and Unions

(FOBA)

,

was formed in

1952 through the union of several
independent unions in Puerto
Cortes, Quepos, Golfito, and
Palmar Sur.
Shortly after it was constituted, FOBA initiated
proceedings for a collective
convention.
Labor requests included salary
increases, the construction of
com-

missary stores and dispensaries,
living quarters, and holidays.
The Compania Bananera de Costa
Rica (Costa Rican Banana Company)

rejected the federation's demands,
at which point the matter was
brought before the labor courts.
The courts rejected the collective
conflict stating that the federation
lacked sufficient support to
solicit a collective convention.

When on May

1,

1953-a national

holiday-the company fired forty-six workers
for refusing

to comply

with a workorder, FOBA called a strike
that paralyzed production in
the Pacific region.

The strike was immediately declared
illegal and

security forces were dispatched from San
Jose.

One day after the

commencement of the movement, the entire
Junta Directiva of the
federation was arrested, and in confrontations
with security forces
one worker was killed and five others
wounded.

security forces were sent from San Jose.

The next day more

Renewed confrontations

led to more injuries, and the arrest of
several more federation

leaders and thirty-four rank and file members.

6

With the declaration of illegality the company refused to
deal with workers collectively.

,

Federation leaders asked the labor

courts to form a conciliation tribunal but the request was
refused.

FOBA than appealed to the
Superior Lahor Tribunal,
but the labor
court's judgement was upheld.
After subsequent ratings
with company officials, President
Ulate proposed a solution
involving a commitment fro m the company to
maintain the continuity of
labor contracts, in exchange for
which workers were to promise
to follow
legal channels in requesting
collective conventions. The
company,
however, refused to guarantee
employment to striking „ orUer s.
FOBA
proposed its own solution but
Ulate refused to deal with
federation
representatives 7
.

On June 27 the Minister of
Labor held interviews with labor
and company representatives.
In the negotiations the
company
promised to consider the federation's
requests, but made no commitments.
With this promise the strike was
brought to an end. Later
however, FOBA complained that the
company rejected the collective
convention, refused to pay lost
salaries, and initiated repressive

measures against union leaders.

8

The PLN administration of Jose
Figueres between 1953 and 1958

displayed an attitude of tolerance for
the labor movement.

Never-

theless persecution of unions thought
to be under communist influ-

ence continued.

What stood forth with striking clarity
in both the

Ulate and Figueres administration,
and for that matter, subsequent

administrations of either PLN or opposition
variety, was a sequence
of action that occurred with such
regularity as to become a standard

conflict resolution procedure.
tive convention.

A request would be made for a collec-

It would be rejected and a collective conflict

wou ld be caned.

In the subsequent

^^ ^

be delayed or the
conflict would be rejected
be

caned and Mediately declared
illegal.

of security £orces would
be clos£ly

A strike

.

89

^
^^

The subse q uent dispatch

^

^^

arrest of union leaders and
strike organizers.

This would he accompanied by the direct involvement
of Executive Power in
the form of
the Minister of Lahor,
and on occasion, the
President himself,
interviews would be granted,
and settlements would be
made.
Following
the strike, the company
would reinitiate the repressive
measures
against labor leaders that led
to the conriict.
conflict
i,
f
In few
cases would
settlements be made between company
officials and union leaders,
and in fewer cases would
settlements be respected.
The first demonstration of
this sequence in the Figueres
ad-

ministration occurred in 1954.

In January of that year FOBA
and

FETRABA collaborated in a strike
in Puerto Gonzalez Vfquez

movement began on January
Plantations.

7

.

The

and involved 1,200 workers on
twelve

Labor inspectors were sent to the
area to investigate

the cause of the strike, and as
the movement developed,

the Director

General of Labor Relations was sent,
along with the Minister of Labor,
and finally President Figueres.

The federations had complained that

because of diverse forms of payment,
some workers were not earning
enough money to cover the minimum
necessities of a single worker,
much less a family.

The General Salary Office had submitted a
report

stating that the minimum costs of basic
necessities was 15.50

colones per day.

Inasmuch as many workers were earning only 11.20
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colones per da y> FOBA and
FETRABA as k ed for salary
raises up
colones.
They also called fox
Ch e hlrlng of Spanlsh
speakers
company medical facilities
f acil i t-i o<= and
or^ an end
to the repressive
measures that
had been taken against
labor leaders
leaders.
Th« ffederations
a
The
argued that
the company was prohibiting
uie exercise
exerci^P of union rights
s the
by firing
workers attempting to unionize. 9

^ „ ^
^

,

•

A strike was called and
immediately declared illegal
by the
regional labor courts.
Security forces, sent to
the area with orders
to break up the strike,
arrested all labor leaders
associated with
the movement.
Two weeks after the
strike was initiated, President

Figueres intervened personally,
upon the request of the labor
federations.
After conducting interviews
with labor and company officials,

Figueres declared that labor
unionism had to be accepted by
both
the company and the
government, but that labor activities
should
show a sense of responsibility.
The tactic used by communist
unions,
of initiating strikes without
concern for production, would not
be

tolerated.

10

Figueres proposed that the company
agree to continue the contracts of the striking workers,
without reprisals, and recognize the

legitimacy of the democratic labor
movement.

In addition, living

quarters and hygienic facilities would
be constructed, but minimum
salaries would be left up to the National
Salary Council.

Any salary

discussions that the federations wished
to take up with the banana
company would be initiated when the workers
returned to work.

The

proposal was refused by the strike committee
but accepted by the
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FETRABA leadership.

VOrkeI d6feat
-

F0BA asserted that the
agreement

lnaSmUch

» "

stained

a

no firm guarantees that
the

company would not reinitiate
repressive measures against
particul.
Lar
unions after the strike had
terminated . > > Nevertheless,
shortly after
Figueres submitted his proposal
the strike came to an end.
In this case the Figueres
proposal succeeded in dividing
the

strike movement.
to

At the
tne samp
same Mmo
time,

the recognition that was
given
.

.

the democratic labor movement,
and the promise of the company
not

to exact reprisals from
striking workers,

could be understood to mean

that any company actions
intended to weaken, or destroy a
class-

oriented labor movement would
receive the tacit approbation of
the
Figueres administration. FOBA was
a communist led labor organization.

FETRABA, on the other hand, was of
Christian origins.

FETRABA

thus had every reason to accept
the Figueres proposal, but inasmuch
as FOBA was not considered to
be a democratic labor movement,

by the company or the government,

either

there was no guarantee that it

would be protected should the company
decide to initiate repressive
measures.

In fact,

the Figueres proposal called for such
action.

In the long run however,

the recognition of the legitimacy

of the democratic labor movement was
a hollow gesture that left the

question of legitimacy of action in the realm of
interpretation.
What union activities would be considered faithful
to a democratic

movement and what activities would not, depended
entirely on the

disposition of the government.

In this connection,

unions could not

be more sure of their rights than they were in
the period before

.
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the Block of Victoria,
inasmuch as any strike that
threatened to

interrupt production in a
critical sector could be
construed to be
subversive, thus setting into
.otion the repressive mechanis
m s of
the company and the state.
A movement that demonstrated
a similar sequence of
action took
Place in the following year.
Once again FOBA and FETRABA
collaborated in a strike on property
owned by the Compania Bananera
de

Costa Rica.

Demands included a forty percent
salary increase,

shorter workdays, better housing,
the construction of a hospital
at
the Laurel Finca, transportation
facilities for children, special
schools for adults, protective
equipment for workers using sprays,
and respect for labor rights.

The company rejected labor's
demands

and the matter was brought before
the labor courts.

In an unusual

decision the Golfito labor court
granted the federation permission
to strike,

at which point the company
attempted to undermine the strike

movement by asserting that many of
the signatures on the grievance
document were forged and that the strike
did not have the necessary sixty percent approval.

The court ordered a plebiscite on

each plantation, but ninety-five percent
of the workers voted in
favor of the movement

Upon the start of the strike 1,600 workers
were involved.
The government, in customary fashion,
dispatched military units headed
by the Minister of Public Security.

Fearing an expansion of the

movement, the Minister announced that he would
not tolerate a

Guatemalization of the banana zone and that force would be
used if
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the movement continued
tinued.

At- the
= same
At
time, echoing company
officials

the Ministry of Labor
refused to deal with
communist labor represent
tatives.
FETRABA, the non-communist
oriented federation, was
re-

peatedly approached in a
ministry attempt to achieve
a separate peace.
Certain that FETRABA would
eventually yield, FOBA accepted
a ten
Percent salary increase, but
was forced to accept the
condition that
no more strikes would be
initiated for
the next two

years.-

A much more violent, though
typical encounter occurred at
the
end of 1959.
Once again FOBA and FETRABA
joined together in a strike
on banana company property
in Puerto Corte's in response
to the

company's non-compliance with
provisions of the Ley del Trezavo
Mes
(Law of the Thirteenth Month).

According to
n^Luiuing

th-f<=
cms

l
,1,.
law
the company was

required to pay workers an extra
month's salary at the end of the
year.

Management on this occasion agreed
to pay only one week extra

salary.

The federations presented a
collective conflict before the

Golfito labor courts with one petition:
Trezavo Mes.

payment of the entire

Before the legal process had been
exhausted, a strike

was called that gained the support
not only of banana workers, but

workers in company shops, docks, trains,
and offices.

The strike

was immediately declared illegal and
workers were ordered by the

court to return to work.

It was added that since an illegal
strike

had been initiated, the company enjoyed
the right of terminating all

labor contracts.

13

The Ministry of Labor, speaking for the
executive authority,

announced that the decisions of the Labor Tribunal
would be respected.

A
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Conservative President Mario
Echandi Jimenez, „ ho
succeeded Jos ,
Figueres in 1,58, promptly
sent public security
forces to the area
with orders to put an end
to the

_nt.

The Echandi government
subse q uently reinforced
security troops with civil
guards and the
Resguardia Eiscal (Treasury
Guard), and placed all
elements under
the command „f the Labor
Court o£ GQl£lto
cushes
strik
and police forces followed
immediately
Aa^cxy.
*•
Clashes „„h
uiasnes
and beatxngs
were
repeated.

^s

_

The government in this case
was particularly anxious to
bring
the movement to an end
inasmuch as it occurred at a
critical time in
banana cultivation.
The Minister of Labor along
with the Minister
of Health who had been sent
to the area earlier to
negotiate with
workers and company authorities,
thus proposed the payment of
lost
salaries along with the guarantee
that there would be no reprisals

after the strike had ended.

The ministry also promised the
presenta-

tion of amendments in the Trezavo
law and suggested that the company
pay two weeks salary instead of
one.
the company and the federations.

The offer was rejected by both

Subsequently, several strike leaders

and rank and file union members
were arrested.

More confrontations

between police and workers followed,
but the strike sustained its
momentum.

lk

The situation in Puerto Cortls was
complicated when dock workers in Limon threatened to go on
strike for the same reason as FOB

and FETRABA.

A dock worker's strike would have been
particularly

disruptive inasmuch as workers were preparing
the shipment of several

tons of sugar.

Security forces were
consequently put on alert
and
Public authorities began
recruiting workers, in the
event that a
strike was installed. A
collective conflict had been
submitted to
the Superior Tribunal of
Lim5n but after negotiations
and management failed to
produce a settWnt, the
court ruled an
end to the collective
conflict.
In this instance, Labor
Code
restrictions prohibited dock
workers fro, initiating a
strike.
The
only allowable alternative
would be arbitration, but if
both parties
don't give their consent,
the collective conflict
is terminated.
The absurdity of this
procedure was expressed when the
court stated:
"from a legal point of view,
relations between the employees
of the
Northern Railway Company and
this business, are normal. "^

^^

Two weeks after the strike
in Puerto Cortes was initiated

President Echandi made a personal
appeal to workers.

The government
subsequently ordered the payment
of the Trezavo Mes but the
company
argued that inasmuch as the strike
had been declared illegal, it had
the right to terminate all
labor contracts.

fire all workers involved in the
strike.

It

then proceeded to

After a meeting between

company and embassy officials, and
the rejection of
from the United States Ambassador,

a

counterproposal

the government offered to pay

seventy-five percent of the Trezavo Mes
or that portion of the salary
refused by the banana company, if the
company agreed not to fire

striking workers.

The company agreed to rehire striking
workers,

•

but only with the understanding that
their previous contracts had

been broken.

Despite the assertion that the settlement was
damaging

96
to worker interests
because It dldn . t contain
sulficisnc

that there would be no
reprisals, the agreement was
accepted and
the strike came to an end. 16
In the meantime the Atlantic
Federation of Workers and the

Union of Dockworkers announced
that a strike would not be
called.
The Labor Court of Lim6n
subsequently declared that the
Northern
Railway Company had only to pay
twenty-five percent of the Trezavo
Mes or one week's salary.
The company was also obliged
not to initiate reprisals against union
leaders.
to

The promise however, applied

the period of time immediately
following the strike.

After that

Northern was free to take whatever
actions it deemed appropriate.

17

It is probably worthwhile to
note that the length of time

during which the company was prohibited
from taking repressive action

corresponded to the amount of time that
was required to load the
sugar harvest.

What should also be emphasized, in the
case of the

Compania Bananera

de Costa Rica,

to the renewal of labor contracts.

all striking workers.

is the condition that was applied

The company had previously fired

This meant that all workers had to sign new

contracts when they were rehired, and since the
Labor Code does not

make unmistakeably clear the precise terms upon
which new contracts
must be based, the company was under no firm obligation
to provide

workers with the benefits they had previously enjoyed.

The banana

company made this clear in their settlement with FOBA and
FETRABA.
Equally important was government complicity in company designs
to take repressive measures against labor organizations.

In both
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the Puerto Cort , s
af£air and

,

Lim n threat>

through the Minister
of Labor> the labor

dent himself, created
the lmpression that
cive measures to the
termination o£

appiicaUon o(

^

^

or legal, were intended
not to weaken labor

protect the pnblio good.

^

organic ions,

^

but to

What stands forth wtth
striking clarity

xn all strike movements
throughout the 1950s is
the use of a carrot

and stick tactic.

The dispatch of public
security forces, vioience,

and arrests, were always
accompanied by audiences with
the Minister
of Labor or the President,
and the offer of settlements
that appeared
to represent at least
partial labor victories.

But agreements that
Provided higher salaries and
added benefits, usually
carried stipulations that left labor
leaders and labor organizations
extremely

vulnerable to employer attack.

Moreover,

the frequent refusal of

government proposals by company
officials, created the impression
that national political
authority was being compromised
by economic

power~i„ this case

the economic power of a
multinational corpora-

tion.

Nevertheless the position of Costa
Rican governments with regard to company labor policy
reflects a coincidence between
the
desire of political authorities
to insure the smooth flow of
production and the desire of business
to insure the smooth flow
of profits.

While economic concessions won
by labor through government
sponsored settlements might have
served short-term economic interests, government involvement must
be understood to have been damaging
to labor's long-term interests
inasmuch as it undermined

the
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structural growth of labor
organizations, and representee
a rejection of independent labor
activity.
Unlike the Block of Victoria
governments in the 1940s, which
intended to encourage the
structural
development of labor and which
acted on behalf of labor's
interests
as they were frequently
articulated by communist cabinet
members and
advisors, governments in the
post-revolutionary period distributed
token economic benefits only
as a requirement of
production.
The application of force
by government authorities,
and unfavorable legal judgements made
by labor courts were
accompanied
by company persecution of
unions.
Executive authority, Judicial

judgement and company action
formed a three-pronged mechanism
of
control that accounted for a low
level of unionization in the
postrevolutionary period.
The most common tactic used
by employers to insure a complacent workforce was the arbitrary
release of troublesome employees.

Several cases of anti-union attacks
after 1952 underscored the post-

revolutionary attitude of employers
toward labor union activities.
In 1952,

for instance,

the Imprenta Termo initiated
reprisals against

the Union of Graphic Arts Workers
after it initiated proceedings for
a

collective conflict.

In the same year the Secretary General
and

several rank and file members of FOBA
were arrested and beaten by
police.

The Secretary General of the Union of
Golfito and union mem-

bers were arrested while gathering signatures
for a collective convention.

In typical fashion,

the Campania Bananera de Costa Rica

threatened to fire workers who proposed to join a
newly formed union.
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The next year several
leaders and rank and file
members of POBA were
-rested by the Resguardia Fiscal
while gathering signatures
for a

collective convention.

In May of that ear
Banana workers in Palmar
y

and Esquinas were fired
en

.sse

after a Ma y Da y parade.

In

Nove mb er several leaders
of a union associated
with FOBA were fired
while gathering signatures
for a collective contract.
The company
claimed that the workers'
production levels were low, and
that the y
had been insubordinate on
several occasions. 18

Company action against unions
in the post-rebellion
period
was frequently accompanied
b y persecution on the
part of bureaucratic
agencies.
A not untypical incident
occurred in 1960 when the Minist
ry
of Labor authorized an
investigation of the Association of
Social
Security Workers (AESS)
Unions in any case were required
to submit reports of activities,
organizational changes, and funding
.

sources every six months.

But on this occasion the AESS
had been

accused of being of subversive
orientation; consequently the political
orientation of its leadership was
subjected to close government
scrutiny.

Shortly after, an investigation of
the financial assets

and funding sources of the Federation
of South Pacific Workers (FUTRA)

was ordered.

Eventually the organization was dissolved
involuntar-

ily. 19

Labor leaders complained that government
persecution was aimed
at class oriented unions.

Novarum.

The AESS had been an affiliate of Rerum

During this time no repressive government
action was taken,

but after the union switched its affiliation
to a more combative

1
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confederation, special
investigations were ordered.-

DeS pite this
claim, state persecution
of the labor movement
affected the CCTRN
as well.
1956 for

m

^

,

^

^

Republic recommended the
dissolution of Rerum Novarum
claiming that
it was financed by the
PLN.
Also in 1957 the Union of
Graphic Arts
Employers initiated a campaign
against unions in the printing
industry.
Their justification was that
printing unions were associated
with the CCTRN, which, having
been subsidized by the PLN were
in
violation of the law and subject
to dissolution. 2
While company and government
actions against the labor movement were supposed to be
directed against communist oriented
organizations, ideological orientations,
as they appeared both in statements of goals and tactics, were
interpreted so broadly as to make
almost any union or confederation
in any sector of production, a

suspect of subversive activities.

In this way anti-union action

lacked the focus that it was supposed
to have.

Thus in 1953, com-

munist affiliated labor leaders issued
an indictment against what
was believed to be a general offensive
against the labor movement.

Agricultural workers, it was asserted,
were afraid to organize
unions because of the employment risks.

In the construction indus-

try employers acted with such impunity
that unionization had become
a clandestine activity.

industries.

The same situation prevailed in all other

Furthermore, they contended, employers ignored legisla-

tion concerning severance pay, overtime
salaries, paid vacations,

minimum salaries, and social security.

At the same time,

legal
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judgements, rather than
profctinj labor against abuses,
served in
combination with anti-union
company and government
actions, to weaken
the iabor union movement.
In this way, it was
argued, workers lost
confidence in union activity
and preferred to deal with
employers on
an individual basis. 22
The annual report, issued
by the Ministry of Labor
at the beginning of 1954, at least
confirmed that the labor movement
since the

rebellion had experienced a
period of decay.

Data on unionization re-

vealed that no more than sixty
unions were functioning at the
end of
The
1953.
newly formed General
Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
(CGTC), with 1,953 members
was the largest labor central.
Its more
important affiliates included the
Union of Construction Workers
with
160 members; the Union of Flour Industry
Workers with 106 members;
the Union of Banana Industry
Workers in Quepos with 104, in Puerto

Cortes with four hundred, and in
Golfito with 469; and the Union of

Grocery Workers of Limon with 318
members.
members, was the second largest central.

The CCTRN, with 1,795
Its more important affili-

ates included the Costa Rican Musical
Union with 347 members; the

Costa Rican Textile Union with
136; and the Union of Juan ViSas Workers

with 265.

The Peronist oriented National
Confederation of Workers

followed with 1,186 members.

Its more important affiliates included

the Union of San Jose Municipal Workers
with 169 members; and the

Union of Electric Railroad Workers with 706
members.

The nonaffiliated

Federation of Workers of the Province of Cartago
and FETRABA numbered
121 and one thousand workers respectively.

numbered 909 workers.

Other independent unions

The number of unionized workers had been reduced

102
to 6,964. 23

The CCTRN alone, *l
at the
cne peak of ir
,
its adevelopment
boasted
a membership of over fiffv n,„
P
f l£ty thousand.
Shortly after these
statistics
were published the Director
of the General Labor
Office stated that
only a few years earlier
there were more than four
hundred unions
functioning.
The decline was associated
with the fact that labor
unionism was frequently
equated with communism. 2 '
,

Reunionization
The repressive measures
that were employed by state
institutions and employers in the
1950s did not change substantially
in the
following decade.
This is not to say that all
administrations since
the 1948 revolution persecuted
labor with equal alacrity,
although

anti-union company activity in
the following decades did
not differ

measurably.-

What it does mean is that the
vulnerability of labor

to anti-union attacks on
the part of patrons depended
largely on the

disposition of the labor courts,
which in turn were dependent upon
the executive authority.

Furthermore, the kind of response that

work stoppages elicited from the
state depended largely on the attitude of the executive authority.

Nevertheless, changes in administra-

tions did not amount to a difference
between support and repression;

they rather signified differences
in degree of oppression, some govern-

ments being more tolerant of labor
activity than others.
But despite an unfavorable political
atmosphere economic changes
in the 1960s, brought about by the
creation of the Central American

Common Market and a dramatic increase in
American investment, both
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stimulated union growth
grnut-h and
or,,-?
encouraged a proliferation
of labor confederations,
until I960, American
invests amounted to S 74 7
Million.
Between I960 and 1965,
an additional »«.3
million were
brought into Costa Rica.
11,00=
Rica
These
investments produced new
industries
and an increase in
production, especially in
manufacturing and
industry.
With 1963 as a base for
instance, industrial
production
since 1948 had increased
154 percent
percent. At the
n,„ same time,
cattle
production increased 114 neront
percent. n
Working classes, nevertheless
did
not profit as much as
a new managerial class
that emerged out of
economic development. Throughout
the period, workers
suffered from
low salaries and unemployment.
One economist noted that
popular
groups, having paid the
price of development, were
impelled toward
unionization as a means of protest. 25
•

i

•

If)/.

TABLE

4

DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY
ACTIVE POPULATION BY SECTOR
1950-1973"

Sector

1950

Agriculture

159,691

Ml
n J_ na
I-L 11
lift

i

i

875

Industry

32,100

Construction

12,548

Electricity

1,541

Transportation

9,922

Commerce

23,054

Services

51,878

TOTAL

291,819

Annual
Increase
1950-1963

1963

Annual
Increase
1963-1973

in %

*„ ?

200,309

213,226

1.7

0.6

1,233

1,557

2.6

2.3

46,205

69,917

2.7

4.0

23,960

39,078

4.8

4.8

4,429

5,531

7.4

2.2

15,316

24,964

3.2

4.8

39,665

67,675

4.1

5.2

76,117

163,365

2.9

7.3

407,284

585,313

2.5

3.6

But in terms of labor organization
the most important by product
of economic growth was a
dramatic increase in the size of the
work

force.

From 291,819 in 1950 the economically
active population more

than doubled by 1973.

While the number of workers in the
agricultural

sector increased, the sectors that
registered the largest increases

were commerce,

transportation, construction and industry.

Also in-

creasing dramatically were the number of
people involved in the electrical industry.

Furthermore the period between 1963 and 1973 showed

an acceleration in the yearly rate of
growth.
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TABLE

5

UNIONIZATION LEVELS BY
SECTOR (PERCENTAGES)

2 8

Sec tor

1963

1973

Agriculture
0.4

5.7

Indus try0.4

5.9

Electricity
9.7

69.3

Construction
1.2

5.5

Commerce
1.7

Transportation

11.9

2.1

30.5

Services
8.4

TOTAL

2.6

19.9
10.9

Accompanying increases in the
economically active population
were dramatic increases in
levels of unionization.
In this connection, unionization increases
in the agricultural sector were
far out
of proportion to increases
in the number of people involved
in agri-

cultural production.

The electrical industry on the
other hand, while

not occupying a large portion
of the work force showed a
particularly

sharp increase in unionization
levels.

At the same time the number

of union workers in the
transportation industry almost tripled between

1963 and 1973.

The number of union workers involved
in industry also

showed a sharp increase.

What is noteworthy about these figures
is

the relationship between increases
in the economically active popula-

tion and unionization increases.

While the number of people involved

in industry lncreased
from

„ >2M ^

^

^^^ ^

percentage of unionized
workers uuring the sa.e
period increased over
fourteen a*..
In all sectors
the
rf

^

,

out of proportion to
sector a i work force increaseg

_

^^
^^

^

cate that the reunionization
of the Costa Ri can „„
rk force Kas
part attributable to a
slackening of iabor repression
between 1963
and the early 1970s.
In faet see writers
have noted that the pitch
of anti-labor action dropped
during the 1960s but rose
again during
the PLN administration
of Daniel Oduber between
1974 and 1978. 29

„

TABLE

6

PUBLIC SECTOR GROWTH 30

Institutions

Number of Employees

1955

Ministries
Autonomous
TOTAL

1975

Increase

Absolute

Percentage

22,093

45,288

23,195

105%

2,780

35,625

32,845

1,181%

24,873

80,913

56,040

225%

Another significant development occurring
around the same time
was a pronounced growth of the Costa
Rican state apparatus.

In terms

of labor activity this is especially
important since the Labor Code

established special conflict resolution procedures
for public employees.

Between 1955 and 1975 the number of people employed
in the
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standing bureaucracy m ore
than doubled.

_^

But even mo re drastic
was
an increase in the nu m ber
of people employed in
the auto
tutions.

such increases serve to
show that development in
th e post
war period was largely
the responsibility of
the Costa Rican state.
At the same ti.e the
growth of the public sector
presented an unusual
opportunity for union growth.
This is probably attributable
to the
lack of patronal oppression
in the public sector,
owing to the existence of certain guarantees
which prohibit the arbitrary
release of
state workers

TABLE

7

UNIONIZATION BY SECTOR:

Population
Occupied

St3te

Prlvate
TOTAL

1973 31

Number
Unioni^pH
unionized

% of
_
Participation
r>

•

72,847

31,648

43.4

477,563

26,100

5.5

550,410

57,748

10.5

The data also show a relatively low
level of unionization in
the private sector.

On the other hand the large number of
unionized

government workers might lead to the mistaken
conclusion that unions
in the public sector are strong.

However these high numbers must be

considered in conjunction with legal provisions
that restrict labor
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activities in the public sector
much more severely than
in the private sector.
Nevertheless, this does not
mean that these onions
have heen rendered ineffectual.
fro. all public employees,

Even though strikes are
prohibited

the threat of a work
stoppage in a vital

public service exerts pressure
on government patrons to
accede to
union demands.
For this reason, public
workers enjoy higher salaries than workers in the
private sector. On the other
hand, government concessions at the bargaining
table are usually attended by
threats against unions contemplating
more assertive action. Public
sector unions must thus accept
offers that are delimited by yearly
budgetary allocations to bureaucratic
organs.

109

TABLE

8

UNIONS ORGANIZED YEARLY:

1965-

Year
Number of Unions

.

1965
l _L
i
-L

1966
1967
26

1968
9Q
ZO

1969
19

1970
30

1971
33

1972
31

1973
29

1974
33

1975
41

In terms of organizational
growth,

the reunionization of the

Costa Rican work force showed a
gradual acceleration between 1965
and 1975.

The forty-one unions created in
1975 represented a twenty-

four percent increase over the year
before.

The majority of these

unions were located in San Jose, and
the banana zones on the west
coast and Lim6n.

Sixty-six percent of all Costa Rican unions in
1975

were located in the San Jose region while
other provinces such as

Guanacaste and Heredia located only two percent
and four percent of
Costa Rican labor unions.
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Once again the increase
in the nunber of lab<jr

«

.^.^

not considered in
conjunction with other data,
might lea d to the
.istaUen conclesion that
anti-union activities tapered
off in proportion to the number of
organizations constituted each
year.
However
these data do not take
into consideration the
number of unions that
were dissolved for reasons
ultimately associated with
company antiunion action. Por instance,
by 1975 , 196 unlons out
Qf ,
q£

^

452, constituted since 1945, were
dissolved by the Ministry of
Labor.

This represents an extremely
high forty-three percent.

3

Ill

TABLE

9

SIZE OF UNIONS:

19 75

3

Size

Number of Unions
less than 20 members
7

between

20 and

between

51 and

between

101 and

200

between

201 and

300

between

301 and

400

50
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100
49
35

13
10

between

401 and

500
7

between

501 and

600
5

between

601 and

700
2

between

701 and

800
2

between

801 and

900
3

between

901 and 1000

between 1001 and 1500
7

between 1501 and 2000
1

between 2001 and 2500
2

between 2501 and 3000
2

between 3001 and 3500

between 3501 and 4000
2

258

5

^
^
^^
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Another sig„ 1£lcant aspect
of the reunlonlzatlon
oean the size of Costa
Rlcan labor organizations.
several unions „ lth

_

Stations
-ions

in

are extremely

1 975

Uks[

contalned less than

^^^

half of the 25g

members whiie

Percent of all unions
contained less than four
hundred members. This
reflects the continued
prevalence of small businesses
but at the same
time it iHustrates the
importance of labor unity.
The
of small unions is a
tendency that has produced
some concern during
labor conferences. 3'
Us significance derives from the
fact that

judicial approval of a
collective conflict requires
the support of
sixty percent of all workers
in an area of production.

TABLE 10

COMPARATIVE UNIONIZATION LEVELS
1975

Country

Ecuador
Peru

Venezuela

EAP

Population
Unionized

345,380

15.5

3,871,613

1,300,000

33.0

680, 000(a)

Brazil

29,557,224

4, 000, 000(b)

Panama

488,335

Costa Rica

% of

Unionization

6,225,800

3,014,674

Mexico

3

8,054,822
585,313

21.5

80,580

16.0

1,954, 350(c)

24.0

10.9

.
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^

seances m ust anti-union

excluded

^

^

Realignment
The proscription of
the CTCR by the
Revolutionary Junta in
1949, and the subsecuent decay
o £ the CCTRN,
although serious hlo„s,
did not completely
dismantle the Losta
w
Costa Rican
Kln*„ labor
i
movement.
In the

post-revolutionary Period
„
new generation
7 nerind a nor,
of labor leaders, who
had
been members of the old ptpr »i
CTCR, along with a large
phalanx of Rerum
Novarum defectors, became
key
figures in *a H«
y ngures
developmental process
i

that culminated in the prp a finn
creation of several new
confederations, both
communist and non-communist.

CGTC-

In the early 1950s a
large number of new labor
leaders created the Comisi6n Obrera
Sindical (Worker Organization
Commission),

trough

the efforts of this
organization,

new federations were established
by 1952.

twenty-nine unions and four
In March of the following

year the Federation of Workers
of San Jose, Heredia, Cartago,
Alajuela
and Puntarenas, and the FOBA
convened a general assembly that
led to
the creation of the General
Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
(CGTC)
.

The new organization adopted
the program of the old CTCR
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and affiliated itself on
the international level
with the Latin

American Federation of Workers
(CTAL) and the World
Federation of
Unions (FSM)
By 1957 the CGTC included
four thousand members in
four federations and
non-federated unions. 36
.

Pressure to withhold legal
recognition of the CGTC was strong,
but owing to the fact that
.any of its leaders were
unknowns in the
labor union movement, juridical
personality was granted. 37 Despite
repressive measures, the CGTC
profited greatly from the reunionization
drive in the 1960s, and
maintained itself as one of the
largest labor
organizations throughout that period.
By 1980 the CGTC, with 20,487
'

members representing 19.2 percent
of the unionized labor force,
became the largest confederation
in Costa Rica.

The CGTC showed its

greatest strength in the San Jose
region where 30.2 percent of its

membership was located, but it also
possessed great strengh in the
banana zones of Puntarenas, where 20.9
percent of its membership was
located, and Limon, where 20.0 percent
of its membership was located.
By far,

it had also been the strongest
labor organization in these

zones.

In Puntarenas and Lim6n for instance,

and 5,962 workers respectively.

the CGTC included 5,203

The next largest organization included

only 1,011 and 1,407 members in the same
areas.

38

The ideological and programmatic orientation
of the CGTC re-

flected the statutes of the CTCR.

Underdevelopment was the result

of a semi-feudal economy that was
perpetuated by the existence of a

latifundia system, and by the exploitation of multi-national
corporations.

Inasmuch as national industries could not compete with large
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American-based companies, Costa Rica
was forced to remain
of primary materials.

a

producer

At the same time the exploitation
of multi-

national corporations was supported
by a reactionary bourgeoisie.
This state of affairs most usually
left Costa Rica with external

debts that were paid at usurious
interest rates, with loans from the

more developed countries.

Programmatically

,

the confederation placed

great emphasis on unity of action
and organization in the labor movement.

It

called for improved living and working
conditions, indus-

trial development, effective agrarian
reform, liquidation of the

latifundia system, and national independence.

39

In the early part of 1981 the CGTC
dissolved itself voluntarily
in order to facilitate the integration
of several previously indepen-

dent unions.

Nevertheless, the larger organization that subsequently

emerged, which will be discussed in a later
section, adopted the con-

stituent acts of the CGTC, and maintains the same
tactics with regard
to the advocacy of workers rights.

FOCC.

The Costa Rican Federation of Workers and Farmers emerged
in

1964 as an alternative to the communist-oriented CGTC and the non-

combative CCTRN.

In following a middle course between socialism and

militancy on the one hand, and complacency and ineffectiveness on
the other hand,

the FOCC claimed to be inspired by the Christian

social doctrine of Jorge Volio.

Although it declared its indepen-

dence from ecclesiastical authority, Catholic social action groups

played an important role in its creation, and like the CCTRN, space
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was provide,

f or

. prlest who acted

theless, this space was

fluently

an impression of
independence.

^ ^
left open ln order tQ
preserve

However, the federation
affiliated

itaalf on the international
level with Christian or
g ani 2 atio„s such
as the international
Confederation of Christian
Unions (CISC), and
the Latin American
Confederation of Christian
Unions (CLASC)

-

The FOCC asserted that
the popular classes of
Latin America
suffered from a t„o-pron
g ed oppression:
political dictatorship and

economic depravation caused
by capitalist economic
penetration.
It
proclaimed its
support for democracy but
stated that the basis
of political freedom was
economic freedom.
Inasmuch as the lack of
economic freedom was seen to
be the cause of political
dictatorship,
a stable and authentic
democracy depended upon the
full participation
of the working classes
in activities affecting
national development.
But along with genuine
democratic participation, and a
comment to
the well-being of the working
classes, emphasis was placed on
the neo-

Thomist conception of an integral
human development in which
economic
vindication was viewed as the basis
of a triad that included moral
and spiritual values.
Human dignity began with economic
justice,
but it could not be achieved
unless material values were
supplemented
by moral and spiritual values
that were communicated to man by
God.

Authentic liberty ultimately depended
upon God.

Accordingly, work

was viewed as an activity, which
in conjunction with spiritual

values, would create a dynamism that
would propel man toward liberty,

justice, and ultimately, a more perfect
life."

1
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Where labor was concerned,
the collect!™ contract
was conferee to b e the expression of a
better understands
between tbe
Actors of production, as
well as an instrument o
f social transformation.
Owing to employer
oppression, the number of
contracts in operin the mid-1960s was
low.
The POCC thus asserted
that the aspirations of the working class
had been impeded by the
arbitrary release
of workers who had
been associated with labor
organizations."

ate

Accordingly,

it

called for the defense of
the inalienable rights

of the workers through
the establishment of a
"fuero

sindical""

that would protect labor
organizers fro. anti-union
patronal actions.
Like the CGTC, the FOCC
believed that the unity of the
working class was indispensable,
not only i„ defending
socioeconomic
interests, but in protecting
the nation against foreign
interference.
It thus sustained the
principles of autonomy and independence
and
asked for the collaboration
of all other organizations
with similar

concerns and goals.

On a programmatic level it
declared its support

for any organization or
policy proposal that would improve
the moral,

material, and economic lives of
the working classes.

The federation's

short-term proposals included the
improvement of medical assistance
programs, credit agencies, paid
vacations, and the construction of

sports facilities.

More importantly however, the FOCC
called for

combined working class action as a
means of intensifying the struggle
for a just and equitable salary.

Furthermore, in order to insure

working class participation in
developmental programs, the federation
called for authentic labor representation
in the autonomous institutions. **
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Owing to the integration
of previously
independent onions
in the period Mediately
following its creation,
the FOCC changed
its name to the Costa
Rican Confederation of
Christian Workers and
Farmers (COCC).
By the early l 970 s,
the new organization
included
two federations and
twenty-four unions, and
showed its greatest
strength in the San dose
region.
However, it only claimed
a membership of 2,032. The
principles and program of
the FOCC were carried

emphasis was placed on the
fundamental transformation of
social and
economic structures. The COCC
declared a classist and
revolutionary
position and called for the
education and radicalization of
the popular classes as a basis for
profound structural change.
Its definition of principles and
goals made collaboration with
communist unions
that much easier; nevertheless,
the COCC actively criticized
the
CGTC for being controlled by
external forces. However,
programmatic
radioalization and the fear of
communist influence, caused a deterioration in relations with the
Church hierarchy that presented
the

confederation with an opportunity
to assert its independence.' 5
Present Distribution of Labor F
orces
CTC.

The COCC,

from its inception, had been
criticized for its lack

of independence from Church
authority.

The radioalization of the

COCC program would destroy any
suspicions of the kind were it not.
for a heavy subsidization from
international Catholic organizations.
In 1969,

the COCC had a budget of 031,573,70
(approximately #3,160.00)

.

Of that, eil.263,70
(approximately

tributes

»»

from the La tin

did-

of

IIMoQ)

_

^^
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con-

ConfederatiQn of chrisuan
UniQns

this state o£ affalrs>
along uith

iMegration

of several non-rural
labor organizations
was sufficient Justification for a change in
affiliations. Thus in 1972
the COCC changed
its name to the Union
of Costa Rican

^^^^^

time switched its
international affiliations
to the Union of Latin
American Workers (CLAT)
and the World Confederation
of Workers (CMT)
As part of this show
of independence, the
CTC clataed to be
neither Marxist, social
democratic, nor Christian.
It asserted an
independence from political
parties the
cne Church,
Church governments,
and

philosophies, and defined its
oriental-,'™ as
=„ u
orientation
humanitarian and democratic.
Inasmuch as the workers were
responsible for their own
destiny, the CTC asserted,
no one could prescribe
methods or goals.
But despite this manifestation
of independence CTC statutes
betray
a Christian heritage.
The confederation still
calls for an integral
development of the worker and
aspires to be not only a labor
organization, but a society for
the promotion of Christian
virtue.
Nevertheless, the CTC maintains
that the liberation of the
workers
will come about only through
rapid, and global changes in
economic,
social, cultural, and political
structures.
Proclaiming the indis-

pensability of working class unity,
the confederation supports combined action in the struggle to
construct a new society.
In terms
of concrete policies,

the CTC has formulated a seventeen
point pro-

gram that includes support for labor
liberties, higher levels of

.
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unionization, the execution
of

station

coUecUve

contracts>

in publlc and private
instiCutlonS;

^^
^
^

agrarian

^^^^

It also proposes various
social policies including
the construction
of orphanages and

popular llving quarters;

ance, better working
conditlons

,

^

unempioyMM

and better assistance
for low income families."

The CTC is a heterogeneoos
organization that Joins peasants
and industrial workers
as well as community
and youth organizations.
"*«* only 5,278 members representing
only five percent o, tbe
unionized work force, it is
tbe smallest of Costa
Rica's four confederations.
Its only real strength
is in the San dose region
where 3,859
members and 14 of its 29
unions are located." 8
CCTD.

The Costa Rican Confederation
of Democratic Workers
emerged
from the remains of the
CCTRN in August, 1966. The
change of name
was supposed to signify both
a conversion from a Christian
social
orientation to a social democratic
orientation, and an attempt to

reintegrate affiliates that had
been frustrated by Return's
Church
affiliations. The constituent
acts of the new organization
were

'

no different from those of
Rerun, Novarum but the severance
of Church

affiliations was a need that had
been justifiably asserted by CCTRN
affiliates
From its creation in 1945, Rerum
Novarum had declared an in-

dependence of action.

However, ecclesiastical authorities
reserved

the right to interpret and dictate
ideological positions.

In fact,
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^^^^

union pronouncements in
the 1940s and 1950s
echoes o f Bishop Sanabria's
position. Mo reover, an
ecdeeiastical
assessor who sat tn the
General

^^

insured the correspondence
of confederation
actions and church
Policy.
Rem. Novarum was economically
dependent upon the Church
and dependent upon the
Church's willingness Co
creace a puhiic attitude supportive of
unionization,
it would he worthwhiie
to point
out that the methods
used h y the Costa P. lc
an Church to controi iahor
activity and poiicy were
similar to those that have
heen employed by
other Latin African
Churches.- The extent of
these controls are
vividly described in a
memorandum fro. Bishop Sanabria
to Benjamin
NuHez.
sanabria stated that the
confederation was obliged to
instruct
affiliates in the principles
of Catholic social doctrine;
that the

ecclesiastical assessor would
guard and

striate

this objective;

that the assessor should
maintain good relations with
Catholic youth
and social action groups;
that ecclesiastical authority
possessed the
right to pressure confederation
leadership in matters of ideology;
that the archbishop had final
authority on ideological questions;

and that confederation
leadership was obliged to inform
ecclesiastical

authorities of all matters.

5

"

With these requirements it is
under-

standable why workers became
frustrated during the period of conservative Catholic leadership in the
late 1950s and 1960s.
The chief goal of the CCTD is
to guard the economic well-being
of the working classes within
prevailing institutional arrangements.

Rejecting the inevitability of the
class struggle, it seeks to create

a social and economic
order that

„

m

promote the dignlty of

guaranteeing an income
sufficient not o„l f„ r basic
y
needs
the

anient

of the benefits of
culture.

state is seen to have
the responsibility of

,

_
^^
^

fey

In this connectlon

climating inanities

between groups, as well as
the abuses of public
and private power.
C ° nfed
i
-«ains the Christian conception that
society
must be based upon .oral
values, and that individualism
as it ex-

&

«" -

ists in capitalist economic
systems, is as unjust as the
of socialist systems.

collective

Accordingly, its long range
objectives are a

reflection of the neo-Thomistic
conception of a communitarian
order
that combines socialist
statism and protection for
individual liberties. 51

The CCTD lays great stress
on labor Code reforms.

The current

code is seen to be a relic
that is out of tune with Costa
Rican social
reality, what is needed is a
legal and institutional
transformation
that will facilitate an authentic
labor liberty through prohibitions
on anti-labor employer activity
and deformed judicial interpretations.

Specific reforms include changes
in the court system that would
provide more rapid judgements and more
effective protection of labor

organizations.

The confederation proposes to make
collective conven-

tions obligatory in all centers of
work and supports the creation of

Labor Relations Committees that would
introduce improvements in

collective conventions.
ance pay, profit-sharing,

Other proposals include guarantees on severthe encouragement of cooperative
industries,

and the creation of commissions to
investigate labor persecution.

52
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Figuring importantly in
the confederatlQn
progran is
o£ land.
As in several older
labor organizations end
political
Parties, both Catholic and
pr i vate property is
vle „ ed as
a fundamental individual
right, but its use must
be regulated in a
»ay that would benefit
all meters of society,
the confederation
stresses the right of every
worker to personal property,
and calls
upon the state to reguiate
land tenure patterns with
a view to eliminating unproductive large
farms on the one hand and
inordinately small
farms on the other hand.
In order for a meaningful
reform of this
type to work, it is asserted,
the state will be required
to organize
dependable and effective6 market
mar]<oi- s,
c
^ a
and
provide technical assistance
on a large level. 5 3

_ist,

The CCTD has taken a finn
position against the activities
and

effects of multinational
corporations.

Nevertheless it is much less

critical of the United States
than the CGTC and on the
international
level the confederation is
affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Unions (CIOSL)
and the Interamerican Organization
,
of

Workers (ORIT)
,

government.

both of which are supported by
the United States

In fact the CCTD has been
accused by other confederations

of being a mouthpiece for
American interests.

It receives financial

aid from American corporations
through the American Institute for

Free Labor Development (IADSL)
and has been known to reserve space
for the American Labor Attach! in
Junta Directiva meetings.

51*

Despite its Christian origins and
orientation, the confederation since its inception has been
critical of Church conservatism.

6

.
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It has indicted
Catholic social organizationSj

^

such
thfi £scueia
Social duan XXIU, for
not su PP o rting Labor Code
Poses that important social
problems
ignored becauge
a
fear of the loss of
important private sectQr

^

^^

^
^

^

has always been .ore
disposed to attack the
activities of the state,
'
it has been argued,
than the businessmen who
share an ecual burden
of responsibility for
anti-labor actions. 55
The CCTD,

though the largest and most
important of Costa

Rica's non-communist labor
organizations, has been weakened
by
personalistic, tactical, and
ideological conflicts, and a lack
of
cohesion.
One major division in the
1970s led to the creation of
a new confederation:
a development that weakened
the democratic labor
movement by raising the number
of non-communist confederations
to
three.

Much of the tactical conflict in
the CCTD revolves around

its lack of combativeness
and heavy subsidization from
American sup-

ported international organizations.

sessed a budget of
(234,575

(5184,

In 1974 the confederation pos-

225.15 (approximately #18,420.00).

Of this,

(approximately #3,460.00) was derived from
affiliates, but

09,000 (approximately #900.00) was derived
from state subsidies while

087,556.15 (approximately #8,760.00) in
educational subsidies and
053,124 (approximately #5,310.00) in general
subsidies were donated
by the IADSL; and in 1978, quotas
from affiliates amounted to

084,979.55 (approximately #8,500.00) while
subsidies totaled
0117,439.64 (approximately #11 740 00)
,

.

5

125

At any rate, with
17,394 members representee
^Fi-cbencing lb
1*

the unionized la bor
£orce the CCTD

Important

non-_ist

.

naintained ics£if

labor organlzatlon

^

L
4

^^

percent of

m

^^

^^

federation shows much
greater strength ln the
San Jos| raglon than
any other organization
where it incorporates
14,412 workers into
thirty unions; however,
it is also much weaker
in the provinces of
Majneia, Heredia, Carta o,
and Cuanacaste.
8
Several attests have
been made hy the CCTD,
as well as its
predecessor the CCTRN, to intrude into traditional
colonist strongholds in the
banana zone;
but in the provinces of
Puntarenas and li m 6„, CCTD
membership is

outnumbered

5

to l. 57

CATD.

Personalistic conflicts
cs in
rh* CCTD
rrm causedi the withdrawal
ln the
of several unions in the
early 1970s.
In 1971 the Authentic
Confederation of Democratic Workers
was formed with the participation
of
only two federations:
the Democratic Federation of
Workers and the
Costa Rican Federation of
Transport Workers.
Confederation leadership has argued that their
withdrawal f rom the CCTD, far from
being
the result of personal
differences, was caused by an opposition
to
,

the intervention of foreign
elements in interest affairs.

The

American labor attache and other
government officials were able to
exert a strong influence on CCTD
decisions.
Their participation in
confederation elections, and active
support of less combative candidates, was thought to be calculated
to serve American business inter-

ests at the expense of the Costa
Rican working classes.

58
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In defining itself ac o ~i
as a classist
8
organization,

the CATD is

«uch .ore critical of
social and economic
structures than its parent organization,
ideologically and
programmatically it has more
in common with the
communist labor
than the social democratic movement that it
claims to represent.
The CATD argues that
the working classes
will be able to enjoy
the benefits of nature
and culture, onl through
y
enormous sacrifice and
struggle.
The Costa
Rican economy is considered
to be underdeveloped,
dependent, and
subject to the exploitation
of multinational
corporations.
In
accordance with a Marxian
view of appropriation and
alienation, the
CATD argues that a small
class of capitalists
appropriates national
wealth, concentrates it, and
produces more wealth through
its
control of the means of
production. Prevailing economic
relations have
impelled society toward ever
greater inequalities, to the
extent

_nt

that the majority of people
are unable to acquire the
basic necessities of life.
Economic, social, and political
development are seen
to be checked internally
by large capitalist concerns
and externally

by multinational corporations.

The CATD asserts that a Just
society,

as it is reflected in economic
and social structures, as well
as the

spiritual development of the individual,
will require
tion of economic relations.

a

transforms-

59

Programmatically, the CATD proposes the
defense of labor rights
and the individual rights of the
worker, and the improvement of the

socioeconomic environment of the working
classes.

Specific policies

include the maintenance of independence
from political parties,

1

.
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establishment of Just
-just salaries,
*al a r~t a ~
t
Labor Code reform,
a more efficient
social security svsrpm
y system, the promotion of health
and educational proSrams, total lahor Hb
erty and 8 reater worker
participation in the
autonomous institutions.
Internationally, it has
declared Its
solidarity with the workers
of cne
the world,
world ™h
and supports the full
sovereignty of nations. 60
t.

,

With 11,088 members
representing 10.« of the
unionized work
force, the CATD is the
third largest confederation
in Costs Rica
Even more than the CCTD
and the CTC, the strength
of the confederation is in San dose where
10,710 members and 7 of its
9 unions

are
The CATD has no union
ion members
memeers in
i„ the
h,„ provinces
of Alajuela,
Cartage, Heredia, or
Guanaeaste, and only 378
members In the

located.

provinces of Puntarenas and
limon combined.
tbe CTC,

Onlike the CCTD and

the CATD does not include
an appreciable number of
indus-

trial or agricultural
workers.

In

fact,

the confederation consists

of little more than the
Union of Costa Rican Educators
(SEC), a

teachers association that
has not always been disposed
to cooperate
with other unions of a more
working class orientation, while
other

organizations have struggled for
higher salaries and labor liberties,
the SEC has been more concerned
with benefits of a non-essential

nature.

This orientation which belies
its program and policies,

has caused some doubt about
CATD's ability to call itself a
labor

organization.

Furthermore, CATD's independence has
been suspect

inasmuch as £20,000 (approximately
#2,000.00) of its (273,492

(approximately #7,350.00) budget in 1979
was derived from nonspecified donations

6
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CUT-

In January of l, 8l
the CGIC dissolved Itself
voluntarily In

order to facilitate the
Integration of the National
Federation of
Public Workers (FENATRAP)
and other previously
independent unions
The result of this merger
was the Central Unltaria
de Trabajadores
(Unitary Workers Center),
a class oriented
organisation that has
yet to be granted juridical
personality.
,

Deriving its antecedents from
the struggle against the
United Fruit Company in the
1930s, the CUT contends that
the process
of Costa Rican labor
development has reached a point
that requires
the total unionization,
and most importantly, the
total unification
of the working classes.

For this reason it aspires
to include all

unions and federations in its
files. 62
The CUT contends that the
persecution of labor leaders, limi-

tations of the social rights of
workers, and the partisan attitude
of labor judges, are all
reflections of the bourgeois nature
of Costa

Rican democracy.

The state is seen to be controlled
by a criollo

oligarchy composed of industrialists
and large landowners who support American policies of political
and military intervention as a
way of protecting their own
interests.

The effects of this alliance

have been deteriorating living
conditions, and a divided labor movement.

The central asserts that it will
struggle for the achievement

of an authentic democracy that
will fully acknowledge the economic,

social, and political rights of workers. 63
The long term structural requirements
of a just society are
not a subject that has preoccupied CUT
leadership.

However,

the

.

central
of

U

certain that this „

m

*.

^
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,

means of production,
but the extent of
statizatton hM
left undefined.
At any rate the
nationallzatlon of multinatlonai
corporations, and . radlcal
restructurlng

^
^
^
of

are goa l s that CUT
leadershlp
the central

U

_

primarily concerned

conditions of the working
classes.

Undhoiding

^

^

^

^^

Toward that end l£ has
placed

great emphasis on the firming
of durable collective
conventlons
Also important are changes
ln tax laus
Labor Code

_

_

greater
ing,

l abor

li ber tiea and guarantees

,

controls Qn

greater worker representation
in the

^^

rf

^

poUUoal

system, construction of low cost housing,
lower transportation and
electrical costs,
3nd subsidies for campesinos 6 *

The CUT has not been in dl
spose d to cooperate with
capitalists

when improvements in worki„
g -cl a ss economic conditions have been
at
stake, but the central
establishes the inevitability of
conflict
between the factors of promotion
as a fundamental principle,
and has
usually employed combative tactics
in defending worker interests.
This is seen to be the major
difference between other confederations
and the CUT, all of which,
despite programs and principles,
assume the

existence of a harmony between capital
and labor.
tactics,

With regard to

the CUT is correct in asserting
that it is the only authentic

class oriented central in Costa Rica.

65

With 20,487 members representing 19.2
percent of the unionized
labor force,

the CUT is the largest labor organization
in Costa Rica.

.
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Us

s tr e„ 8 th is

federations, both ln terms
of the types q£
ates, and ln the locatlQn
Qf

unions and

5

;

^^

much more evenly dispersed
than the other

of

^^

^

^

7i6 members are located
in th e San Jose region.

XM,

ls

substantially less than the
CCTD ana
and the
cne CATnlaw, h„
however the CUT shows
the same degree of strength
srrpnot-h
tl
the provinces of Pontarenas
and Limon
"here its membership numbers
5,203 and 5,962 workers
respectively.
The central is unchallenged
in the province of Heredia
where it incorporates 1,907 workers into
three unions, and also shows
much greater
strength in the provinces of
Alajuela and Guanacaste. Only
in the
province of Cartaso
tago does
dop<? the
rho CCTD
rcrrt
incorporate a majority of unionized
6 6
workers

„

.

-•

In addition to being the
largest,

organized labor organization.

the CUT is also the best

Some members of the directive
bodies

of member unions that had
been independent prior to the 1981
merger

objected to entering the central,
but CUT leadership asserts that
the vast majority of rank and
file union members support the unifi-

cation of the labor movement.

There has also been some disunity in

the "left" with regard to methods
and goals, but these conflicts most

usually occur on the political party
level.

With regard to labor,

all political tendencies within
the CUT are committed to a tactic
of militancy.

6 7

Independent Organizations.

CUT leadership is correct in asserting

that the force of the labor movement has
yet to be concentrated.
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*

addltlon t0 £our
con£ederatlons that haye
maintained di£fertag
fluently contradictory concepUons
of ciass reiations
the role 0£ lahor in
polltlcal sociali Md
economic deveiopment(
a great majority
of Costa
RiV,„
Coqi-p R 1C an unrons
have no federative or
confederative affiliations. One
e Hundred
hundred flfi-„
efifty-five
unions representing 52
185
workers, or fort y -„ine
percent of the unionise
„or k force fall into
this category. Most of
these independent unions
are located in the
San lose area, hut in
the provinces of Cartage
and Heredia the
majority of unionized worKers
workers h^,
„
havee no confc ederative
affiliation.
One of the largest independent
unions is the National
Educators Association (ANDE)
A teachers' union founded
in 1942,

^

_

^

,

™

.

the association boasts a
membership of 22,000.

Other important

unions are the National Union
of Public Employers (SNEP)
with 13,131
members, the National Union
of Social Security Employees
with 4,354
members, the National Union of
Public Works Workers with
3,058 members, and the National Union
of Hospital Workers with
2,121 members.
While ANDE and SNEP can claim
greater strength than some confederations,

the majority of independent
unions are small, and in some

cases membership levels are lower
than the requirements of the law.
The significance of this derives
from the fact that smaller union

organizations also tend to be weaker.

It is difficult to sustain a

strike when it is not supported by
conf ederative funds.

Smaller

unions are thus much more pressured
to accept patronal offers during

collective conflicts.

The total unification of the labor movement

has been established as a basic CUT
principle for exactly this
reason.

6 8

'
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Interunion Relations
The Costa Rlcan labor
movement was never more
unified Chan
in the period before
1948.
Owing to the understanding
that existed

between Bishop Sanabria and
Manuel Mora, and the coordinating
activities of the Comite de
Intelligencia, two large
confederations with
antagonistic principles and
goals, collaborated for the
benefit of
the working classes.
Organized labor profited greatly
from this
alliance.
Since that time, relations
between union organizations have
most usually been characterized
by hostility.
Communist-oriented
unions have accused the CCTD of
dividing and weakening the labor
movement, and of being an agent
of American Imperialism.
On the
other hand the CCTD, and In the
19 70s the CATD as well, have
accused
communist organizations of subversive
activities calculated to undermine social peace.
Conflicts occurring in the 1960s
underscored the hostility

between democratic and communist labor
organizations.

In December

of 1960 the CGTC accused Rerum
Novarum of being financed by the United

States government through the ORIT.

It

attacked the Ministry of

Labor for opening an investigation of
a CGTC affiliate and complained
that while the same union was affiliated
with the CCTRN, no repres-

sive measures of any kind were initiated.

69

For their part, the

CCTD in 1967 asked the Ministry of labor
to dissolve the CTGC because
of subversive activities.

The action was taken after the CGTC

attempted to organize personnel in the national
hospital system.

^

C GTC contended that

„ orkers had

^

rlght

^
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^

that thls could best
be accompllshed through
uniQn af£iliatio
CCTD on the other hand
claimed tha£
communiscs

^

^^^
^

tahe advantage of a
difficult national economic
situation.
It COntended that onanist
labor organisers were
infiltrating the hospital system and asserted
that "We of the Costa
Rioan Confederation of

Democratic workers have the
responsibility of unr.as.cing
false
leaders who pretend to be
acting with good intentions."'"
A great deal of attention
was given to what appeared
to be a
tendency toward cooperation
between democratic and colonist
labor
organizations after
Ler iyoe.
1968
Tn
n,«*
In that year, for instance,
all three

confederations collaborated in
the presentation of a
proposed Labor
Code reform intended to
protect labor leaders against
patronal repressive measures.

In 1969 and 1970 the COCC
and the CGTC partici-

pated in May Day festivities.

The CCTD, which had refused
participa-

tion owing to pressures from
the American labor attache,
joined
other confederations in the May
Day parade in the following
year.

71

The most serious collaborative
effort however, was the crea-

tion in 1976 of the Comite de
Unidad Sindical (Union Unity
CommitteeCUS), a union of the CCTD, CGTC,
CATD, and CTC that was intended
to

offer more effective protection of
working class interests.

Alli-

ances between confederations had
existed before, but they had always

been intended to serve short term
objectives, and they had always been
temporary.

The CUS on the other hand was supposed
to be a permanent

organization that would protect not only the
short term economic

134

interests of the „ orking
classes

^

as well.

The program of the
organization chus coyered ^
areas and included such
proposals as Labor Code
reforms, projects
allowing for broader labor
participation in legislative
decisions

^

worker representation in
the autonomous institutions,
broader labor
liberties, agrarian refom,
salary increases and price
controls."
Shortly after it was
constituted, however, relations
between
confederation delegates began
to deteriorate.
By 1,79 the CUS was
an organization that
existed "my
only on paper.
oaoar
n..
One commentary in the
Nacion accurately asserted
that the goals of the
organization were
not received with equal
enthusiasm by all four confederations.
Co mmU nist and democratic
unions were struggling for
common objectives,
but a coincidence of short
term goals betrayed profound
ideological
differences that made any alliance
unstable at best. Within the
alliance the democratic organizations
were only concerned with the

execution of programmatic objectives.

The CGTC on the other hand

considered working class economic
gains and the assurance of labor
liberties to be part of a long range
plan to alter political, social,
and economic institutions.

Inasmuch as the democrats had no such

aspirations, propositions presented by
the CGTC were suspect, even
though they served common short
term interests.

73

The disintegration of the CUS became
the basis for a subsequent

realignment that reflected these ideological
divisions.

The unifica-

tion of the labor movement had always
been a fundamental objective
of the CGTC, and a recognition of the
futility of interconf ederation

.
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alliances encouraged an
salification of the CGTC
organt2atl<jn
The result was the m
erger between the FENATRAP
the CGTC , and

_

,

several previously
independent unions.

For their part, non-

classist organizations,
recognizing a threat to the
democratic
labor
established another
interconnection alliance consisting of the CCTD, uaiij,
CATD Lie,
CTC ANDE,
ant>f
„ a
and
the Association of Secondary School Professors
(APSE).
The alli ance was denominated
Frente de Trabajadores
Democratic (Democratic Workers
Front FTD) 7k
The creation of the CUT
and the FTD has given an
organizational
basis to the conflict and
competition that existed in the
CUS
The

_nt,

a

,

.

^

—
.

democrats accuse the CUT of
betraying working class interests
by
attempting to undermine movements
that are undertaken by unions
outside the CUT organization.
In a train strike initiated
by the FTD
in 1981, for instance,

the CUT discouraged the
participation of FTD

affiliates, asserting that the
movement would result in a settlement
damaging to working class interest.
When it appeared that the Carazo
government was prepared to make
significant concessions, the CUT

published its support, in what was
regarded by FTD leadership as an
attempt to steal credit for the
movement. 75
The negotiating rights to collective
conflicts and collective

conventions has been a traditional source
of conflict between organizations that has given rise to several
internecine and potentially

economically destructive movements.

A typical incident occurring in

1975 threatened to paralyze several industries.

The conflict involved

CGTC interference in a collective conflict
that was being negotiated
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by the CCTD.

The communist
organization
rganizatron, supposing
.
that it possessed
a numerical majority
petitioned the uxnistry
Ministry ot
of Labor .to remove
CCTD
jurisdiction of the collective
conflict.
-lxul.
The
me LL1D
CCTD subsequently
. K
threatened t0 paralyze
Che reflnlng lndustry
and

^
^
^^^
^

The CGTC councer
threatened tQ iniuate
a

result in the certaln d e
structlon rf

Pacific and Atlantic
regions.

^

^^

^

^^

The STAPQ, a CGTC
affiliate initiated

a strike,

asserting that workers would
not return to work until
the
union was given a voice
in the deliberations. 76
Conflicts between confederations
have a variety of sources,
act the least of which
is the assertion by
democratic organizations
that the CUT'S plan to unify
the labor movement amounts
to the imposition of labor totalitarianism
and the destruction of
democratic

unions.-

The CUT on the other hand
contends that the democratic
confederations, owing to a variety
of factors, have kept the
potential
of the labor movement in
check.
In the first place, they
arguo, the

democratic unions are too small
to be effective.

Their financial and

numerical poverty, which diminishes
the capacity to initiate and
sustain strike movements, forces
them to look for quick solutions
that
are frequently inimical to
worker interests.

78

9
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TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE
CONFLICTS ACCORDING TO
CONFEDERATION: 1976 7
Confederation

Conflicts

CCTD
10

6.3

CTC
25

15.8

CGT
102

64.5

Independents
21

TOTAL

158

13.4

100.0

Statistics compiled by the
Center of Democratic Studies
for
Latin America (CEDAL)
demonstrate the willingness and
the ability of
the CUT to challenge
patronal authority. With 102
conflicts representing sixty-four percent of
all collective conflicts,
the communist
organization is far ahead of any
democratic confederation. The CUT

attributes its lead in this area
partially to ideological orientation,
and partially to the fact that
the leaders of the democratic
movement
are not really workers.
Having never
set foot in a factory, they

lack the experience that is
needed to defend working class
interests

effectively.
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Further debilitating the democratic
movement are ideological

differences among member unions.

The CUT asserts that the democratic

confederations have not been able to
reconcile the widely differing
attitudes that exist between white collar
and blue collar union

2
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-bars.

Converses

the

_ists,

„ ho also incorporat
e a wide

range of workers fro m
peasants to p ublic
administrators, cent end
that their white collar
memb ers have developed
a sense of so!idarit
y
other occupational
categories that has contributed
to a muc b
higher level of cohesion. 81
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TABLE 12

DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE
CONVENTIONS ACCORDING
TO CONFEDERATION:
1976 8

Confederation

Conventions

%

CCTD
4

8.5

CTC
3

6.4

CGT
39

83.0

CATD
1

TOTAL

2.1

47

100.0

Personalistic rivalries, ineffective
leadership, lack of cohesion, and an ideological
orientation that is seen by the CUT
to be

based upon class conciliation,
have contributed to the failure
of the
democratic movement to win collective
contracts.
The CUT thus asserts
that the democratic organizations
have not defended the economic

interests of the working classes.

The lopsided distribution of con.

ventions won by the CGT in 1976 adds
considerable weight

to

this con-

tention; but democratic organizations,
on the other hand, assert that

3
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collective conventions should not
be used as the only
criterion for
judging the effectiveness of
labor organization activities.
The
firming of contracts via
collective conflicts is a
procedural route
that has been used effectively
by communist unions; however,
the
democratic organizations assert
that they have defended worker
interests with equal vigor, although
by means of direct negotiation. 8
Interunion attacks reflect the
perception that each confederation has of its social role.

The CUT views itself as an instrument

of social justice and an engine
of radical change.

Democrats, for

their part, inasmuch as they view
themselves as occupying the middle

ground between the Camaras (Chambers)
on one hand, and a revolutionary

movement on the other hand, have a profound
belief that they are the
caretakers of social harmony.

Armed with these convictions, and

the belief that they both represent the
true aspirations of the work-

ing classes,

interunion cooperation has been considered by
union

leaders to be an impossibility.
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Concluding Remarks

Three important developments occurred in the Costa Rican
labor

movement in the post-rebellion period.

The first was an increase in

union persecution that encouraged a process of deunionization
during

which labor unionism practically disappeared.

The second was a re-

unionization drive that established the CUT as the most powerful and
combative labor confederation, and which left the democratic movement
divided and weak.

The third was the development of an irreconcilable

.
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-t ubor

organl2ations

^

^

^^
^
^^

Mcan state
nespite Che potential
that „ as crMted by
economtc grouth
eaucratic expansion, Costa
Rican labor unionise
is still weak at
least in terms of unity
ana the percentage of
the work force that
has been unionized.
!n terms of labor
relations,

the most important
characteristic

of the post-rebellion
period, has been the
combined application of
patronal, legal, and
government powers against
labor anion activities
Herein lies one of the
most important reasons
for Costa Rica's relatively low level of
unionization.
Countless cases of union
persecution have left a clear
impression that it would be
safer and much

more practical for workers
to deal with employers
individually rather
than collectively.
But what stands out most
clearly during collective conflicts is the
coincidence between government
and employer
interests, and the utilization
of the judicial system
to defend those
interests
The Costa Rican labor
relations system is characterized
by a
sequence of action or a process,
that employs a different mechanism
of repression at each stage.
a collective conflict,

Before and during the initial
stage of

repressive actions are employed by
patrons.

During the conciliation process
labor ministry officials pressure
unions to accept patronal offers.

In subsequent stages the appeals
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of the Ministry „ f
labor are replaced by
prohiblUons by
courts and ultlmately by
the force q£

^

^

^

Finally,

thfi

ubor

through the combination
of judicial
iudicial „„A
k
and physical
force, and
labor ministry and executive
appeal, a settlement is
reached which
while fluently representing
modest economic gains,
most often leaves
labor organizations as
vulnerable to anti-union
patronal attacks as
they were in the period
before the conflict was
initiated,
still
*ore importantly, the
ability of labor organizations
to defend socioeconomic interests remains
dependent opon the good will
o£ the executlve authority.
•

,

The mechanism that puts
this process into motion
is a Labor
Code which, while specifying
the rights of labor, is at
once much
more clear in its statements
of obligations and
prohibitions, much

more subject to deformed
interpretations, and much more useful
to
patrons, than its authors had
intended.
How the code protects or
undermines union organization, and
how it controls union activity
will be the subject of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER

iv

JURIDICAL INTEGRATION
The Labor Code was
i Mtitutad tuo
decades
had begun to make an
impact on Costa Rlcan

^^^
^
^

the 1920s workers in
San dose had demonstrated
their
-d their ability to acr

^

wiiHngness

collectively.

A Little more than
a decade
later communist labor
organizers
ganizers In t-h
a k
the
banana zones had served
notice Co both policy-makers
and employers char
production in this
economically lmportant reglon

m

^^^

^

rights and worker benefits
were not forthcoming.

^

^

Labor Codes that
had been instituted in
other Latin American
countries under simiLar

circumstances intended to
diffuse working ciass
radicalism by restricting collective action
whiie legitimizing collective
association
Where Costa Rica is concerned
however, there can be little
doubt
that Caldero'n Guardia and
Manuel Mora, who were
instrumental in both
creating and implementing
the Labor Code, were
primarily

motivated
by a sincere desire to
achieve a more equitable balance
of power
between the factors of
production. Nevertheless, it
should be carefully noted that there has
existed a great difference between
the
intentions of the administration
that instituted the Labor Code,
and

the way in which it was
interpreted in the subsequent period
of Costa

Rican labor development.

On the one hand the code did
represent a
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or organl2atlons

there was considerable
doubt abQut

Unl ° nS

C

°

BXlSt

Trr

-

SeC ° ndl

uorker rishts

- — «—

-

and a reaim

^

right

^

to specify . body
of

f

°

to be of crucial

Up to

^
-—
.

importance in t-v^
the protection of
those rights.
But
along with these libera a~
liberal declarations,
it cannot be
denied that the
same legislation, in
sDeMfv-f™
specxfyxng extensive
obligations and prohibitions, seemed to
cancel out any rights
gnts that it was
y
supposed to have
conferred upon the working
classes in
i

i

^

^^

Owing to these
contradictions it could he
argued, with e qual
Justification, that the Lahor
Code either iiherated
the working
dasses through its
recognition or hasic rights,
or disarmed and
-opted the iahor movement
by tying unions to
the state an d confining
their activities in
such a way as to render
the. ineffective.
What
should he emphasized
however, is that in
reiation to the guarantees
that had existed previous!,,
and in relation to the
response it
elicited fro, conservstive
events, the Lahor Code was seen
to represent a giant step forward
in the development
union

_nt.

of the Costa Rican lahor

For this reason,

second day of independence.

September 15, 1943 was called

a

Nevertheless this same code,
however

radical it m ay have heen
in the pre-rehellion
period, was flexible
enough to be used b
y conservative elements in the
subsequent period
to impede unionization
and prohibit labor activity.
In fact, the
code has been used against
labor with such effectiveness
that it is
considered to be the lynch
pin of anti-labor activity.
For this

.
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reason legal reforms have
been a

b asic

goal of all four
confedera-

tions

Patrimonial Basis
The architects of the
Labor Code drew
uicw hpavilv
ueavny trom
fr™ a variety
of sources including
the OIT,
OTT m,„
* j
the n
Uruted
8
States, Spain, and several
Latin African countries.
Particularly influential
were the Mexican
Labor Code, which served
as a m odel f or
provisions re g ardin collecg
tive conflicts, and the
Chilean Labor Code, which
served as a basis
for conciliation and
arbitration procedures.
According to Calderon
Guardia, all of these elements
were har m„nized with the
social doctrine of the Catholic Church,
as it had been put forth
in Rerum Novar
Quadragesimo Anno, Divine
Rede.ptoris, and the Codigo
Social de
•

Malinas
From this description it
would seem that the Costa Rican
Labor Code fell well within
the Catholic, Latin,
patrimonial tradition.

It would thus be possible
to say that the code was
bound to

be much more regulative than
its framers
to be.

had wanted, or intended it

In the Social Guarantees
for instance, which served as
an

outline for the code, a heavy
emphasis was placed upon collective
responsibility.

In this connection several
provisions show a preoccu-

pation for the maintenance of social
peace.

Labor organizations

were given the right to function
but only for the exclusive purpose
of defending economic and social
interests.

Any form of political

activity was strictly prohibited, and
while workers were given the

.

t0

"

—
™
——
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WOrkerS

inClUdi
'

-

yees and

Urge categor-

agrwtural

cultlvation of delicate
eropa<

vork _

Thiseffgc

cancelled out the right
to strike for
or a vast majority
ma
of workers inasmuch as Costa R ica
had, and still has,
h*« an
agriculturally based
economy that depends
significani-1
gnxfxcantly
v n
on revenues from
banana and coffee
exports
"

,

m

-ial

P-ector

of the „ orking
classes ,

ts charg£d

for re g ulatin salaries,
8
vacatlons> „ ork hours>

indexes.

The execution of this

the establishment of
labor courts

,

is

used m ost

fluently

^

^

.

^

as an lnst

_

^^

Most usuaUy however>

applled ln a manner damaging

while th e Labor Code
guarantees

^^

responsibmty

„ hich ln practice>

flics, both i„ dividual
and collectiye
Judicial authority

^

responsibmty

responsibility for the resolutlon
of ,

»d

^^

Along with these
prohibitions
Lions, and In -tune
with Catholic
doctrine, several
artlcles
basic

f undamental

^

iabor interests

rlghts>

££ has

^

„f

The Power of Firing

Employers h ave used . wide
variety of wespons to discourage
union activity:

the most common an d most
effective of which has

been the power to arbitrarily
release troublesome workers.

«

,
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-ees

against lrresponslHe

^^^^

^

actions
whiie
antees were seen to
present a rh>Present
threat- to the
patrimonial relationship
that had existed
between labor and capita!
capital, •employers
have used flexlbU Ub ° r Code provlslons
<°
an attempt to
Postpone and ln many
cases
prohiMt
_

——
^^^^
,

«~

,

„

^

izations

Responsibility for the
termlnatlQn as

UX- «
employe,:
C

" in8

labor contracts

^
—

,U S

"*

PrOViSl °"

collective conflicts.

changes

^

^

^
^ ^^^^

almost entirely ln the
hands Qf the

the only protectlon

ft0m 3

^

lng the flrlng o£ workers
durlng

The basis of enployer

work force begins with a
legal princIple> Jus

^

fcrs upon employers, ss
the directors of means
of production, the
right to change the terms
of a labor contract,
with or without the
approval of the worker. The
only restriction on the
use of this

provision is that any changes
in the conditions of
work must reflect
the needs of the business,
and they must not damage
the moral or
economic interests of the
worker.

^

Nevertheless, countless modifi-

cations in the terms of
employment are justified by the
needs of
the industry.
It
worth 00tlng> in thls connectlon>
lafcor

U

^

contracts are in the first place
bilateral agreements reflecting
the voluntary compliance
of both parties.

That the contract may,

be changed with the compliance
of only one party places in
doubt
the equitability of the
agreement that both parties had entered
into.
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Inasmuch as ius vsr-ia^-;
landl Pe

™ ltS

chan «« in the

f 0rm , the hours
and the location of
work, it has provided
employers
"F-Luyers with an
important

—

^
,

-r

discoura g in g rank and
flle partlcipation
and

f or

„

^

that matter any
other form of collective
action

in .ore genera!

te„s

the si gniflcance o£
jug

the tact that it
piaces the employee
almost at the compiete
exposal of the employer h
y conferri„ g discretionai
power up0 n the
employer and the o bl i
g atio„ to obey opon the
worker.
Where the

Glance of power hetween
worker and employer

is concerned, the principle thus for m s a
doohie-ed g ed hiade of
suhordination. The employer
ahle to deterge the
for. in which he win
enploy the „ orker
»hile it is the responsihiiit
y of the worker to comply „
lth employer
commands.
Furthermore, the employer
is ahle to take disci
pli „ a r y
action by virtue of the
power conferred upon him
as the director of
a center of production.

-

The recognition of the
employer, or patron, as the
director
of a center of production
is critical not onl
y i„ terms of its effects

on individual employees,
but for the implications
it carries for

labor as a collectivity.

That is to say, employers
are entrusted

with the responsibility of
taking whatever action is
deemed necesaary to insure the survival
or increase the efficiency
of the center
of production.

Countless modifications in labor
contracts are thus

justified by the needs of the
industry without concern for the
implications this may have for the
worker.
This of course includes
the

termination of labor contracts.

While the code stipulates that the

application of jus variandi
must
wor k er, „orker complaints
must
lon g and expensive
proC ess of

_

^ ^
^^
^

grave

^ submitted ^
U tlgatlon and the
,
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^
o£

^
^

unfavorable judgement,
frequently discourages
iscourages sui
rs against
suits
employers.
At the same time
t-h*> Hifp;,
i*me, the
difficulties that legal action
poses for labor
encourages employers to
destroy
oy unions In
in the
rt.. process
of formation
by firing or transferring
labor leaders. 3
•

What also merits attention,
where the application of
juS
variandi is concerned, is
th e method that has
been prescribed for
the resolution of disputes.
The only response allowed
for patronal
actions against individual
employees is litigation.
Grievances of
this sort are completely
removed from the responsibility
of the union.
In this connection it is
worth pointing out that the
Labor Code defines two types of conflicts.
Conflicts of an economic and
social

nature are concerned with the
establishment of new rights or benefits,

that is to say improvements
or adjustments in salaries
or work-

ing conditions.

Conflicts of a juridical nature
involve interpreta-

tions of labor contracts.

Conflicts of this sort, especially
in

cases of individual violations,
frequently are settled through litigation.
Conflicts of an economic and social
nature, on the other
hand, are resolved through
actions initiated by labor unions.

That

is not to say however that
conflicts of this nature are the exclu-

sive responsibility of unions;
it only means that proceedings for
new

collective contracts begin at the level
of the labor union, independent of judicial authority.

In fact the Labor Code specifies not
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cm,
«ve

the rules by „ hlch
.

^
^

may inuiate proceedings

convention, it also
estabUshes

^

^

^

a

^

Ministry of Labor or
the Lahor
Labor Tr-ii.
Tribunal at various
stages of the confilet resolution process.
These procedures serve
to add
a

tension

to a patrimonially
oriented and re uiator
g
y

system that begins with
iegai retirements for
union
operation.

second

labor-relations

for^ion

and

With regard to employer
abuses, companies have
used the Labor
Code to impede union
organization and repress
Labor activity at ali
stages of the conflict
resolution process, whether
the conflict is
of a juridical or
socioeconomic nature.
The Labor Code does
not
prohibit the firing of
workers before, during, or
after the formation
of a union.
Nor does the code
prohibit the firing of workers
while
a union is in the
process of submitting a
petition for a collective
convention.
Prohibitions on the release of
employees begin only after
a list of petitions or
grievances has been delivered
to the labor
courts.
At that moment a collective
conflict is initiated and all
firings must be made with
Judicial authorization. This
however does
not prevent employers from
threatening to fire workers once
the conflict has been terminated.

Outside of the legal status
that is given to the collective
conflict, Article 29 of the
Labor Code prohibits the firing
of a

worker without just cause.

This provision however has not been
very

effective inasmuch as employers
can release workers without just
cause with the payment of
indemnizations
Apart from the fact that
.
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«.e a mount o£ Indemlzation
la

wrtar .. only alternatlve

tt frfiquentiy
in

instMce

^

is expensivfi

consuming legal action.
The power to Elre
a „ orker has been

^^ ^

^^

^

of Agricultural Workers
of Sixaola
<?-f v *«i
dxsxntegrated after all
members of
the Junta Directiva
were tired.
fired
Tho
n
The Union of Banana
Workers of Limon
.

•

disintegrated after Standard
Fruit ri
fired
red ,11
all union leaders.
The
union was reorganized a
year later h,,f
but adisintegrated when the company
once again fired its
leadership. A subseouent
reorganization attempt
incurred the same response.
The Union of Workers of
the Northern
Railway Company was dissolved
in 1958 after all
members of the Junta
Directiva were fired.
In the 1960s labor
unions formed at the Saprisa
factory were destroyed when
their leadership was fired.
At the Junay
Finca in Turrialba
agricultural workers attempted
to organize four
times.
On each occasion the union's
leadership was fired. On the

u

,

i

fourth occasion, all workers
on the farm were fired whether
or not
they were associated with
the union. 4
The CGTC at that time asserted
that constitutional and Labor

Code guarantees protecting
the right to unionize were
totally ineffective inasmuch as legal provisions
such as Article 28 of the Labor
Code, which permitted employers
to fire workers without
just cause,

served in the end to cancel out
labor rights.

The confederation

complained that employers could
effectively prohibit union development by firing any worker at any
time, as long as it was done before
or after a collective conflict.

5
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Company

r e„ reanlMlon

has called deunionization
by p

has become

„.

^

Ministry or Labor notl£led
labor ieaders
tacns that a strike
that had been

Shortly after, the Gen
eral

Sector

o£

Rzca c 0 »uni=ated the
dismissal of 280

basis

utet

^
^
^

^

sev£rai banana

^

the CompaSia

wAer ^

^

^

^
^

om

^^
^

^

Costa

^

criticism of the Ministry
ry or
of Labor
0 company
Labor, rh
the
stated that its personnel reductions were
made on thee basis
Dasis of »™
economxc and not politi•

cal factors.

6

The arbitrary release
of workers (despido)
as a tactic that
has been used by employers
with regularity and
effectiveness since
1948.
More recent examples of its
use include actions taken
by the

Coca-Cola Company in 1979 and
the Yohan Company in 1980
where fifty
and twenty workers
respectively were fired while
attempting to organize unions.

Besides these multi-national
corporations firings have

been used by national businesses
with e„ual vengeance.
most extreme anti-union actions
on the part of

a

One

of the

national enterprise

occurred in one of Costa Rica's
largest department store concerns
where
every one associated with an
emerging labor movement was fired
on the
spot.

The company stated that it was
restructuring its organization.'

Labor leaders of both communist
and non-communist orientation

attribute the low level of Costa
Rican unionization to the relentless
persecution of labor leaders and rank
and file union members.
the CGTC in the 1950s,

Like

they have asserted that Labor Code
guarantees

supposedly protecting the right to unionize
are a mere fiction.
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While employers were
opposed to labor
legislation
xegislation

o™

-

ends;

^

they have conslstentiy

weaken the iabor

KTCMt

their p

m
,

_^

and preserve
paternaUstic

employer org a „i zatio ns
such as

Association of Economlc
Development (ANF£)

-on

„
the
1940s,

_

they

^

£ire workers

Nationai

^^

^

^

than labor unions, and
are able to use this
power to justify

and encourage anti-onion
attacks,
class oriented unions,

m

a

ia^cion, Costa

oal, published an article
attacking

typical

indicant

against

Rica's most important
periodi

_ist

labor leaders for dis-

figuring the labor movement
by converting
^""verting ,',
it <„,.
into a movement against
the dignity of the human
being.
The labor movement, it
was stated,
must not fall into the
hands of leaders who, having
ac q uired some
degree of power, lose touch
with reality.
Distinctions are frequently mode by the Cameras
between democratic and
non-democratic
unions.
Those unions that happen to
be the most combative are
usually branded as communistic.
The suspicion that a union
may be
subversive can unleash a claim
of repressive measures on
the part of

government from special investigations
to the removal of juridical
personality, and on the part of
employers from the firing of a junta
directiva to the firing of an entire
8
union.

This state of circumstances has
prompted the CGTC to declare

on various occasions that employers,
as well as the government, were

openly hostile to the labor movement.

The government permitted local
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authorities t0 be sponsored
by large business
enterprises
result that labor leaders
„ ere

^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^

whll. att^pting to carry
banana

2 one,

Mt

union-related actlvitles

_

^^
u

^

for instance, labor
leaders have been jailed
and or

threatened with physical
violence for such activities
as distributing union literature,
disseminating anti-company
propaganda, or
gathering support for a
collective convention. Union
members have
been threatened for supporting
collective conventions or
strikes,
while non-unioni Z ed workers
have at times been required
to state,
under the penalty of firing,
that they would not
Join a union.'
Even more frequently
companies will take advantage
of the powers
conferred upon them through
the principle of jus
variandi to discipline troublesome workers by
transferring them to less agreeable
duties.
A typical example of this
method of repression occurred
when
one labor leader on property
owned by the Compafiia Bananera
de Costa
Rica, was transferred to swamp
cleaning duties when he was
discovered
gathering support for a strike. 10
There are several other more
subtle,

though no less important

tactics that employers use to
repress union activities.

Employers

have not hesitated to disqualify
from employment anyone having a
history of labor activity, and many
authors and labor leaders have contended that businesses frequently
circulate lists of the names of
the country's most notable labor
organizers.

No less importantly,

the Labor Code does not prohibit
company management from interfering

in the competition between unions
in a factory.

Employers frequently
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»—

Pr ° m0te

•

At the moment that
„ orkers attenpt to

adopt . more conbatlve
posUlonj

biii

^

Legal dispositions „
hlch leave unlons

attacks have prompted

^

Ubor organizations, research

institutes, and
Political parties to draft
Labor Code reform proposals
that have
been designed to prohibit
the flring o£

^

Judicial authority.

Owing to patronal pressures
and the disposition
of political forces in
the Legislative Assembiy
however, no significant reforms have been
approved.

Collective Conventions
Apart from legal dispositions
that place workers at the
complete disposal of employers,
the Labor Code prescribes
a long list
of procedures and regulations
for the resolution of labor
conflicts
that both involves the heavy
participation of the Ministry of
Labor

and the Labor Tribunals, and
places unions at the mercy of
patronal
attacks,

The code states that particular
patrons are required to negotiate collective conventions
upon the demand of more than
one-third
of the workers in a factory
or center of production.

ments at this stage of the process
are:

The require-

that the percentage must

be calculated upon the total
number of workers in a factory;

that

the convention must be negotiated
with the largest union in the

factory; and that a term of thirty
days must be given to direct labor-

management negotiations.

12

There are several points which should be

'

!(,()

noted about this
procedure.

I„ the ,fi
±9at
rst place,
.

the code makes
reference to "particular
patrons," by which it i
is meant only
y
employers

to

demand collective c„
wcntlras „as brough[

* -e

early 1950s

.

Ihe

Murt

^
^^
_ ^

judg

t

^

^

the object of excluding
tMS " a3 done
from sue
M,'""
8 *'*"™* th<? State and l»
institutions, inasmuch
as It
S^*
bee " Ms tendon,
would have been
It
sufficient to sav- ' ,?
a
stated In the Mexican
P trons,' as it Is
labor code^"

Buttressing these labor
Code and judicial
dispositions is the Ley de
Administracion Financiera
(Pi„ a „ clal Admlnlstratlo
„ Law)

^^

e

conf °™ance »Uh
constitutional and corx2£rfi» ,
"
P
P SUl0nS
the li.lt of action
0 """"""
of
b
fpol rs tor
o
th
the
e°
H disposal
J
use a nd
state resources. 14
of

H

r

The same law later
states that each departmental
budget constitutes
a

Mxi»u»

which can not be exceeded.-

Public institutions, both

centralized and autonomous,
do negotiate collective
conventions, but
the state is under no
obligation to deal with unions.
Consequently,
as the following table
Indicates, the number of
conventions negotiated
by atate institutions
falls far below the number
that Is negotiated
in the private sector.
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TABLE 13

DISTRXBUTTON OF COUECTXVE
CONVENTIONS ACCORDING TO
SECTOR:

I 976

»

Quantity

Centralized Public
1

Autonomous— semi-autonomous

1.0

15

15.6

Municipalities
12

12.5

Private Sector
68

70.8

96

100.0

TOTAL

A second point that should
be noted is that the right
to demand
a collective convention
requires one-third approval
of all workers
in a center of production.
The process of collecting
signatures is
time consuming and employers
frequently use this period to fire
either
union leaders or rank and file
union members. 17 Movements
that would

ordinarily receive the approval
of a vast majority of workers,
often
never get off the ground. Another
difficulty associated with percentage requirements is that
workers, owing to patronal intimidation,

will prefer not to be associated
with labor organizations.

Consequently

the number of unionized workers
in many factories falls below
the

percentage requirement.

This problem was particularly acute
in the

1950s and 1960s when the number of
unionized workers in Costa Rica

had been significantly reduced.

As late as 1968, only 5.3 percent of

the Costa Rican work force was
unionized.

According to one author,

this made collective conventions
practically impossible

1

8
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TABLE 14

DISTENTION

OF COLLECTIVE
CONVENTIONS BY YEAR

1

'

Year

Quantity
1967
1

1.0

1968
1

1.0

1969
3

3.1
19 70
3

3.1

1971
14

14.6

1972
27
28.1

1973
10

10.4

1974
15
19 75

15.6

22

22.9

As Table 14 indicates,
collective conventions after
1968 in-

creased dramatically.

This in large part is
attributable to tbe

unionization increases that were
registered around the same time
as
a result of the economic
prosperity brought about by the
Central

American Common Market.

Nevertheless,

the level of Costa Rican

unionization, not having risen
above ten percent, would indicate
that unions in many factories
still lack the numbers required to

initiate proceedings for collective
conventions.

A third point that should be noted
is that the right to demand
a collective convention is
at all times provisional.

Should the

~»
-
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of

»m

<— *

f rom

wooers approvlng

a convention

Percenta g e, employers
can stQp negoUation
^

pat ron a l a

„ acks

a[

ne g otiatio„s durlng
whlch employers

"
"

^

^

wiU. provided

UnJU3t CaUSe -" 2
°

stagfi of

^

^ ^^^^^ ^

at iiberty to

Wm

^

they pay the
lndemnlzat , ons assoclateQ
uith
In thls

»Ploy.ra are abl e

to abort eoU . c .
tive conventions and
reduce the effectiveness
of labor actlvlty
At the end of the
thirty day term> dlrect
negotlatlons batween
labor and management
come tQ
end>
just after
into effect, even the
petition for a collective
convention retired
the presence of
inspectors from the Ministry
of Labor
Thls ln
i. stiil
common
pra
.
ctice.
Current l abo r practice
retires the union
to deliver
copy
of
the
.
convention to the ministry
before ne g oti a tions hsve hegun.
In the event that ne
g oti a tions f.U, the union
must send . copy of the
petition to the a ppropri a te
lab or court.
At t hat moment
. collective conflict is considered
to hsve heen initiated end the termination
of .
labor contracts t ,
.

^

^^^^
.

U

out Judicial authorization.

^

^

It then becomes the
responsibility of

oourt to for*
.

condition

representees

of both parties.

the

tribunal that will hold
discussions with
The representatives of the
concilia-

tion tribunal theoretically
are neutral participants in
the tripartite
discussions, but labor leaders
have complained that their
real function is to pressure labor
leaders to accept employer offers. 21
In

*.

—e

Severn^

C ° nfUCt

Part "er

3

"

—

representatives have attempt£d

COUeC " Ve

^^^

than one onion Mas
lnvolvedln the negotiations

*

ml0n alU

-

—-

22

^

-*

*.

le ss

_

costive

«*«

0public secur!t y
forces have been
mobilized even
n before
•,
netore the ,„
conciliation
process had
begun.
.

^™~™XV

TABLE 15
E

CO^ICXS

AC 0 0RWNG X0 FORM OF

^

Quantity

business
25

8.5

Conciliation
119

40.7

Arbitration
6

2.0

Strike
12

4.1

Courts
131

TOTAL

293

44.6
99.9

A large percentage of
conflicts are resolved at the
level of
conciliation; however, a larger
percentage of conflicts are resolved
at later stages of the
resolution process.
In the event that both
parties fail to come to an
agreement during the course of
tripartite
negotiations, the labor organization
is left with two alternatives:
submit the matter to arbitration
or request permission from the
labor
courts to initiate a strike.
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"hen negotiations between
labor and
to

.anient

do not iead

sections, the o„ ly elective
course of action tot
labor

is the

tant measure of the
balance of power between
the f actots of production.
Yet extensive legal
regulations on the use of
this most important power are so
prohibitive that it is
practically removed from
the domain of labor
activity.

One specialist in Costa
Rican labor legislation
has perceptively noted that the
strike in Costa Rican
history has gone through
three stages:
the period of the illegal
strike; the coexistence
of the right to strike
and the liberty to strike;
and a blending of
the first two periods.
!„ the first period, legal
dispositions prohibited collective action
aimed at upsetting the iiberty
of supply
and demand. Article
308 of the 1880 Penal Code,
for instance,
stated that

Ve r

y fr UdUl6nt

Ubor
labor, m
^ f
materials

Sh ° uld alter *e common
price of
or merchandise, stocks, or
public or private

incomes, or any other such
activity will suffer the penally
P^lty of
imprisonment or a fine of 100-306
colones.' 25

Similarly, the Penal Code of 1924
stated that
'whoever consciously spreads unfounded
alarms or false informaassoci *<:ed with production and consumption,
J?
or false dealings,
or through concerted action
oppresses the
liberty of supply and demand or uses
any other type of fraud
to alter the value of salaries,
materials or merchandise or any
r
COnmercial traffic
suffer the penalty of
?inemen? '^

L?LT

>

*U
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The second hlstorlcal
perlod

kOU8ht ab ° Ut
The Penal

C^e

^
o f 19

«

_

^

^^«ve

8 o,

did not Include

^

^^^

^

^

the Bloc, of Victoria

^

actions aimed at dlsruptlng
. laissez . £alre
capltalistic
system.
It on ly prohlblted
labQr organl2atlons
£ron forcing uorkers
to go on strike.
Article 257 stated, for
instance, that

clones, or both penalties
will be applied to,
1
h„ Zu
Vl ° lenCe or
against anotner partv to
2
He Wh °'
himself or
"
h
i""
t
f
ei *"
°
to oblige anothe
p
y 0
ShUtdOUn 0r C be
separated fro, a lega/assocla
°
tion"-

^

'

™^!;"™I

*

-

'

The strike as a right
and a liberty corresponds
to the period

medi-

ately following the
implementation of the Social
Guarantees and the
Labor Code. 28
The present epoch is
characterized by a combination of
the

first two periods.

The right to strike has
not been removed or changed,

but the liberty to go on
strike has been greatly reduced.

29

One can begin to find the
justification for this interpretation in Labor Code dispositions
regarding the percentage of support
that is needed for a strike
petition to even be considered by
the
courts.

While the requirement for a
collective convention is thirty

percent,

the code specifies that strikes
must have the support of

sixty percent of all workers in a
factory or center of production.
This difference points to the
conclusion that the resolution of col-

lective conflicts involves progressively
increasing regulations at
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each stage of the bargaining
process

.

fct apart

it must be considered
to be lnordinately
hlghj

,UireBent C3JSeS Pr0ble " S
»h

-Ploy workers

«"

is considered

o£ various professlons>
most of

^^^^

^

that most

^

interest in the conflict
in the fi rs t place.the broad scope of banana
production operations.

sixty percMt

facias

probabiy

^^

Consider for instance
The Compafiia

Bananera de Costa Rlca not
onl y employs various kinds
of
workers on several separate
farms, but engineers,
office
personnel officials, iabor
relations specialists, public
Officials, marketing personnel,
janitors, transportation

-rkers, etc.

^

agricultural
workers,

relations
and packing

In addition to operations
directly associated with

banana production, the Standard
Fruit Company even operates
box factories.
Each one of these professions
is an independent entity
that
possesses its own specific interests
and problems.
Each one must
therefore be treated independently
when proceedings have been initiated for a strike.
It would be worth pointing
out that the Labor Code dispositions

on collective conventions take
into account these peculiarities.

Article 56 Section

C

states that

in the case that they [all the
syndicates in a factory] can not
reach an agreement, the union
corresponding to each profession
or occupation can require the
celebration of a collective convention, in order to determine the
conditions relative to said
profession or occupation within the mentioned
business or center
of production.

On the other hand, in the event that
collective negotiations breakdown,

the union representing that same profession
is prohibited from

initiating a strike,
unless it la able
to

Closer related
WOrk6rS t0 3bStain

^

—^~
^ ^^ ^^^
^

to this prohle,
is

the preference Qf

U

us employers
frequently

coerce workers into
abstaining

-hing support

^

^

^

for . strike

w

before the Lab or Trihunals
the courts ruled

abstaining workers must be
respected ag much

^

^

^

^

^

The court a dded that the
idea that results shou
ld be calculated on
the nu.ber of votes
cast, is a principie
that applies to eiectoral
Politics and not to matters
of a conflicts
nature.
The nu mber of

abstaining workers was thus
added to the nu.oer of
anti-strike votes
and the collective conflict
was rejected.

TABLE 16
CAUSES OF STRIKE PETITION
REJECTIONS

Less than 60% of the workers

33

Quantity

%

18

52.9

1

3.0

13

38.1

1

3.0

Patronal pressure

Considerations of the business as

a

block

Miscellaneous
TOTAL
34

i

nn n

h
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The failure of unions
to gain sufficient
support has figured
the principle cause
Qf strtke re ecUons
b
wor t
noting that a significant
percentage of strike
reactions, at ieast
19 76, were attributable to
the
cne courts
court*' judgement
<
a
that collective
confiicts must b e assessed
in individual centers
of production
The courts have rejected
coiiective confiicts hrought
against more
than one factory of a
particular genre with the
judgement that the

-

^ u ^

.

^

m

individual peculiarities of
each factory call for
individual collective conflicts.
The justification for
this has been Article
36 4 of
the Labor Code which
states that strikes must
be employed for the
exclusive purpose of defending
socioeconomic interests.'*
Sympathy
strikes do not meet this
criterion and are automatically
declared
illegal
While prohibitions against
sympathy strikes have been
critical from an historical
perspective, the most important
prohibitions
are those associated with
occupational categories. Qualifications
on the use of the strike begin
with legal provisions referring
to
public employees.

Article 61 of the Constitution
acknowledges:

The right of patrons to the
shutdown and the right of workers
to strike except in the
public services in accordance with
the
636 [SerViC6S] C
Stit ^e the law and m „ t
conform to tL
I'"
the regulations
that the law establishes, those
being
the repudiation of any act of
coercion or violence. ?5

r^

^

-

Corresponding to this regulation Article
369 Section A states that
strikes will not be permissible for "all
those who undertake the

9
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labors of the state
or its institutions
-LLucions.

T
Inasmuch as public
employees do not have
the riphtright to requxre
collective conventions,
Article 368 of the Labor r n A
Code states that all
differences between
workers and employers
in the public sector
win *be automatically
will
submitted to the Labor
Tribunals. 37
t-

The regulations
presented for the resolution
of labor conflicts
in the public sector
are more harsh than
any other occupational
eatethat is precluded from
the use of the strike.
Underlining the
importance that has been pl
ace d upon the dependability
of state
workers, Article 33, of
the Labor Code

ry

^

-

incite a strike in a public
institution with the stiff
penalty
of imprisonment or fine. 38

TABLE 17

DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS
ACCORDING TO SECTOR 3

Quantity

%

Centralized Public
3.1

Autonomous and semi-autonomous
16.0

Municipalities
3.8

Private Sector
77.1

TOTAL
100.0

Oespite these controls
however>

v-e

^^

shQuid

^
^
—
—
^^^
^
^
*——

has lntimidated
CQsta Rican
adnInistrations co
SP6Cial COnCeSSl ° nS
«•
t. bring a labor
t- a speed, end
For

«"

.

Sal3rieS th3n

as

"on.

"

0rke

" -

tbe occur-

iUegal strikes perpetrated

01tlfflately ,

™i„g „

conmct

^

any other cMter

the disproportlonately

^

the publlc sector
would indicate

^

^

confiicts

ubor

are maintained in a st^ P r>f „
state of complacency
through the use of carrot
and stick tactics
i

While the state ma at
y
times be a more benevolent
employer
It consists pubiic
sector unions t0
be part „ f

-in

and applies all

t he

paternalistic

sures that attend upon
that function.

increasingly important in
Costa Rican

bureaucratic growth since
„or ld War

„

^

b ene fi ts and

Wis

^

^

diaciplinary mea-

function ts becoming

^

has heen accompanied by
propor-

tional decreases in the
ability of workers to exercise
their constitutional right to strike.
Bat besides increases in
the number and
size of state institutions,
the special conflict
resolution procedures prescribed for public
employees is critical inasmuch
as the
Labor Code includes a broad
realm of activities within
its definition
of public services.

,
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m

addition t0 Korkers „
ho are dlrecay
empioyed
Lab ° r
include all those
actl,ities ssociated
*
" lth the
ation, or recollectlon
Of agricultural or
£orest products
strikes
uorters
these occupations is
prohlbUed

^

^

°*

——
-

,

^^

P-duc t .-

-

^
^^^

Thls dlsposltion becomes
es?eciaiiy critiMi

-ken tato consideration

^

^

that agricultural
production is the

n

^

^ ^
^ ta

comer-

stone of the Costa Rican
economy.
Besides the prohibitions
on agricultural workers
Article 369
Section C disqualifies

those workers associated
with rail
=oo ° T
*" trans P°^ation
those workers involved
Lnvo Lved with loading
loin
and
unloading on dork*
3nH those
n
and
workers involved in any
other labor of'transporr.'"'

^

/

-

,

Perhaps as importantly,
Section D of the same article
disqualifies

damage to the health or
hospitals or Tr r
liness? or

\

CaUSing graVe and ™diate
PUbllC economy s "ch as clinics
and
aSS ° Ciated WUh public h

It

ll^l"

>

"> cW-

In expanding the discretion
of public authority Section
E states that

strikes will be prohibited from
workers upon the declaration of
the
Executive Power, in all or in
part of the territory of the
Republic,
once the Legislative Assembly
has made use of its constitutional
faculty of suspending certain
individual guarantees.

43

These legal dispositions practically
cancel out the constitu-

tional and Labor Code provisions
permitting strike movements.

As one

.
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-hor

noted, who can g0 on
strlke la a

can be made

ubera lly

Qf interprecation
that

or conservatively,
depending

of the legal authority.

Prohibi£lons on

^

^

^

right
strite misht
be confined to the
centralised bureaucracies,
or extended to the

autonomous institutions end
municipalities,

dostices may take into

considetation the nature of
the industry affected.

Practically any
occupation could be considered
to he indispensable to
the public
good
All judicial determinations
are made upon subjective
criteria,
and inasmuch as contemporary
Costa Rican politics is
becoming increasingly concerned with
themes that affect the laboring
classes, it is
becoming progressively more
difficult to establish the
boundaries
separating the political from
the economic.
An expanding state apparatus, which is constantly
assuming new activities, is
increasing this
confusion.
For this reason judicial
authorities are not compelled
to impose rigorous definitions
on their legal judgements.
According
to one legal authority,
when all the constitutional,
Labor Code and
Penal Code dispositions are
taken into consideration, as
much as

seventy percent of the economically
active population is prohibited
from using the strike as a means
of defending socioeconomic interests

k 5
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TABLE 18

DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS
ACCORDING TO LEGAL
JUDGEMENT

14

6

Quantity
%

Legal
19.5

Illegal
70.7

No Declaration

9.8

TOTAL
100.0

An investigation undertaken
in 1976 Indicated that
less than
one out of flve strikes
received ju diclal approval.
But even in those
few cases that work stoppages
are declared legal, a
series of Labor
Code procedural regulations
are calculated to postpone
and discourage
the initiation of strike
movements.
In certain sectors of
production,
once the declaration of
legality has been made by the
Labor Tribunals,
the Ministry of Labor is
given the responsibility of
integrating a
special conciliation board
composed of state, employer, and
worker
representatives, whose function Is
to study the points of
discord between labor and business in
an attempt to arrive at a
settlement.
If

negotiations fail once, the board
is given another term.

the second attempt fail,

Should

the strike is permitted, but
only after the

unions involved have notified the
Ministry of Labor seventy-two hours
before the commencement of the
movement." Furthermore the Labor'

Tribunals have the power of suspending
the right to strike for a

"

175

period of six months
in the event that rtn
this is considered
necessary
tor the accomplishment
of a just
lust settlement
,-f-M
between workers and
3
employers
•

**

.

— —

The procedural
mechanlsms prescribed

re,Ul

" "me

P
-

y

coiiMt

^

««» „m

elapse betBeen the
commencement of collerHvo
„
collectxve negotxations
and the initiation
of a
strike during which
unions are vulnerahl.
Ulnerable *to Patronal
•

one case, ln „ hlch
. strlke
of

.„

_

^ ^ ^ ^^
attacks.

^

months because the company

port a strike at that
at moment.
momenr

In

_ Mt ^

^

a

pMition

^

n,„
The company used this
time to fire

all workers who supported
the strike.-

For thls

„ ^

many
Ptefer to initiate strikes
directly after collective
ne g otiatio„ s
even though the movement
will certain!
v be
h= declared
A
,
certainly
iliegai since
the union failed to
exhaust the conciliation
procesa.

,

Even once the strike has
begun its legality is
provisional.
If any violence or
coercion is used against
people or property Judicial
sanctions are removed
automatically, or if the union
fails to compiy
with any of the requirements
that govern collective
conflicts, legal
recognition can be withdrawn.
At any time, any one of
the parts of
a collective conflict can
request the requalif ication of
a strike.
If support for the movement
at any time drops below sixty
percent,

legal recognition is withdrawn.

Similarly if it is determined that

the motives of the union are
political rather than socioeconomic,

judicial approval can be removed.
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.

The

decision

o£ lllegallty
renoves

ehe union submltted
tta pe£ltion

a

conective

regain the libert t0
y
£lre „ orkers at wlll
worker
rehired, the employer

u

u

^
m^ ^

proMbicions

Furthermore>

^

u

^

a

^

obUgatton

precisel y with the CenM
of the contract
that existed previQusiy
-Plo.ers have in SOffle cases
been aUe tQ decrease
sauries

workday

_

reduce beneflts;

of the business.

„

^

^^

take other actions

ln one case lnvolvlng

Jose textile factory,
the union follo „ ed

^
^

^
^

^

^

appropriate
guidelines in winning a
verdict of
*
or 1legality
eM n. w from
the Labor Tribunals
But fifteen minutes
af£er the strlke

^
_nt
had

bv telephone, concluded
that the

union support, and declared
the

_

did not have sufficient

_nt

to be Illegal.

The co„pan y
then initiated an anti-union
ca m paign that resulted
in the firing
of several workers and
the circulation of a black
list.
The affected

workers were ulti ra atel forced
y
to abandon textile work
because the y
could not find employment. 51

Case Studies

Owing to extensive regulations,
prohibitions, and broad loopholes that facilitate anti-union
attacks, the Costa Rican Labor Code
has become more an instrument
of domination, than a document
intended
to

protect labor organizations.

The labor laws have permitted
the

government to say '"it can't be done,
the law doesn't permit it.'"
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According

to

one labor leader,
leader t-fco
the workers have
lost faith in both
the code and the
Labor Tribunals.
"Thev
ihey [the
rt-h. workers]
don't believe
and I don't beiieve
ln the
53
,

Uglslatw

-

«»

patronal actlonSj

^

physicai

conMnation

^^^^

resolution of iabor-management
coafllcts

_

^

tha£

Three

-typical strike movements
underscore the con£rol
are put into operation
by judicial sentences.

^d

^

In July of 1979 the
Union of Pozuelo Workers
(SITRAPSA)

1-

initiated

^

J

rMsons

can be most vividiy
descrlbed ln

dements,
*.

,

strike after the Pozuelo
candy factory rejected
a petition that included salary
increases, improvements
in working conditions, and increased
pregnancy benefits
The basis of iabor
discontent was the company's
refusal to deal with un.on
representatives.
The initiation of the
movement was immediately
followed by company accusations aiming
to cast doubts on the
legality of the work
stoppage. Management claimed
that strikers had occupied
the factory,
an action that is grounds
for the rejection of a
strike petition or
the remove! of Judicial
authorization. Labor leaders
answered the
accusation with the assurance
that no such action had
occurred.
The
company then claimed that no
more than twenty-five percent
of the
a

.

workers supported the strike.

On the other hand, labor leaders
argued

that 400 out of 525 workers
were involved in the movement.

The

company further asserted that
striking workers were blocking factory
entrances and sabotaging machinery.
The penalty for any of these developments is the removal of Judicial
authorization.

_ ^^^^^
_

^^

in a second attempt
to

~

Pan, asserted that ln

»

t he

as

factory „as

aMe

^

to

froduccton op ^_
Despite union
accusations
ions that thm
the company was
attempting
to undermine the
k,r „
strike by
spreading false propaganda,
the Superior
Labor Tribunal subsequently
upheld a verdict
veraict of in
„
illegality
that had
been made by the First
Labor Court
rt
Th^r
Their reasoning was
that the
strike lacked the suDnor-tsupport of sixty percent
of the factory work
force
and that the union
failed to follow
foil™, the
-v.
proper procedural
guidelines
for the resolution of
collective conflicts.
The union claimed that
they had fulfilled
their responsible,
hut that the company
had
refused to name representatives
to the conciliation
hoard.
The conflict they asserted had
heen in the lahor courts
for over a month and
a half during which
the company repeatedly
threatened to fire both
union and non-union workers.
work-P-rc
Tn
j
In order
to demonstrate their
strength
of support, the union
staged a sit-in at the
Ministry of lahor. Legal
judgements were nevertheless
upheld.
The frustration with the
conduct
of the courts in this
case prompted the bitter
comment that '"it
appeared that thee tnesis
thesiq of the0 ubusiness
coincided with that of the
54
labor courts.'"
ations.

'

•

m

The initiation of the
strike was accompanied by the
presence
of forty civil guards
who had been sent to the
cite upon company
request.
Subsequent confrontations produced
several injuries and the

arrest of forty strikers.

Company officials attributed the
violence

to the union's refusal
to allow the entrance of
non-striking workers.

7
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The union, on the othpr honj
hand,

^versing with

,
clawed
^

factory employe£s

the occasion to i
nlt

* te

^ ^^^

that striking uorkers
„ efe

pubuc

gratuitous acts of
vlolence

fifteen people were
hospitalized.

.

&t any

Shortly . fter the strike
had been decurtd
iuegai>
took advantage of lts
legal pouers by

^^

^
^
^

factory positions were
rilled by new personnel
on the basis of wha
t
iSjiacion called "a careful seiection
process,- At the
strike leaders complained
that management was
offeri„ g "loyalty
prizes" for any worker who
refused to go on strike."

_^

The intransigence of
the company position
prompted SITRAPSA
to solioit state
mediation. However a
revest for a meetin g with
the Minister of Labor was
rebuked when it was stated
that iabor leaders involved in illegal
strikes do not represent
the workers.
SITRAPSA
then petitioned for
presidential assistance, but a
demonstration before
the presidential residence
was answered by the refusal
of executive
authority to require the
reinstallation of fired workers.
President
Carazo stated that inasmuch
as Costa Rica was a nation
of laws,
and each individual was
obliged to conform to legal
principles, the

judgement of the Labor Tribunals
could not be overturned.
part,

By their

the Ministry of Labor offered
only to help fired workers find

new employment.

5

With legal judgements having served
as the basis for anti-union
patronal attacks, and with executive
authority supporting company
labor policy the SITRAPSA organized
a desperation hunger strike.
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When this failed to
budge
either
ither COmpa
8
was called off.

- ».
C

°

^

^

or government,

the strike

Pozuelo case possesses
several lmportant
charact£rlstics
'
o f which
the utlUzatlon

u

emPl0ye

"

Wh »'

^

of

cMpanyis

*• declaration o f 1U . g aUt
y
Labor Code dispositions
protecting union workers
Secondly what should
be noted is the
coinoidence between the
company's
estimation of strike
support and the Judgement
of the iahor court
The company on this
occasion ieveied several
accusations a 8 ai„st
SITXAPSA aii of „hlch are
punlshaMe by

_^^
^ ^^^^

Without

q uestion

th e y

were made in order to
prejudice Judicial opinion.
Third!,, one must take
note of the fact that
once the court
had rendered its
Judgement, puhlic security
forces were placed at the
disposal of the Pozuelo
factory, and put into
action when the company
014*1 that striking workers were prohibiting
the entrance of factory workers.
No less important^,
one should take note of
the company's attitude toward the
labor unions.
Wei! be fore the strike had
begun the Pozuelo management
refused to deal with union
representatives.
Equally significant was the
company's policy concerning newly
hired employees. Workers
were hired with the promise
that they would
not become involved in union
activities. This promise was
enforced
by the conference of loyalty
prizes on the one hand, and
threats of
firing on the other hand.
What obtains in the Pozuelo
case is a fairly complete demonstration of the combination of
forces, both institutionalized and
informal,

^
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can be brought
against obstinate

cation 0£ thls mechanlsm
an d
«*-

I-

„

u

the Po2uelo strlke

ubor oiianizano

^

uncMmM

u

Costa

atypicai _

of direct executive
involvement

.

^

^

^ pii _

^^^

ts oniy

^

^

^

studies
demonstrate how executive
pressures can be applied,
ln gr earer or
lesser degrees, to the
termination of coliective
conflicts.
In 1978 the Union
of Pococi Agricultural
Workers (STAP)
Initiated a strike on
several
several farms
f,™, managed by the
National Banana
Association (ASBANA) in
protest of low series
and union persecution
2-

Workers claimed that the
company had violated the
terms of their collective convention. They
also demanded Both the
rehiring of workers
that had been fired
and the reiease of a
company administrator who,
in their opinion,
was the perpetrator of
several anti-union attacks
The matter was brought
before the labor Court of
LimSn
A subsequent
judgement of iliegality was
upheld in the Superior labor
Tribunal.The court's decision in
this case is typical of
iegal decisions in
matters associated with the
banana industry. The most
legal
dispositions brought against
these unions are the
prohibitions on
strikes in agricultural
industries (Article 369, Section
b), and the
.

_

failure to exhaust the
conciliation process (Article
366, Section
b).

Upon the submission of the
court's judgement seven hundred
troops of the Guardia Rural
(Rural Guard) were sent to the
area in.
order to maintain order. As
in the Pozuelo strike, public
security
forces placed themselves at
the disposal of the company and
waited
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for orders to
disperse the movement
ent.

—

In
n thxs
tM case, however,
the company behaved with
considerably
Y greater tm
tolerance than the
Pozuelo
Security forces
matntained a state
readiness
l

^

_

One week after the
the* STAP
qtad initiated
its movement against
the
ASBANA, the strike
expanded to several nrt,
*
other farms belonging
to the
Banana Development
Company (BANDECA)
Once
ULe again th.
the company refrained from the imp „c
of cforce; however,
they refused to
negotiate
with workers while the
strike was in progress.
•

.

By paralyzing a
significant portion
UDn of
ot the banana
h,
^
industry
the strike gave
sufficient cause for direct
executive involvement
President Carazo visited
the zone and factored
workers on their patriotic duty to insure the
weii-heing of the country
by resting banana
Production.
The attitude of executive
authority in this case was
epical in the sense that
presidential audiences intended
to encourage feelings of national
pride, at the same tlme
giving workers reason to helieve that work
stoppages were not in the
hest interests of
the country.
On the other hand President
Carazo in this case demonstrated an unusual restraint
in the sense that he
did not apply physical violence, even though
the strike had the
potential of being
severely damaging to the
national economy.

This attitude did not escape
the criticism of conservative
elements, which, through their
control over the means of
communication
initiated a sustained attack
against the labor movement. The

National Chamber of Banana
Growers expressed its dissatisfaction
with
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the conduct of the
Executive Powerr> and
an H

*

'

stri ke had be en
decfared

PUt into effect.

iUe^i

ending

asked that

,

the President that

^

^^

^

One week later
,

the ASBANA u bllshed
P
an article
stating that labor leaders „„„
were not rnterested
in the defense
..

of the

socioeconomic interests of
rank and fil e onion
members, hot that in
acoordance with their
politioal motivations,
were onl y interested
in
SttemPt
ln rfe
«- company's ri g ht to decide its
ad ml „istrative affairs.
The next da y
the Chamber of Coerce
expanded open the suggestion
of political!,
motivated union activity by
launching a severe attack
against the labor union
movement that included assertions that
amll groups

^

^

"

"

»

,

of

the national economy,

Costa Rican people.

_

lsts

^

the social peace, and
the well-being of the

Labor leaders, it was argued,
far from being

interested in solving
worker-related problems, were
coated to provocation, the paralyzation
of business, the
perpetuation of class struggles, and the destruction
of industry and democracy.
This indictment was shortly
followed by an announcement
from
the ASBANA reminding workers
that the strike had been
declared illegal,

and threatening that legal
provisions, giving business wide
discretional powers, would be applied
if production was not shortly
resumed.
Four days later production
was resumed.
The company promised to

establish a bi-partisan committee
that would study the problems
that
led to the strike.

It also promised to respect
the collective conven-

tion in operation and to refrain
from punitive action against labor

leaders involved in the strike;
however, workers were

to

return to

their posts under
the 8amP
6 eCOnMlC
the strike.

C ° ndltl

-

««« h.d existed before
But Just before
thi. agreement uas
w,iS algned
"U'.ned, „
workers asso-

——

.

ciated with another
company
declared „common cause
V declarer!

^
-

1»

o r,„.

^

-

te ptrnlt productlon

u

wUh

th« STAP and

^

Rural were aent to

a{ewwi

p

tte

after fourteen labor
leaders were fireH
,
fired f„
for u
having
participated in an
illegal strike and several
several oLhers were
arrested for the destructi
on
<>f
private property. 59
in addition to the
personal appeals of the
President, four

factors merit attention
in the ASBANA strike,
rim, as in the
Pozuelo strike, public
security forces were
placed at the disposal
of the company, and
although no[

m

ln£o action __ an atyptMi

rence, especially In
extended strikes

!„,„,,,,
Industry— it
*
111

,

,

^

can be

concluded that the threat
of violence contributed
heavily to the formation of the movement. Ibis
beco.es especially clear
in Ught o,
the fact that tbe
strike ended shortly after
the ASIJANA

pubHshed

ultimatum,

Us

secondly the use of the
m eana of communication
by the
Cameras and the company,
a usual tactic during
strikes, can be seen to
be an important means
by which conservative
elements not only Justify,
but generate support
for the application of
force against labor organizations. It might be added
that denunciations of union
activities were
accompanied by reports of vast
destruction o, banana crops and
huge
financial loss. Thirdly,
antl-unlon pstronal actions taken
at the
end of the strike cannot
be ignored.

While the

ASSAM

had promised
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not to take punitive ant--.*™
Ve actlon against
labor leader*
,
readers, th
a strike
.
the
involved
workers from several f aT m „
-

company.

These companies

^^

use c «e discretional
powers conferred upon
them by the Labor PnH
„
Code.
y
Fourthly, one should
take careful note of
the fartfact that +u
the courts did not
hesitate to
withhold legal approval
of a strike in th.
the agricultural
sector.
This
is crucial inasmuch
as agricultural
cuitural nr^
8
production occupies a
significant
portion of the economically
active population.
u

m

,

At any rate, the ASBANA
strike, while demonstrating
a series
of tactics and
measures common to Costa
Rican labor relations,
was
atypical in the sense that
prolonged strikes in the
banana sector
usually provoke stronger
responses from public
security forces. However, as the following
case study demonstrates,
the a PP li cation of
violence is a measure that
is applied not only
against agricultural
and factory workers, but
against the managerial
classes that occupy
posts in the autonomous
institutions.
3-

In Juiy of i976, seven
hundred workers from the Costa
Rican

Electrical institute (ICE)
initiated a strike in protest
against PLN
President Daniel Oduber's
decision to withhold salary
increases that
had been approved by the
ICE administration.
The Association of

Communication and Electrical
Industry Employees (ASDEICE),
an affiliate of the FENATRAP, issued a
list of petitions that included
above
all,

the suspension of the
executive order freezing salary
increases,

but also;

the termination of union
persecution;

the rehiring of labor

leaders that had been fired; and
the termination of actions
prohibiting union meetings.

After the propositions were considered
by the

Minister of DeveloDme^
lopment, n,«
the announcement was
made that the freeze
on salaries would
not be
lifted.

increase, to Cuo thousan
,
»as not

acceded

th.less

the Superior Labor

^

by . suspenslon
Qf

TribuMl upheld

** the resolution that the
co n« ltutlonal la „
(Artlcle
369,

^ ^ ^^
a

strtke involved
d)

Md

Labor

section a) are prohibited
from utill2lng

judgMent Q£ iuegaiity

puMlc uorkers>

^

^

provisions

^

^^

determination, units of the r<-.,n r
Civil Guard armed with
tear gas, batons,
and machine guns,
occupied ICE installations.

Lawyers attached to the
executive office announced
that if the
strike continued, the
y would have no alternative
hut to put lnt0 oper .
ation the measures
prescribed by the Penal Code
for public employees
involved in illicit union
activities.
Similarly President Oduber,
in an attack against
leftist labor organizations
reminded workers
that strikes in the public
sector were illegal and that
this particuiar strike was the result
of adventurers who merely
aimed to prove
that they could organize
a strike in the public
sector.

These labor

leaders belonged to political
groups, he asserted, that having
failed
to gain electoral success
were merely out to gain some
form of notoriety.
The strike was seen to be
the responsibility of radical
groups
aiming to paralyze the country.
He insisted that the smooth
functioning of the public services
was an obligation. Work stoppages
in a
vital service he stated '"will
not be permitted, and if we have
to
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a PPly the law we
will "'

will be taken."'

60

"»Tf it is
necessary to take measures
they
•

•

With the conviction
that
tnat the strike
=tnu was not the work
of ICE
»p!eyees, p ublic securlty
o££icials

^

picket

Unes

t

„

the purpose Q£ identifying
poi;Ucai

The discovery of thls
developnent

^

^

^^^

that touched off violent
confrontations leading to the
hospital^tion of several ICE
employees
Payees, anH
and t-^
the arrest of several
labor leaders.
Shortly after the incident
the AbDEICE
tne
ASDFTPF convened a general
meeting doting which it
issued a list of grievances
that repeated the
demands of the original
petition, and called upon
the administration

™

to recognize

that the problem in 1CE
was caused hy the lack of
any

norms governing union activity
in the puhlic sector.

For this reason
the ASDEICE demanded a
collective convention, in
conformance with

the rights conferred by
Article 62 of the Constitution.

The petition
also included the demands
that ICE refrain from any
disciplinary action among either labor
leaders or workers who had
participated in
the strike;

that firings be prohibited
without proof of just cause;

and that fuero

sindical be provided for labor
leaders up

to one year

after having served as a labor
representative.
The petition was answered by
a denunciation of extremist
groups

which were seen to have taken
advantage of labor problems by infiltrating picket lines and perpetrating
acts of violence.
to adjust salaries and
claimed

Oduber refused

that violence was the responsibility

of political subversives who
left police with no alternative.

The
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strike was seen

b£ a

^

not a labor struggle
Oduber further stated
t-fco
that the
workers must understand
that the resolutxon of the courts
had to be supported
pported.
,
The interpretations
of
admlnlS a «°"
-Parted by leaders o£ the
pollUcal oppo^o, after havlng studied
nt
jssued a

^

sorting

"

—

that Bhlle

thfi

_

governnent shouid

_

^

n<)t

of radical e leMtts
by applylng

foMe
crudeiy
aimg
with the acts of violence
olence w
PT-o #.».
were
the responsibility
of professional
agitators attempting to
spread chaos.
_

The ICE board of
directors
rectors and
3n H rt.
a
the administration
refused to
accept the union's
petitionq
petitions.
rw week after
,
One
it began the strike
was called off.
The ASDEICE stated its
opposition to the administrai

WS POUCy

responsible manner.

di

«-ces

should be settled in a
more

61

In addition to the
violence employed by public
security forces
two points st a nd out
in the ICE strike.
The fl rst is the decision

of the labor courts to
interpret public services to
mean autonomous
institutions a s well as standing
t
.t.-j.^,
bureaucracies.
In this connection
It should be remembered
that state institutions
employ over eighty
thousand members of a
550,000 member work force.
Constitutional and
Labor Code dispositions
concerning public employees
consequently preclude almost fifteen percent
of the Costa Rican work
force from the
right to strike.
The second is the accusation
made by the Executive
Power as well as the political
opposition that the participation of

subversive elements had converted
the strike from

a

labor matter into

a
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a

political struggle.
56 xe.

labor

«-

conizations

that pursue

Pena lty of forced
dissolution,

P-ved

^

t0 have

^

^

subversive ob ectives
.

.

sub ect

pla ce inasmuch as
constitutional

Politic.! activity.

^
^
^^
^^^

T n thi
in
this connection if<;hn,,i a v.
it should
be remembered that

^

^

relations prohihited union

No Ugl8latlve action
„ as taRen against
AsDEic£

accusations were m ade.

^

It should be

tions and force, dissolutions
of

l abor

^

conizations had occurred

the pest, end there is
no reason to expect
that a

in

prolong

work
stoppage in a vital sector
would not evoke the sa me
response.

Concluding Remark
Juridical provisions are
structured in such a way as to
prohibit Costa Rican labor
organizations from any form of
independent
activity. While labor's rights
are guaranteed in a series
of constitutional and Labor Code
provisions, those same documents
establish a
body of regulations so confining
that union activity, at least
where
strikes are concerned, has become
an illegal affair. While
unions
are free to organize, they
are not free to act.
But apart from prohibitions on strikes, loopholes in
Labor Code regulations regarding
the discretional powers that
employers enjoy before, after, and even

during collective conflicts, impinge
upon labor liberty.

^

^^
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Bes Wes collective
conventiM

conectiTO

guidelines that bind
labor organUations

l«es,
Costa

„

a

Ktan

t important>

labor

though sometimes

reUUonSj

ls a

m

-

diSPOSltlOI,S

UaVe

attacks.

subue characterisuc

executive

•

'

--

^

P-*

J

,

once agaln> LabQr

Judgements

an

o£

„•
UUJ-ciai, and
private

Nation

reguiatiQns

but prohibit the use
of

in this connection
it should be recalled

•

via Lab o r Code

vulnerable to patronal

attacks encQurage iabor
to tnitiate

fUcts; however

J-ICUI

—

bureaucrauc

nutuany supportive

control that involves
bureaucratio

StltUUmS

^

^

^
^

important

fluently

coinci d e with the
accusations made by businesses
that ace
being affected by strikes.
The declaration of
,
„
illeealii-v
,
illegality <c
is a
critical
stage in the conflict resolution mechanism,
for
ur it is at
xt H-Hc
this point that public
security forces are placed
at the disposal of
employers.
As the previous
case studies showed,
physical force may he applied
or threatened; in
either case, it serves to
discourage unions from continuing
work stoppages.
The prolongation of
strikes, especially in
critical sectors,
•

•

,

frequently gives sufficient
cause for direct executive
involvement.
This involvement may he
calculated to appease labor or
it may be intended to threaten labor
with the possibility of forced
dissolution.
But whether or not executive
authority is applied, illegal
strike
movements present employees
with the opportunity to continue
antiunion attacks.
Inasmuch as Labor Code guarantees
do not apply i„
these cases, unions become
defenseless.
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™icting

case, in „hich
judicial and

brought t0 bear a8ainst

^ ^^

^
^ ^^
^ ^
^ ^

labor actlvlty are
frequenuy

Mt

^

Ubor organlzations

ent from the Pozuelo
and ICE strikes.
strikes

^

illegal, workers Will be
flred>

c,
»,
Strikes

dM£er _

may be declared

^

the disposal of
husiness, buc ln the end

hired, lahor leaders „
in be relMsed

reprisals
won.

win

^

^

^
^
^

prison

be glven , and
slgnIficant materlai

_

^^

^

Nevertheless, while unions
„ ln as much as they
actions ere closely regulated
by a Labor and Penal
Code
the. t0 higher authority.
The Juridical integration
of Costs Riean
labor thus prohibits
independent activity during
the conflict resolution process.
But apart fro m the
association between labor
organizations and state institutions
duri„ 8 collective conflicts,
labor mln .
tains points of contact
with several bureaucratic
agencies.
How those
contacts either encourage or
confine labor activity, and
whether or
not they constitute foru.s
for an effective alternative
expression of
labor interests will be the
following subject of discussion.

^^
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CHAPTER

V

BUREAUCRATIC INTEGRATION
The establishment
of the Social
Social r
Guarantees was a landmark
in
the development
of Costa Rican
R->^„ labor
i
u
unionism. Until 1943
workers
and labor leaders
could not be sure
of th*
the response that
union activity would elicit
from public authorities
Ues
Em»1
Employers for their
part,
were not obliged to
deal
«rt *h
deal with
workers as a collectivity.
No less
importantly, there were
no rules to
tn delimit
h»i
,
the
boundaries of fairPlay in labor management
conflictsSl Having
Hav-f™ no legal
n
,
guarantees,
»or k ers „ ere at the
complete dtsposai Qf
their
"

•

Guarantees supposediy
attempted to change

•

^

^

snip between „or k er
and employer by
recognizing

^

^

^ ^

rf
to ace collectively
in defense of its
socioeconomic interests.

Sot

»hile these constitutional
amendments helped to balance
power between
the factors of production,
they have been most
successful in replaci„
g
the patrimonialism of
private employers with the
patrimonialism of the
state.
This has significantly
reduced both the ability
of labor organizations to act independently,
and defend the socioeconomic
interests
of the working classes.
The Social Guarantees,
in addition to establishing
a regulative

legal system that bound
labor organizations to the
Judgements of the
judicial branch of government,
also created a Ministry of
Labor that
196
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was given the
responsibility not only of „
y
providing a variety
of technical functions surh ac
as legali advice
and une.ploy.ent
assistance, but
of overseeing all
labor activities
cxvities, for the
rt
ostensible purpose of
encouraging labor
organization. All thecp
these ffunctions, while
perhaps
aiding the working clasqpc:
„
a
8 classes
material way, remove
a vide variety
of worker related
activities from the
responsibility of labor
unions,
and encourage workers
to seek protection
in tbe state system.
Like the Ministry of
labor, the autonomous
institutions that
-rged during and especially
after World War
„ e re supposed to
Protect worki„ g class
lnterests fcy

m

„

^

^

a degree of participation
in a process
Fiucess bv
by whnVh
which *.
the state assumed ever

neater responsibility

for directing the course
of national develop-

ment.

Nevertheless tbe functions
of these bureaucratic
mechanisms have
been disappointing to labor.
lahnr
tt,-,-^
This
g
is as true in the
Ministry of Labor
where labor organizations
are more regulated than
represented,
•

1=

as it
In the autonomous
institutions where cooptation
is mora common

than participation.

.The

Ministry of jgbor_and_thg_Labor
Organizat ions

The Ministry of Labor at
once serves as the basic point
of

integration for labor organizations,
and the principle mechanism of
a patrimonial labor relations
system. As an expression of the
patrimonial concept that labor's
interests should be protected by the
state,
the ministry's broad responsibilities
include the protection of the

cultural, moral, and economic
interests of the workers; establishing
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and maintaining a een P r a i ™,
general policy that
will protect th
a worker
the
and his
•

*. consciences

-

0£ unfQrtunate

. natlonal pollcy
ln

-

^_

^^^^

^

^

^^

Qf

«<. o f guaranteeing
effective pubuc assistance;
organi2ing
administering public
servlces; coordinating
activtties
welfare s mices; and
guaranteelng

^

lation.

1

^
^
^

^

Corresponding Co ics
responsibllities the mlnlstry

i«0 SU

depertments.

every aspect of

^

^

divided

Three o f these depnrtments
affect virtueiiy

uw-^ent

argue, tn a uay that is
damaglng

confiicts, most usuaUy>

^

^

^^

^ ^
^

of Labor Reiations is
divided into two departments
one of which processes labor conflicts by
receiving complaints and est
ab lishin 8 conciliation boards, the other
of which accepts
requests for Juridical

Personam

and monitors the a ctivities
of previous!, existing

It is in this office
that punitive action is

taken against unions failing to complv with labor
statutes, and in which iegal
recognition can
be either delayed or refused.

Secondly, an Office of
Inspection, divided into three
departments, one for industry,
coerce, and agricuiture, is responsible
for investigating working
conditions and complaints of
patron.l Labor
Code violations. Labor conflicts
originating in this department

automatically follow a juridical
route but labor leaders have argued
that complaints filed with the
Office of Inspection rareiy reach
the
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co-s.

P^ods

„suall y lnspectlons
ar£ deUyed
of time that the
matter

complaints, for instance
instanr^

u

^

^

inordtnateiy

eventuauy

v

have been concerned
with patronal action
against labor leaders a t-*- Qm ~«-attemptxng to form unions.
All workers known
j ° lned 3 Unl ° n in
of formation wiU
«»
be flred
inspection will be undertaken
fcy
,

^
"

^

^

^ m^ ^

any determination has
heen made, the workers
in q nesti on „
have
found new employment,
reducing the necessity
o £ further ministry
action.
I» other instances,
workers will he allowed
to keep their
employment with the
stipulation that legal action
win not he taken
against the company. At
any rate, the fine that
employers must pay
should a conflict actuaily
reach the courts, is
well worth the long
term benefits that can
be derived by avoiding
the establishment of
unions in a factory.
Similarly, the same penalty
does not prohibit
employers from violating
the terms of individual
worker contracts.
In this way,

empioyers are able to bypass
minimum salary

Thirdly,

the Office of legal
Assistance has the responsibility

of providing legal
advice to workers dissatisfied
with patronal con-

duct.

While undoubtedly a valuable
service, this free assistance
has
had the effect of marginalizing
unions from conflicts with
employers.
At the same time labor
leaders have criticized the
legal office for
emphasizing the difficulty involved
in carrying through successful
suits against employers accused
of violating either the code
or individual worker contracts.'

Its long range function has thus
been to

encourage workers to look for
protection in the state apparatus rather
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than in worker
organizations.

"

discourage leeal
art-i™
a
8
10n a831nSt

Its snort
xcs
short term function
f
has been to

of what employers
have to offer.

e„c„„ aglne acceptance

In addition to thpco
^^-p-?
these offices
the ministry al so
maintains departments that have such

responsibilities as relntegrating

union activities,
prot£ctlng

^

^^ ^^^
^

minors, ana providing
assistance in the construction
of worker recreation facilities.

What is carious about
the organization of
the ministry is that
it is designed both
to provide individual
assistance, and to punish
or at feast discourage,
collective action, while
lt provides
advice to individual
workers through its Office
of Legal Assistance,
it discourages collective
action through its slow
moving Office of
Inspection. While these
delays encourage anti-union
patronal action,
an Office of Planning and
Employment assists workers in
their search
for new employment.
At the same time the
Office of Labor Relations
can put into effect its
punitive powers at any time.
Recent examples
of this have been the
difficulty that the CATD and
CUT have had in
gaining juridical personality.
When the CATD submitted its
request
for legal recognition, the
Office of Labor Relations forced
several
changes in confederation
statutes and electoral procedures.
Similarly

^

the CUT, after having
approved its statutes in its first
general

assembly, was forced to change
electoral procedures, and organizational
form.
Despite several subsequent
statutory changes, the ministry has
yet to grant the confederation
legal status.
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I" a ddltlon to the
af£ects Qf these

forMi

Has also been accuse.
o £ managing che
lafcor

special status on certaxn
i,u
certain labor
tion against another.

movents

tiea>

^

^

or by playing one
confeoera .

The rrTn
CCTD, ^for instance,
has been considered

by the CUT to be the
off-fr-fai
„
offxcxal government
labor movement, owing
to a
heavy government subsidy
subsidv m,^
^
that seems to increase
when PLN Ministers
are appointed to office.
1n
The tatf.
CATD, as well,
has accepted substantial
,

financial subsidies from
the Center of Democratic
Studies for Latin
ica, a P LN subsidized
training
Centrai
leaders.
Through direct ministry
assistance and CEDAL contributions
as well as contributions
from other institutions
such as the Episcopal
Church and international
organizations, the democratic
labor movement
has had a history of heavy
financial dependence.
Confederation leaders
assert that there is nothing
unethical about receiving
assistance from
organizations that support the
principles and goals of the
democratic
labor union movement,* but
CUT officials on the other
hand argue that
any type of financial
assistance creates a bond of
obligation that
cannot but affect union
activities.
The disproportionately low
number
of collective conventions
that have been signed by the
democratic
organizations seems to add weight
to the argument that
labor-party
relations have not generally
served the interests of the working
classes.
The terms of this relationship
will be discussed in a later

—

chapter.

^^

^

What deserves attention at this
point, at least where the

democratic organizations are concerned,
is a financial dependence that
is maintained both through
direct party assistance and by party
assis-

tance that proceeds via the Ministry
of Labor.
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Apart from £inancial
subsldles>
-o

d-»

thfi

ministry

^^

^

t0 certain labor
organl2atlons

^

through a poacy
discrin _
inatio- that l8 put lnt0
effect during labor .
manag£ment dtsputes
»p
of Labor has the
responsibllity o£ determintng
uhich iabor
° r8aniZati ° n Wl11
*»
^tiate collective contracts
the event that two or
more

*™

^

of production.

^_
-

^

^^^

On more than a f»,
few „„
occasions, conflicts have
arisen
between confederations
regarding the negotiating
rights to collective
conventions.
fte CUT complains that
whenever situations of thls
tyP e
have arisen, the title
has usually heen given
to the democratic organizations.
On the other hand, there
have heen several occasions
in
which the ministry decided
to include the COT in
negotiations that
were claimed by the CCTD
to fall strictly within
its jurisdiction.'
inasmuch as the stability and
effectiveness of a labor organization
greatly depends on its ability
to defend the interests
of its affiliates, the importance of
ministry decisions in the realm
of negotiating
rights should by no means be
minimized. On more than one
occasion,

confederations have lost important
affiliates when collective conflicts
failed to produce results.
Beyond the conciliation process,
the ministry also finds itself
in a critical position once
strike movements have been initiated.
It should be noted that
ministry officials are actively
involved in a

vast majority of strike settlements,
most particularly those occurring
in the banana zones.

In its capacity as mediator
between labor and

management, the ministry proposes its
own solution to work stoppages;

~
—3

«

* I*.

-—
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«"ctly

0f£en lmpQsed

""€e"

^^ _ ^

to che Executlve
po „ er>

Mntending

dilutes during „ hich competing
uniQns teve
has on

fluent

to negotiate with
one of
b

i ink ed

occasions enCQUraged
dlvision

m

the parties
P rcies in the alliance.
„in

*~> ^ —a

ance ln the 1950s serve
as

^

The struggles

^ ^

Rica and the FOBA-FETRABA
alli.f

-

'

^

^

carefully noted that
ministry behavlor on these
Qccasions ms jaMg _
ln g to labor not only
because it undermined
coilective union action
at the bargaining ta
ble> but because the
strlke

insufficient guarantees
against subse q uent anti-anion
patronal activity.
Most labor leaders, both
colonist and democratic, agree
that
the activitias of the
ministry hava baan damaging
to labor's intarasts
Ona of tha raasons for
this has bean tha
anti-anion attitude of successive Ministers of Labor,
whose appointments have
been .ana not only
without the consent of labor,
lahn>u.
but* upon recommendations
submitted by
the Chambers of Commerce,
Agriculture, and Industry.
New administrations, labor leaders conten
d
consult with employer organizations
before a Minister of Labor
is appointed.
For this reason both colon,

ists and democrats have
argued that a conservative and
bourgeois char-

acter has been bailt into the
ministry.

But perhaps mora fundamental

than this, as we shall see,
are Labor Code provisions that
tie labor

organizations to the state in a way
that has been described by most
labor leaders as excessively
regulatory, prohibitive, and patrimonial.'

.
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Nothing more clearly
illustrate
lustrates *,
the patrimonial
relationship
between labor and the
ministry
than the r.n
Y tnan
requirements that are
placed
upon unions in the
proce«?Q
n f formation.
f
process of
A<? a
a
j
As
Prelude
to these requirements the code
dlvWes labor organ±2ations
intQ
i

'

CuiUs are rhose worker
organlzations formed

—

Pro.ess.on.

^

^
^^

individuais

Business unions are
chose organl2atlons

individuals invoived in
varlous professlons
fa
area of production.
Industrial „ nlons

_

volved ta various
professlons ln

production of the same
type

individual who are
industries

^ ^

.

involved

tM

m

•

^
^

^ ^^
^

factories

^

^

Mixed unions are
organizations of
in various professions
in a variety of

8

After establishing these
categories, th e code
recogni.es the
right of employees as
well as patrons to for.
unions without previous
authorization, hut establishes
a ter m of thirty days
curing which
the organization must
submit a request to the
ministry f or Juridical
personality.
I n order for
fnr iegai recognrtion
to be granted the union
-»t .eet various requirements.
First the union must submit
a written
request to the Department of
Labor Relations that contains
such information as a copy of the
constituent acts of the organization,
the

nu*er

"

of members,

bCrS ° f 311 the

elected.

the type of union,

th e na.es and

identification

rf the Junta Directive
and how they were

The request is then examined
by the Director of the Office

of Syndicates and Cooperatives,
who within the next fifteen days,

either recommends the
inscrin^^ ofc the
L
mscrrptron
union or reCurns £he
request
t0
JUnta Dlre 1Va

"

or

^logical

can be granted.

^ ~~
^
*

changes that must

electoral

before juridtcai

9

The statutes that
each union is required
lu send
n
to
s>ena to the ministry
must contain a wide range
ranw of
r>f
c
information
inciuding its objectives,
the obligations and
riehts
ghts of its
If. „.
t
members,
and the margin by which
the dunta Directive
was erected. A11
unlon members mus£ be
Ricans by birth or marriage
with at least a five
y ear residence in
Costa Rica. All Junta
members must also be Costa
Rican bv birth.
•

,

^

Other requirements include
the conditions by which
new members are
admitted to the union, and
causes and proceedings
established for
the expulsion of members.

With regard to the latter
point, the coda

requires at least a two-thirds
majority for the expulsion
of any member,
rhe union is also required
to hold meetings regularly
with the
participation of at least
two-thirds of the organization.
Furthermore the ministry is to be
informed of the dates of all
assembly meetings.
Information must be provided
concerning the form of union dues
payment, the amount, the names
of the union members
responsible for
the collection of quotas,
destination of expenditures, and
a state-

ment of union financial
accounts.

The statutes must also describe
the

causes and form of self-dissolution.

Extensive requirements are placed

even upon the attributes of
the General Assembly.

Responsibilities

include the election of the Junta
Directive, approval of statutory
reforms, approval of collective
conventions, approval of quotas,
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declaration of strikes,
st-T-Mr««,
approval 0£ union mergers>
budgets and the authorizatinn e
notation of investments.
What's more, the union
must submit reports
of all
all these proceedings
to the Office of
Syndicates and Cooperatives
every six months, or
upon request."

^^^^ ^

The Ministry of

Uhor can withhold recognition

or order the

dissolution of the union
in the event
lL Lnac
that lt:
it involves
inv 1
itself in
Political affairs or
religious struggles, if
it expresses
•

or adopts

a position contrary
to democratic
principles,

or if it involves itself in any activity
that is not strictly
associated with its socioeconomic interests:
n f u Q>
rests.
Other
causes for withholding
recognition or ordering an involuntary
dissolution includeinclude.
t-h* submission
c k
the
of false data
to the Department
of syndicates
Syndicates and r
Cooperatives; the use of
union
funds for purposes that
are not directly related
to the improvement
of the economic well-being
of union members; the
personal use of
union money; the use of
violence as a means of forcing
entrance into
a union; and the
encouragement of violence against
people or property.
The Ministry of Labor
also reserves the right to
dissolve unions if
the members of the Junta
Directive fail to comply with
residency requirements, if union membership
dips below twenty, or if
the union
does not comply with any
of the regulations covering
General Assembly
actions and responsibilities. 11
.

•

•

The overwhelming concensus
in the labor community is
that code

regulations tying labor organizations
to the Ministry of Labor
have
been used to delay and even
prevent union organization. 12 Without
juridical personality employers
are not bound by the force of law
to

negotiate with unions
ions,

rn^r
what s more, workers
belQngtng

—
*— — «~

unions are not protectPH
M, 3ntl
, -

^

txve conflicts.

C0U

"S

If

fl

non inscribed union
asked the

^

negotiations had been

•

legaX action.

„

P-ronal activity during
collec _

for inst

PermlSSi0n t0

tQ

•
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Juridlcal personaUty

u

^^

ments for union formation
other nnan
than a simple
q^i declaration to the
Ministry of Labor.
J,

,

The process that labor
organizations must follow in

Juridical personality Is
complicated and difficult.

uniting

The problems

-re

sent to the ministry
only to be returned
with lists of organizational and procedural
changes.
A conservative Minister
of Labor has

the capacity to delay
legal recognition indefinitely
if the ideologi-

cal orientation of the
union,

the Junta Directive, or
the Secretary

General is considered to be
questionable.-

In anot her not untypical

case, the Union of Costa
Rican Educators asked for
recognition as a
business union, inasmuch as
it grouped various
occupations in the

field of education.

The Ministry of Labor
required the organization

to change its statutes
to a guild association.

layed several months.

The

Recognition was de-

problem that delays may cause

for a union
in formation are serious
Inasmuch as the protective provisions
of
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the Labor Coda do
not go Into operation
until
Ui jJuridical
urldlca] personality
granted.
Employers
^y^^^ can
can, and u
have on reop3fpH
repeated occasions,
taken

An

exaction

of

the requirements
that are placed upon
union

formation and operation
in Costa Rica and
other countries in the
region prompted the
Confederation of Centra!
African Workers

(CTCA)

to issue a puhiication
stating

that the Labor Codes
of the Centra!

African nations, while
containing
guarantee the liberal ri»l
rightr

r-„

to

a series of

derations

that

organrze, also establish
a series of

Proceedings for the recognition
of those rights that
imply controls
which contradict the
principles of labor liberty.
tte CTCA contended
that these proceedings
discourage union organization
when it is considered that the length
of tl» that is
retired to complete these
transactions, gives people
of bad faith the
opportunity to obstruct
the creation of labor
unions. *
1

The difficulties accompanying
union organization have been
noted in a preceding chapter.
But it might be worth noting
that a
comparison of the requirements
and guarantees that are
applied to
unions information shows that,
at least in theory, Costa
Rican unions
are not as well protected
as unions elsewhere in Central
America,
The strongest criticism of
these requirements is that
labor leaders
are not protected by fuero
sindical.
The Guatemalan Labor Code for

instance, establishes that all
members of a provisional executive

committee of

a

forming union cannot be fired.

Article 198 of the

.
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Venezuelan Ley de
Trabajo states that
once
"orkers have submitted
a request
equest for union

SW°

8

H~
-worker

P

" iUOn

actions.

«

~

F rom the date
of

*

-

a

suffic , number of
sufficient

recognition, all workers

state from anti-union

ootlflcaMon

„

£

can be fired or
transferred.

^

Neither can employers
change
conditions without
Just cause and the
certification of a
Similarly, article
333 of the Panamanian
labor Code
criers fuero aindical
upon all „ orkers
lnvolved

-king

I*-

—to.

^

a labor organization,

^

^

accordingly, no „orker
can be fired without
mat cause and authorization
from the labor Tribunals.
Once the
union has been inscribed,
all union members enjoy
fuero sindical for
the next three months.
I n the case
ca c P of
ftf delays
in inscription,
fuero
sindical is extended for
the length of time
n required to correct
objections

Regarding labor leaders,
article 223 of the Guatemalan
labor
Code states that up to
five members of a Junta
direotiva enjoy fuero
sindical. Article 212
of the El Salvadorean
labor Code indicates
that labor leaders that
have complied with labor
Code regulations
cannot he fired or transferred.
Neither can employers alter
working
conditions for up to one year
after the term of leadership
has
expired, except in the case
of Just cause.
Similarly article 516
of the Honduran labor
Code states that members
of a Junta direotiva
cannot be fired without
sufficient notice for up to six
months after
the term of office has
expired. Article 198 of the
Venezuelan labor
Code stipulates that members
of a Junta directive cannot
be fired
until three months after
the term of office has expired.' 5

-«

^

w- u

not t0 say that
the
or South

Ubor reiatims

^^^^

^
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to

cQuntries
nor does it indicate
that Labor Codes
d6S ln
in these
th*
countries provide
blanket protection f^>for unions in
the process of
fornatlon
But what
it does indicate
is that
thatrequire.ents on onion
organization in Costa
Rica provide employers
urf i-n m
yers with
many more legal
opportunU es £o initiate
anti-union campaigns.
This state o£ clrc
.

-:

„

.

ceSj

„

^^

Xeaders assert,- Has
served to impede the
nor m ai development
of the
labor movement.
As objectionable to
onion readers as onion
formation retirements are tbe relations
covering tbe activities
of onions in operation.
Two- thirds of the
ne rank and
anrf f,i„
frle union membership
are required
to attend Cenera!
Assembly meetings. Ministry
of Labor fonctionaries
»ke occasional appearances at
meetings to insure compliance
with
isolation. This is seen to
be an unnecessary
control that serves
only to encourage
anti-union patronal activity.
It la extremely dlffi
celt, labor ieaders have
asserted, to convoke a
general assembly even
"hen employers are not
disposed to taking anti-onion
actions; frequently however, employers
will find ways of diverting
workers from
union responsibilities.
Failure to form
failure
fn™ aB quorum at assembly
meetings
is punishable bv tines,
an H *e
and
»y fines
if „
occurring regularly, by the
involuntary

dissolution of the union.

With or without anti-onion
patronal

activity the two-thirds
regulation has generated interest
at several
labor conferences where
recordations have been made for an amendment that would allow the
participation of delegates rather
than the
regular presence of rank and file
members. 17

.

eve.

si x months, and
provIsiMs pernitung
speciai
S-ons of union fundlng;

organization>

^

^

^

the most objectionable
restriction on unxon
activity has been the
prohibition on political
activity
Herein lies a
=7.
contradiction
1

,

with
,
On th*
the one u
hand the constitution
confers

individual political
rights
ghts.

upon each individual
the r-foh*.
right ofc political
discussion and activity
On the other hand
union activity is
strictly
strictlv confined, by
y
the Labor
Code to socioeconomic
mtt ers .
But lt

^

possihie at all,

to

m^

u

divorce polltlcal actiQn

accrue from experiences
in the
tne factorv
tactory.
Politics in order to solve
prohlems of

^^^^

interests that

t aIndividuals
participate in

a

sociai and economic
nature

If

factor, and Uving
conditions are to be
considered sociai prohlems
if low salaries are
to b e considered
economic prohiems, and if
patrona!
persecution of labor leaders
Kn considered
is f«
to be
a political problem,
then to prohibit political
activity is to deprive workers
of their
democratic rights.

k

While failure to comply
wlth thls prohlbitlon lncurs

^

^

penalty of forced dissolution,
all unions and federations
have found
ways of maintaining at
least a minimum degree of
political activity.
The links between

colonist labor organizations and

the Popular Vanguard
Party, for instance, have
heen well known ever since the
party was

^instituted after the revolution,
although the PVP does not advertise
the specific nature of this
relationship in its publications.

Similarly the CCTD and its parent
organization the CCTRN have had a long
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standing association
with the PLN

au, ° U ^ uh the
Alth
relationship has not

until recently been
formalized, the partv
party h*
has integrated
several union
leaders into its
organizational apparatus
HHdracus.
The appointment of
Ben JamIn Nu „e 2 as
Mlnlscer Qf Labor
first p
,

-n

^

in the 1950s

u

. case

,

poInt

_

^

^

However>

accepting
Positions, labor leaders
must rellnqulsh their
posts
ubor

~„t.

^

nis

requlrement

=al influence of

l abo r.

an important

At thts polnt however>

^ ^
M

^

.hat the prohibition on
polulcal

^

acUvity
been lnterpreted so
broadly that labor
organl2atlons scarcely bother
veii their

^

cal connections.

^^^^

Never
thelec-o
nT m
ertheless,
on
more than one occasion,
unions
,

in maintaining a cavalier
attitude, have had to pay
the prlce of

dissolution.

^

Per this reason the
possibility of stricter enforcement

by the Ministry of Leber
should under no circumstances
be discounted.
The involuntery dissolution
of the CTCR after the
1948 rebellion,
and the dissolution of
the FUTRA after special
investigations in the
1960s by the Ministry of Labor,
are illustrations of this
point.

Tripartite Ministry Organs

^^Jaci^^

Article 57 of the Constitution
states:

™

rk r
h3Ve
right t0 a ml
salary, fixed perTo7/ T? !by normal workday,
iodically
that will insure well-b i2
a d
dignified existence.
Everything related to
6

ia :

Irishes. 1!™"^

the
°* * technical

fixing

ofsaLr-

organist t'ST
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This provision became
the basis
basxs forfor the creation
of the National
Salary Council in
1949 . a
technicai
t he Ministry of
Labor that ±s

^

^
^

-

,

^

private sector minimum
salaries.

^

according t0 occupatiQnal
categories

economic and social stu
dies.

-~

-

^

Consejo fi xes salaries
once .

ordfir £q

^

^_

^
^
^
^
^

basis

^

of working class
socloecononIc condiUonSj

.

Conse o
of the Office of
Salaries in the Ministry
o£ Labor

^formation

f rom

private and

^

studies of yearly economic
performance.

^

„
^

Mtes

The collection of
information, which forms
the first stage o,
the salary fixing
procass

,

begins

^

^

technical dependencies and
representatives from the Cameras
and certain state institutions.
Wlth regard to state
institutions, the orSans of greatest interest
to the Conse.o are
the Central Ban, of
Costa
Rica, the Office of Planning,
the National Production
Counsel, the
Ministry of Economy, Industry,
and Commerce, the Ministry
of
Agriculture, and the Ministry
of Labor.
This is undertaken in order
to obtain opinions on
monetary, credit, and fiscal
matters. The
technical office of the Consejo
then effects visits to
private businesses to obtain information
on salaries that are paid
and importantly to obtain information
on the distribution of
occupational categories in each factory.
In addition to economic
activity the technical
office collects information
on population growth, increases
in the
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economically active
population, prlce lndfixes
taxes, unemployment
rates, and cost of
l iving increases
special benefits, such
as company provided living
accommodations
ions, food p.l
allowances, and general
services, are calculated
along with salaries."
.

Of particular
importance
0 prrce
P rtance is t-fc
the
of minimum daily
nutritional requirements.
Prices
,
C6S , ro ^deterffllned
accordance with the
nutritional needs of an
urhan family of f ive
mem bers. The ministry
bases its calculations
on the average price
of

^

basic commodities
commercial centers in
both the San
q 3 n Jose
t
region and the provinces.

AH
of

^

of this information
is applied to salary
<*j-ciLy scales in
seven sectors

m

sconce

activity:

Portion, storage
The

agriculture, mining, industry

,

and communicacion, ana
services and general.

i^rtance

"Xing process shoold

^

of the Information
gathering stage of the
salary
not he underestimated,

statistics, polls, an d

Personal interviews,
constitute Che frame of
reference on which Che
Consejo hases its decisions.
In this connection, Che
Consejos acuities, chough perhaps
exhaustive, possess important
flaws that are associated with the fart
i^u
fact ch^tthat labor
representatives have no control
over
the flow of information.
I, mighc he unfair Co
expect labor organizations, as impoverished
as they are, Co establish
independent information gathering structures.
On the other hand, the CUT
has from
time to time issued
publications explaining yearly
inflation races
and price indexes as a way
of pointing out the errors
of the Consols

decerminations.

These statistics are never taken
into consideration.

The Consejo is thus largely
dependent on the one hand, on
information

-
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- « «--

by government
agencies attachfid tQ

*-

P3tr0nal S6Ct0rS
be overlooked.

appose.

"

"»

—

°"»«"

Government representatives

^

process

.

by the

c™. ^

fflati0n

nly fr ° m
°

Slmllarly> patroMi

^

^

^
^
^^
Conse o
.

^

^^^^^^^

~*

b

«

.

effects which have been
crlUclzed by

^

individual businessmen

Tbe structure of thls
part rf th£ Conse o

,

s

^

Qperations

ubor representatives

Price indexes and lnflatlon
rates are
the ectuel ievel.

appointad

consejo soUclts a
significant

"»

Md

comittee> ghould not

directors
tries whose consultations
are a requlred part
Qf

Coring

^

governmeM

^

hy the Executive
po „ er; so

^

infom ^

sources 0£ i„ formation
correspond

^
^

executive branch

other hand, on the
persMal testimony
might be expected
Co sutait Hased

secondly, in asmuch as
minlmum salaries

for e ach profession,
employers will frequently
lnflate
of employees Involved
in low paying occasions
while

^

20

wrst

^
^
_

^

deflating the
number of employees Involved
in higher paying
occupations.
In this
way, patrons havee bneen
een sMe
able to pay

,

l arge

numhers of employees at a

rate that is below the
actual value of their services.

After analyzing the information
that has been pieced at Its
disposal, ea ch sector of the
tripartite Junta Directive submits
a
salary proposal. Final
decisions are sent to the Ministry
of Labor
"here they are either accepted
or returned with recommendations
for
corrections.
If the Consejo chooses
not to amend its decision, the
proposal is sent back to the
ministry, where it must be approved.
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The structure that is
employed in rendering these
decisions

Possesses certain attributes
that create an i.pression
of effective
sectoral or corporate
representation.
The Junta Directiva of
the
Consejo is formed by nine
members named by the Executive
Power.
The
state, business, and labor
are represented by three
members each, along
with one substitute for each
sector.
The members of the junta
are
chosen by the Ministry of
Labor fro, a list of ten
candidates submitted by patronal associations
and labor organizations.
Fro, this
list the ministry can choose
any three.
If nominees are not submitted,
the ministry enjoys the
prerogative of freely choosing
patronal and
labor representatives.
Each delegate remains in office
for a period
of four years and can be
reelected indefinitely.
Importantly any
member from either the patronal or
labor sectors can be removed from
the Consejo if the association
or union that is being represented

submits a statement of no-confidence.

representatives of the state.

The same policy applies to the

Replacements are made on the same basis

as appointments to the original
junta. 21

With respect to the appointment of the
Junta Directiva, the

policy of recall would seem to insure
effective labor representation.
In fact, unlike other tripartite organs,

this power might be seen to

have effectively cancelled out the possibility
of cooptation.
ever,

How-

there are two points associated with the selection
process that

should not be overlooked.

The first is that labor organizations do

not have complete control over the nomination
process.
tives are selected from a list of ten candidates.

Representa-

When it is

.

'

^^^

217

considered that each
confederation, and £or that
independent unions and
federations, submit lists
of candidates, the
Pool from which che mlnistry
selects representatives Mn
reach into
the hundreds.

No less importantly,
the ministry is not
required to

distribute its selections among
the major labor groupings.
If the
ministry was so disposed, the
entire labor sector of the
Consols
directive body could be selected
from one or two confederations.
In
this way the possibility of
nominating troublesome representatives
from the more combative labor
groupings can be avoided. Or even
more
likely, discriminatory
nominations might be used as a form
of payment
for political support.
Similarly, regulations covering
the replacement of labor representatives,
in the case of recall, multiply
the

ministries discretional powers
inasmuch as hundreds of names, from
a variety of labor groupings,
would be submitted for one vacancy.
This problem has not escaped the
criticism of Consejo labor

representatives who claim that nomination
regulations are calculated
to give the executive office
wide discretional powers.

Nevertheless,

the distribution of Consejo labor
representation, at least in the last
ten years, has been well balanced.

Even so, all labor representatives,

regardless of union affiliation, have been
equally critical of Consejo
policy

Without doubt the greatest impediment to effective
labor repre-

sentation in salary determinations is the
distribution of forces in
the Junta Directiva.

At least since 1974 the Consejo Nacional de

Salarios has essentially been a bipartite institution
composed of

3
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government and patronal sectors.

Every decision has been
the result

of a convergence of
government and patronal opinions,
in which labor

has been outnumbered by a
vote of

6

to

3.

In November of 1974 the
Consejo fixed minimum salary
increases

for 1975 at ten percent.
teen percent.

Prices for 1974 had increased
over seven-

In response to this
determination Rodrigo Paniagua

Paniagua of the CGT, Luis Guillermo
Oreamuno, Oreamuno of the CCTD,
Alsimiro Herrera Torres of the CTC
and Juan Rafael Espinoza Esquivel
,

of the ANEP, withheld their

votes.-

The explanation of their absten-

tion was made in the following
terms:

We wish to present to you, in a
formal manner, and in order to
comply with legal requirements, our
dissatisfaction with the
salary settings established by a
majority of the patronal and
state representatives in the organ
of which we form a part. 2

Labor representatives that year had
proposed a salary increase of between thirty percent, for low income
workers, and ten percent for

higher paid workers.
In 19 75, Paniagua, Oreamuno, Herrara, and
Espinoza abstained

once again, complaining that for all intents
and purposes, salaries

were established by the majority formed by
patronal and government
representatives.

Again in 1976 Oreamuno, speaking for the entire

worker delegation, cast a negative vote.

The labor delegation that

year proposed an increase of between 20 and 40 percent;
however, the

Consejo approved a salary increase of between

8

and 13 percent.

21*

Oreamuno contended that it was the feeling of the delegation that
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mi
al

ni™

series

Bere being fixed
exciusiveiy

representees.

^

government

^

The consistent coincidence
of opinion between

these two sectors, Orea
m uno argued, had

pation.

^

M de

a Jo k e of „„ rter
partlcl .

Similarly ln 1977 the „ orker

of a govern^ent-patronal
al li an ce.

^

Their action „ as explsined
in

the following terms:

goods and services-especially
those of primary necessity!-

Repeating their dissatisfaction
with the distribution of forces
in
the Consejo, the labor
delegation stated that:

^

—

° Ut
coincide
opinion that have
existed between the representatives
existeHetweS
of the state and the patronal
sector in every aspect of our labor
in the Consejo de Salaries and
in the general settings in which
we have participated; it is for
this reason that our proposals,
as representatives of the workers
have crystalrzed only minimally,
and the immense majority
these
decrsrons have been rejected without
justifiable motives! 26

™

For the 1978 term, labor representatives
had proposed a salary increase

ranging from thirty percent for low
income workers, to fifteen percent for higher income workers.

between

8

The Consejo approved an increase of

and 14 percent.

Frequently, when government and patronal
opinions do not correspond, each sector submits a different
salary proposal.

In these cases,

government representatives find themselves in a
key decision-

making position.

Labor representatives have complained that government

7
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^

representatives, aftet heating
patronal and labor
"ill present a figure somewhere
between that win USUall be
y
approved
by the patronal sector.
A typical decision would
involve a labor
proposal of eighteen percent.
Business will record ten
percent.
The government delegation
will suggest twelve percent.

Forced to

choose between the lesser of two
evils, labor representatives
will
support the government proposal.
After salaries had been fixed
for
1979,

for instance, labor
representative Alsimiro Herrera Torres
made

the following statement of
labor's position:

In light of the fact that the
propositions of the workers did
not count on the support of
the other represented sectors
in
the Consejo and upon having all

our proposals instantly rejected, not with the idea of solving
in full the whole problem
of low working class incomes,
but with a view to par tl/solving
the existing high cost of living,
that has a tendency
^
u^uutiiv. y to
rp
lu lnr
increase
S
r
POSiti ° n ° f
MlniSt6r ° f Labor -presenting
the Fxr
Executive pPower, not precisely because
it would solve the
problem of low worker incomes, but so
that salaries would not
remain frozen for 1979. 2

^

•

7

«-*

'

The 1980 and 1981 Consejo decisions
evoked the same response

from labor representatives.

After the 1980 salaries had been fixed

Juan Rafael Soils Barboza of the CGT,

the director of the labor dele-

gation, stated that the cost of living was
rising faster than salaries.

Despite salary increases, workers were becoming
increasingly

impoverished.

Inasmuch as patronal proposals were seen to be more

ridiculous than state proposals, the labor delegation
was compelled
to

accept the lesser of two evils and accept the proposal
submitted

by the Minister of Labor.

The inflation rate for that year was mea-

sured at eighteen percent, but the Consejo decreed a salary increase

221
of between 10 and 12
Derrpntpercent.

tu„ next
The
year Herrera Torres
abstained

when the labor proposal
of a 30 to 40 percent
salary increase was
rejected.

The labor delegation
once again issued a

govern.ent-patronal

recordation, which

potest

of

the

in this case a.ounted
to a

salary increase of between
11.5 and 12.5 percent.

28
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TABLE 19
REAL MINIMUM SALARIES FOR
A SELECT GROUP OF ACTIVITIES
ACCORDING TO ANNUAL GEOMETRIC
RATES OF INCREASE

1954-1964

Activity

UP -° f
9^
Salaries

Salaries
in Colones

1954

Newspaper printing

1964

Geometric Rate
of Increase
1954-1964

low

7

.08

8 .58

1 .94

low

7

.37

7

.96

0 .78

low

7

.87

10 .61

3 .03

low

8 .26

9 .36

1 .26

low

8 65

9 .99

1 .45

high

9

83

10 61

0 .77

high

11. 01

14 67

2 .91

Agriculture - bananas

all

13. 37

12. 48

-0 69

Sawmilling

high

13. 77

13. 73

-0 03

Construction

high

14. 16

17. 17

1. 95

Newspaper printing

high

26. 75

28. 09

0. 49

Agriculture - coffee
Mining
Sawmilling

Construction

Agriculture

-

coffee

Mining
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TABLE 20

REAL MINIMUM SALARIES FOR A SELECT
GROUP OF ACTIVITIES
ACCORDING TO ANNUAL GEOMETRIC RATE OF
INCREASE 30

1964-1974

flc l

iv i ty

Group of
Salaries

Real Salaries
in Colones
1964

Textile industry

Agriculture - coffee

low
low

Geometric Rate
of Increase

1972

1974

11.91

12 .48

2 .94

2.83

xu

10.78

11 30

0 .64

1.00

9 .44

.

1964 -1972

1964-1974

Newspaper printing

low

11 .05

13.08

13 .10

?
fa

1

Sawmilling

low

12 .05

13.84

13 .87

1 .75

1.42

Textile industry

high

12 .05

14.42

14 46

2 .27

1.84

Construction

low

12 86

14.92

14 40

1 .88

1.14

Mining

low

13 66

15.88

15 33

1 .90

1.16

Agriculture - coffee

high

13 66

14.38

15 05

0 .64

0.97

Agriculture - banana

all

16. 07

17.39

16. 14

0 .99

0.04

Sawmilling

high

17. 68

19.48

18. 06

1

22

0.21

Mining

high

18. 88

20.23

18. 78

0 87

-0.05

Construction

high

22. 10

23.83

23. 34

0. 95

0.55

Newspaper printing

high

36. 16

35.45

28. 96

-0. 25

-2.20

70

I

1

1

11
11

1t

1
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TABLE 23

MINIMUM SALARIES 1952-1980 3

Period

52-54
10% or less increase

Period

54-56
10% or less increase

Period

56-57
Salary freeze

Period

57-58

Period

10% or less increase

58-60

Period

60-62

Period

62-64

Period

64-66

Period

66-68

Period

68-70

Period

70-72

Period

72-74

Over 16% increase

Salary freeze
11% to 15% increase

11% to 15% increase

Salary freeze
10% or less increase

10% or less
7

Ap.

74 a Dec.

74

1/2% to 15% increa:

10% to 41% increase

Period

1975

Period

1976

Period

1977

Period

1978

Period

1979

5.8% to 12% increase

Period

1980

10% to 12% increase

Ap.

80

a

Dec.

9% to 11% increase

8% to 18% increase
8% to 13% increase
8% to 14%

80

8%,

9% and 10%

4
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Despite labor delegation
assertions of progressively
increasing worker impoverishment,
salary increases approved
by the Consejo
have generally corresponded
to increases in the
price of basic commodities.
Real salaries for the ten
year period between 1954
and
1964 increased 1.2 percent.
Between 1964 and 1967 the
cost of basic
comities such as food, clothing, and
housing had decreased slightly.
Roughly during the same time
period, the Consejo maintained
a freeze
on salaries.
An inflationary trend
thereafter was accompanied by
corresponding salary increases,
Tn
in rh*
y increases
the -ten year period between
1964
and 1974 real salaries had
increased 0.8 percent.
The period between 1976 and
1980 showed progressively decreasing gains in purchasing power.

Cost of living increases between
the

end of 1976 and the end of
1977 were registered at 4.2 percent
and
6.0 percent respectively.

by between

8

Salaries during that time were increased

and 13 percent, and

8

percent and 14 percent.

However

this increase, despite a mid year
Consejo readjustment in 1980, was

partially offset by a nine percent cost
of living increase in 1979
and an eighteen percent cost of living
increase in 1980.

3

While it would seem that the Consejo Nacional
de Salaries has

fulfilled its responsibility of providing
the working classes with
the means for acquiring at least basic
necessities,

clearly do not count on worker approval.

its decisions

In order to facilitate a

more effective labor representation, several
suggestions have been
recommended.

Most importantly, fundamental changes are needed in
the

organization of the Junta Directiva.

Inasmuch as there has been a
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Pronounced coincidence between

phonal

and government representatives,

labor delegates have expressed
the view that government
and patronal
representation ought to be reduced
to two, or government
officials
should be allowed to participate
without vote, in an advisory
capacity.
Secondly, changes should be made
in methods of appointment
that would give labor
organizations complete freedom to name
delegates.
Similarly the Ministry of Labor
should be required to appoint preferred labor organization candidates
in the event that a Consejo
member resigns, or is recalled.
At the same time the Ministry
should be

required to distribute nominations
among the largest labor organizations.

This applies also to the appointment
of substitutes.

Labor

leaders have complained that in the
event of a recall or resignation,
there is no guarantee that the ministry
will fill the vacancy with a

labor representative from the same
organization.
Thirdly, the Consejo should be more
independent of Executive
Power.

Besides exerting influence over the appointment
of labor repre-

sentatives, technical staffs responsible for
directing polls, soliciting

information, and conducting interviews, are all
dependencies of the

Ministry of Labor.

It might be pointed out that every institution

that conducts statistical research, whether
public or private, seems
to produce different data.

How inflation rates are calculated has an

important effect on Consejo determinations.
Fourthly, labor delegates have complained that the Consejo
lacks adequate technical machinery.

They argue that regional offices

should be established for collecting data and implementing salary
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regulations.

The firstf„„„*.-!
first function
is important inasmuch
as

^

ties are m ore expansive
outside of the San Jose
region, „hlle the
second function is i mp
ortant inas m uch as a large
nu mb er of e mplo yer,

ignore n i nimum salary
regulations.

With regard to this point,
labor

delegates have expressed
an interest in increasing
the penalty for
minimum salarv
ary offpnrioro
t>
offenders.
Present penalties make
violations well
worthwhile. Furthprmnro
urthermore, t-u„
the r
Consejo, it has been argued,
should be
given the power to recommend
legal action. 35

Although perhaps not as critical
to

working class interests as the
Consejo Nacional de Salaries
the importance of the Security and
Health Council should not be
underestimated.
Article 66 of the Costa Rican
Constitution states that
"all employers must adopt in
their businesses the necessary
means
for insuring safe, and hygienic
working conditions ." 3 « In accordance

with this disposition the Consejo
de Seguridad

e

Higiene was estab-

lished in 1957, like the Consejo
Nacional de Salaries, as a dependency
of the Ministry of Labor.

The Consejo's function is to
insure the highest possible degree
of physical, mental and social
well-being of workers.

In general

terms this involves reviewing cases
of job-related injuries, protecting laborers from risks resulting
from poor working conditions, and

placing and maintaining workers in occupations
that correspond to
their physical and psychological capacities.
of the Consejo cover several areas
including:

better occupational conditions,

2)

The specific activities
1)

the promotion of

the direction of studies and
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speci.l investigations
o£ uorker problems

_

^^^^

3)

rf

lations guaranteeing
occupational Health,

^
^

4) the tralnlng of
cal personnel speciali7i
cxal lzlng
no ln
i n „
occupational health, 5) the
diffusion

of methods of
occupational
nai safefv
safety, 6)

M

m,
the

guides indicating Proper
f 0 H,
8 proDer safety
equipment,

w

to the Ministry of
Labor,

8)

preparation of machinery
7)

the proposition of
laws

the proposition,

to the Executive Power
of the duty-free
importation of safety
equipment, 9) the organic
tion of safety commissions
in each
cn cen
centPr
a
ter of production
and 10) the
direction of studies concerning
occupational safety.

To help fulfill these
functlons the Conse o somet
mes
.

security commissions, composed
of a n
ployers,

e qua l

.

Mpioys

number of workers an d em-

to conduct personel
interviews end inspections
of occupational

conditions, in order to uncover
the causes of occupational
injuries.
The Consejo a lso uses the
Office of Health in the
Ministry of Leber
to obtein additional
infection on questions of occupational
safety
and heelth.
In feet, all the Consejo's
operetions end finences ere
dependent on the Ministry of Leber,
elthough opinions ere frequently
requested from outside sources
such es the College of Doctors,
or

engineering associations.

37

The most serious impediment to
effective labor representation
on the Consejo has been the
composition of its directive body.

Decisions are essentially made by
state authorities, appointed either

directly by the Executive Power or by
the directors of the autonomous
institutions, who owe their appointments
to the Executive Power.
In the law that created the Consejo,

the Junta Directiva was formed

.
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by eight

Mb ers.

Two m e mb ers „ ere appolnced

fcy

"ve

^

^

Power and included one
representative fro m the Ministry
of Laoor
and one representative
fro m the Ministry of
Health.
Two other representatives were appointed by
the Institute Nacional
de Seguros
(Nationai Security Institute)
and the Caja Costarricense
de Seguro
Social.
The other four representatives
included two employers and
two workers 38

Essentially, this distribution
conferred upon the state a representation of four.
Each institution in the state
sector certainly has
some for, of interest in
questions of occupational safety.
The autonomous institutions, for instance,
are responsible for distributing
payments to incapacitated workers.
The interest of the Ministry
of Labor
stems from regulations covering
occupational risks that appear in the
Labor Code.

At the same time,

the Ministry of Public Health
is respon-

sible for elaborating hygienic
conditions that are considered to be
inuurious.

Nevertheless, questions associated with
occupational safety

and hygiene most properly fall
within the responsibility of workers,

employers, medical, and technical officials.

Outside institutions

of the latter type, such as the
College of Doctors and engineering

organizations, or for that matter the Ministry
of Health ought to be
used only in an advisory capacity.
Despite this state of circumstances the
structure of the Junta

Directiva was subsequently reformed in

a

way that conferred even

greater representation upon state institutions.

The Consejo's direc-

tive body is currently formed by seven members.

Two representatives
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Including one from the Minisfrv
f
Ministry „
of

Ubor-who

presides over the juntaand one from the Ministry
of Health, are appointed
by the Executive
Power.
The autonomous
institutions are represented
by one delegate
from the Caja Costarricense
de Seguro Social, and
one delegate from
the Instituto Nacional
de seguros.
Seguros 39 FEmployers
mT,i~
are represented by
two delegates but labor's
representation has been cut to
one.

discretional authority of the
Executive Power in this structure is enhanced by
regulations covering the
appointment of delegates.
As in the Consejo Nacional
oe Salaries, patronal
and labor representatives are selected by the
Executive Power on the basis of
a list of
nominees, reaching into the
thousands, that are submitted
by labor
organizations at the end of each
term of office. Appointments
can
be made liberally without
regard to union size or
ideological orientation.
With regard to the latter point,
the CUT has never been represented on the Consejo, even though
it is the largest labor
organization in the country.
In addition to these regulations,
union organizations that are represented in
the Consejo, do not have the
prerogative of recall, as they do in
the Consejo Nacional de Salaries.
In the present Consejo Junta
Directiva the distribution of

sectoral power has not worked against
labor interests.

All members

are protection-oriented; however
the most usual state of circumstances,
is a confluence of interests
between government and patronal represen-

tatives.

Employers, labor delegates have claimed,
are not usually

interested in buying machinery with expensive
protective devices.

At
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the same time government

,

which coUects taxes

of this machinery,
has no strong desirg

^

importatiQn

fcQ

The structure of
participation and the method
of selecting

^

sector delegates place the
Consejo well wit hin the
domain of the executive authority.
Even so these connections
,

by the organs which are
used to enforce safety
regulations. All otters of this type are the
responsibility of the Departs
of Inspec-

tions

division of the Ministry of
Labor.

This circumstance has

the effect of conferring
upon the ministry a function
which ought to
be the responsibility of

labor organizations.

Problems associated

with occupational conditions,
rather than enjoining labor
organizations, are taken directly to
the ministry.

Matters that ought to

involve employers and labor
organizations then become part of
tripartite discussions that involve
a heavy government participation.
The function of the Department
of Inspections has been criti-

cized by labor organizations
not only because of the dependence
it

establishes between workers and the
Ministry of Labor, but because of
the procedural guidelines that
must be followed in bringing suits

against employers.

It was

mentioned in an earlier chapter that
vio-

lations of the Labor Code usually
follow a juridical route.

Inasmuch

as Consejo determinations become
part of labor legislation, violations
of safety regulations are brought
before the labor courts.

Apart

from the fact that this involves
lengthy legal procedures, complaints

against employers are often lost in the
maze of special investigations
that attend worker complaints.

Furthermore, employers can use various

-sure*

such as threats of
flrlng

t„

dlssuade

action.

^^^
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0„a labor leader complained
that violations of the
code
never reach the courts. h0

A no less serious problem
with the structure of the
Consejo
is its heavy dependence
on the Ministry of
labor.

All proposals must

be approved by the
ministry and the executive
authority.

Many tl mes
the dunta Directiva has
submitted propositions only
to have them dras-

tically reformed after
examination by the Executive
Power.
The recent
restructuring of the Consejo's
directive body, having been
made despite
Consejo disapproval, shows
that what Is sent into the
decision-maKing
machinery and what comes out
are two different things.
Even with regard to regulations
that have already been
approved,
the likelihood of enforcement
depends on the disposition of
the Minister of L abor.
Labor inspectors, for instance,
may submit a report to
the Minister Indicating that
a business ought to be
penalized for not

having complied with safety
regulations.

During the subsequent appeal,

the Minister may decide that
the factory was in fact
conforming to

safety code regulations.

Neither is there any guarantee that
the Ministry will accept
the testimony of the Department
of Inspections.

that occurred in 1981,

In a typical case

inspectors attached to the Consejo visited
the

construction site of a branch office of
one of the state banks.

A

report was submitted to the Junta
Directiva stating that several

safety regulations were being violated.
stop in construction.

and promptly rejected.

The Consejo recommended a

The proposal was sent to the Ministry of
Labor
1*

1

.
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The relationship
between labor organizations
and autonomous institutions can be viewed as
an important measure
by which lab or has
been allowed to i„f lu
e„ce the
of

-oh

^

inas _
as the dramatic
inorease in the size o f
the Costa Pican state

sinoe World War
1! has corresponded to a
dramatic increase in state
responsibility for developmental
programs, labor representation
in
Public institutions has come
to be no !ess important
than representation in political institutions.
Several of these institutions
do or
have established a greater
or lesser degree of
labor representation.

^^^E^iL^Desarr^

ne

Popular Bank

^

Development is an autonomous
institution that was created in
1969.
Us objectives have been to protect
the economic well-being
of workers
and small scale producers,
through the encouragement of
savings and
the satisfaction of credit
needs.

In specific terms this
involves

providing loans that would be
used to:

liberate the worker from debt;

purchase tools and other working
equipment; buy or repair popular
housing facilities; finance
educational costs, finance cooperative
operations; solve emergency social
problems; finance community development programs; and permit the
purchase of basic consumer products."
Funds are formed by tripartite
contributions.

Employers, as well as

state institutions contribute one-half
percent of their profits or

renumerations, while workers contribute
one percent of their monthly
salary
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Inasmuch as it

U

an organ

^^

^

^^

economic interests of
small stale producers
and
u workers
wurKer s, the original
,
,
contituent acts o f the
Banco Popular placed
the responslbiUty
„f
direction lar g el y in the
hands of the working
classes.
The original
Junta Directive was
formed by nine meters.
Two delegates, representing the national banking
system were chosen h the
Banco Central and
y
the Banking Coordination
Commission. One delegate
represented the
municipalities.
delegates represented
Association
for Community Develoomenta
e
,
,
veiopment, and
four delegates represented
labor.
Beneath the national Junta
Directiva, five regional
Juntas Directives
were formed hy one
representative from the state
hanking system, one
representative from the municipalities,
one representative from
the
regional Association for
Community Development, and two
worker representatives,
addition to regional directive
Bodies, local conm,ittees
,

^

^

m

were formed by three worker
representatives, one representative
from
the Association for Local
Development, and one representative
named
by the regional Junta
Directiva.

4

In this structural scheme,

'*

the directive bodies of the
regional

offices were given the responsibility
of designating representatives
to both the

national Junta Directiva and the
local directive bodies.

The two worker delegates at the
regional level as well as the dele-

gates of the Association for Community
Development, and the delegates
of the municipalities were
selected directly by the represented labor

organization or association.

Delegates at the local level were

selected from lists of nominees submitted
by the corresponding local
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orations

or association.

Wlth regard to the
interna! organiza-

U~

and functioning of
the national dunta
Directive, an Executive
Director was elected by a
majority of six votes, two
of „ hlch „ ere

reared
a ouorum,

to be from the labor
sectoc.

m

addition, five members
formed

two of which were
required to he labor
representatives.-

The original organization
of the Banco Popular
conferred upon

labor a much higher degree
of representation than
other tripartite
organise. Almost half of the
national dunta Directive was
composed
of labor representatives.
Furthers the appoints of the
Executive
Director as well as the approval
of all bank decisions
insured at
least a minimum degree of
labor support for hank
policy. Most importantly however, labor delegates,
unlike other tripartite organisms,
were named independently of
the Executive Power.
Owing to this form
of appointment, labor delegates
were directly dependent on the
organization they represented.
This liberty insured a much
more authentic
form of participation. Along
with this disposition though, the
original
constitutive law confined labor
participation to those organizations
of a democratic orientation.

Labor delegates had to be represented

either by the CCTD and the COCC.

A whole sector of the labor move-

ment was thus prohibited from
participation.

Apart from this restriction, the power
of labor to affect decisions in the Banco Popular was substantial,
at least in the period

directly following its creation.

Since 1969, however, several reforms

which will be discussed later in the
chapter, changed both the

struc-

ture and the methods of appointment to
the Junta Directlva and have

reduced both the degree and quality of labor
representation.
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The Caja was established
in

early 1940s as part of
the Christian-oriented
reform package of
Dr. Calder6n Cuardia.
The institute provideg

^

Pregnancy, invalidity, old
age

,

and involuntary unemployment

shares some of the
responsibility for problems
associated
age, the death of
breadwinners, and funerals.

_

^

ft

^

Contributions, which
are derived fro m workers,
employers, and the state,
are regulated b y
a directive bod
y which, supposedly, functions
independently of the

Executive Power.

Upon establishment the
Caja was directed by a tri-

partite junta co m posed of five
members, along with four
substitutes.
Three of these members, named
directly by the Executive Power,
represented the state sector. One
member represented the patronal
sector
and one member represented the
labor
sector.

In all three sectors,

candidates were approved by the
executive authority.

46

The problems associated with
the original structure of the

Junta Directiva are clear.

The executive authority, for all
intents

and purposes, was given complete
control of the selection process.

Furthermore, labor organizations had no
control over the activities of

representatives that were chosen to participate
in the junta.
theless,
tantly,

two points should be kept in mind.

Never-

First, and most impor-

the participation of labor prescribed
by the Caja statutes,

minimal though it was, represented a
considerable breakthrough in the
ability of labor to affect the activities of
a major state institution,

when it is taken into consideration that labor
organizations prior to
that time not only had no decision-making
input, but no firm legal

9
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guarantees of their riohiright #-«
to *function or even
exist.
Secondly, it
should be carefully noted,
that the executive authority
during^a
period of Costa Rican
political development was used
to support labor
interests.

The appointment of
nominees representing the
Popular

Vanguard Party, and in an
indirect way, the Confederation
of Costa
Rican Workers, was sufficiently
alarming to business interests
to
cause an erosion in Calderon's
conservative support." It might

be

assumed therefore, from the
political repercussions of communist
influence in the Caja, that a
confluence of interests had developed

between those delegates representing
the state, and the one delegate
representing labor. This situation
terminated in 1948 as a result
of the revolution.

After 1948 labor representation
on the Caja was substantially

diminished owing to a combination of
the removal of PVP state representatives, who might be considered to
be surrogate labor representatives, and to structural changes
in the institute's governing body.
In 1963, reforms in the Caja's
statutes raised the number of members
on the Junta Directiva to seven.

The state sector was composed of

two members, one of which had to be
a Minister of Government, who

would preside over the Junta Directiva.

The other five members in-

cluded a doctor, two representatives from the
patronal sector, one

representative from the academic community, and one
labor representative. 48

Another reform, instituted two years later, made the
Minister

of Labor the President of the Junta Directiva.

4
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Consejo Na cional a^roduccion.
de Prodnminn

tu„
The m
National Production Council
(COT)
•

was originally formed in
1944 in order to promote
agricultural production, and make basic
foodstuffs such as beans, corn,
and potatoes
available to the public at cheap
pr i ce s
Owing to an overlapping of
functions between the Consejo,
the Ministry of Agriculture,
and the
.

Ministry of Economy, the CNP,
by 1948, had proved to be a
failure.
After the revolution the Consejo
was reconstituted as the National
Production and Credit Council.
One of the responsibilities of
the Consejo during this time
was to provide credit to small
producers but because of its failure
to fulfill this

function, the institution was
reconstituted as the

Consejo Nacional de Produccion.

In general terms the function of
the

CNP was to encourage agricultural
and fishing production, stabilize
the prices of basic foods, and
establish a just equilibrium in the

relations between producers and consumers.

In specific terms this

involved the purchase of basic foodstuffs
and primary materials at
prices that were considered to be reasonable
to the producer; the

acquisition of fertilizers and insecticides;
the purchase of agricultural machinery;

the purchase or production of animal foodstuffs;
and

the coordination of agricultural and fishing
projects.

The Consejo

has continued to fulfill these functions; but
in 1977 the responsi-

bility of providing credit to small scale producers
was resumed.

50

The participation of labor in the Consejo directive
body during this time was either non-existent or negligible.

The power of

appointment was placed well within the domain of the Executive Power,
and there were no requirements on the participation of labor

.
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organizations.

For much of its history,
the Consejo could not have

been considered to be a
tripartite organization.

The Junta Directive

between 1948 and 1957, for
instance, was formed by the
Minister of
Economy, the Minister of
Agriculture, the Minister of Labor,
and the
President of the National Bank.
Substitutes were named by the directive bodies of each ministry. 51
A legislative reform in 1956
officially established the Consejo
as an autonomous institution.

In accordance with this reform,
the

Junta Directiva was restructured
to include five members.

The repre-

sentative of the state was required
to be a minister of government

while the rest of the directive body
was formed by four persons who

possessed agricultural or economic
experience and an ample understanding of the functions that the Consejo
was called upon to perform.

All of these representatives were named
by the executive authority.

52

During much of this time labor representatives
were appointed to the

Consejo's directive body, but importantly
there were no legal dispositions requiring tripartite representation.

Instituto Nacional De Ap rendiz^P.

The National Apprenticeship Insti-

tute (INA) was created in May 1955 as a
decentralized, semi-autonomous

institution.

Its function in general terms has been to
contribute

to economic development and improved living
conditions through the

creation of apprenticeship programs in factories and places
of business, the direction of studies concerning the scientific
organization
of the work force, and the economic subsidization of
technical

schools

5 3
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Upon its creation the INA
was governed by a tripartite
Junta
Directiva composed of seven
members.
Two members included the
Minister of Labor and the
Minister of Education.
Substitutes in both
cases were designated by
the respective ministries.
One delegate
represented the Office of
Planning. One delegate
represented one of
the autonomous institutions
that financed the institute.
One delegate represented the National
Technical School.
Two other delegates
represented patronal and labor
organizations. 54
The distribution of
representation in this scheme did
not in-

volve a high degree of labor
participation inasmuch as state institutions, either centralized or
decentralized, were given a high
degree
of representation.
Furthermore the executive authority,
as in all

other tripartite organs, was at
liberty to choose labor delegates
from lists submitted by legally
inscribed labor organizations.

Apart

from this, however, the balance of
sectoral representation would indicate that state institutions
controlled INA decision-making, and policy.
The structural characteristics
of the INA's directive body

bear great similarity to all other
tripartite organisms:

a high degree

of state representation accompanied
by state control over labor appoint-

ments.

With regard to sectoral distribution,
what ought to be empha-

sized is the frequency of Ministry of
Labor participation.

Nacional de Salarios and the Consejo de
Seguridad
of the Ministry of Labor.

In the first case,

e

Higiene are adjuncts

the appointment of labor

delegates falls within the ministry's responsibilities.
case,

The Consejo

In the second

in addition to its power over the selection
of labor delegates,

the ministry is responsible
fQr bQth

Conse jo decisions.

^ ^^^^ ^ ^^^^^ ^
^

Where autonomous ins t i
tutions are concerned

,

Ministry is given representation
in the di re ctive body
of all tripartite organise except
the Banco Popular.
It would thus seem
the Ministry of Lahor
has an important involvement,
not only in those

^

questions concerning collective
conflicts and labor organization,
but in almost all forms of
activity that affect the working
classes.
The importance of this
state of circumstances derives
fro, the fact
that the ministry is a dependency
of the president.
Inasmuch as the

executive personnel of the ministry
are appointed by the president,
without the approval of labor
organizations, its relationship with
labor is largely a reflection of
the ideas and opinions of the
presidential administration. What also
should be pointed out is the influence that the camaras have on the
selection of ministers of government.

Patronal approval of presidential
appointments to the Ministry

of Labor in fact has been a
long standing source of criticism
for

several labor organizations, both
social democratic and marxist.
Tendency Toward Centralization

.

55

While dozens of autonomous and semi-

autonomous institutions have been created
since World War II, labor

participation has been confined to only the few
that have been mentioned.

And while the quality of this participation
has never been

effective, the organizational and coordination
problems caused by
the expansion of the state apparatus prompted
several reforms result-

ing in a further dimunition of labor representation
in each institution.
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ttC firSt £ theSe
l^isiative reforms was Instituted
°
in 1970.
Law no. 4646, commonly
callad the 4-3 act, intended
to solve the

problem of poor coordination
among the autonomous
institutions by
granting the majority political
party the right to name three
representatives to the Central Bank.
The minority party was also
given the
right to name three
representatives, while the Executive
Power was

responsible for appointing the
director.

The 4-3 law not only changed

the decision-making structure
of the Central Bank, but
eleven other

autonomous institutions as well,
including the Consejo Nacional de
Produccion, the Caja Costarricense
de Seguro Social, and the
Institute
Nacional de Aprendizaje. Where
these institutions were concerned,
directive bodies were reformed to
include seven members.
was required to be a Minister of
Government.

One delegate

Six other delegates were

required only to have an ample understanding
of the activities of the

corresponding institution.

In both cases, delegates were
chosen by

the Executive Power. 55

The promulgation of the 4-3 law had
an important effect on

labor representation.

From that point the Executive Power was no

longer required to appoint labor delegates
to the autonomous institutions.

The immediate effect on labor representation
on the Consejo

Nacional de Produce!™ was not significant
inasmuch as

a

previous

reform had accomplished the same objectives as
the 4-3 law.

However,

labor representation was removed in the Instituto
Nacional de

Aprendizaje and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

Where INA

was concerned, and for that matter, all other
institutions affected

.
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by the lav,

law

delegates »„„

U

Jrom tlme t0

^

be
but importantly, this
re p resen tation was
net required t0 be
constant ,
and in all cases, the pxph.h™ o *.u
executxve authorxty was
in charge of authorizing
all appointments
in Practical terms,
the 4 . 3 law

drastically affected the orien-

tation ef the directive
bodies in the autonomous
institutions. After
1970, there was a tremendous
competition for leadership
posts.
In
for
1970,
instance, ninety-one
appointments were made:
fifty-two
from the P LN and thirty-nine
,
fro. the Unification Party.
One month
before selections were made,
over two thousand applications
had been
submitted.
This state of circumstances
led to the criticism that
the
autonomous institutions had
become a mechanism for political
patronage.
In addition to being an
impractical and ad hoc solution
to the problem
of bureaucratic waste, the
system was accused of being a
manifestation
of the commitment of Costa
Rican statesmen to political
corruption."
The centralization of the
Central Bank and several autonomous

institutions began a process which
was followed by an organizational
reform that profoundly affected
the structure of participation
and
method of delegate selection in the
Banco Popular.
In 1973 labor

representation was cut to three.

Even more crucially, labor organi-

zations were deprived of their liberty
to name delegates directly to
the Junta Directiva.

From that point, all labor delegates
were

selected by the executive authority from
a list of five nominees.
Quorums were still set at five for banking
policy and six for the

election of the Executive Director, but
requirements governing mlnimun labor support for junta decisions were
removed. 58

246

In an equally profound
reform,

the Central Bank and
twelve

autonomous Institution, were
further centralized one year
later hy
the Ley de Presidencies
Ejecutivas (Executive Chairmanship
Law).
Professionals at the Central
Bank communicated their
opposition to
the reform by stating that
it exposed the country
to the danger of
a unification of political
and economic power.
Autonomous institutions,
It was argued, had a
technical, not a political
function.
The structural reform threatened the
operations characteristic of
autonomous
institutions by submitting each
entity to the discretion of an
Executive Power which might be more
Interested in political matters
than
technical matters.

Furthermore, the Imposition of the
ideas of a

small group of people was doubly
dangerous when the high level of
public sector Involvement in
developmental programs was taken into

consideration.
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Where autonomous institutions were
concerned, the Ley de

Presidencias Ejecutivas did not affect
structures of participation
as much as it did independence
of decision-making.

The Executive

Directors of the affected institutions were
still appointed by the

Council of Government while the other six
members, also appointed by
the Consejo, were required only to
have ample understanding of the

activities of the corresponding institution.

However, the Executive

Directors of any of the affected institutions
could be removed liberally by the Council of Government.
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This process of centralization provided occasion for
several

criticisms.

Alsimiro Herrera of the CTC stated that the Banco

'
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Popular had been placed in
the hands
tne
nands of
nf M«
big economic interests.
Luis
Agendo Gutierrez of the CCTB
stated that the legislature
was converting itself into a generator
of Internal agitators,
inasmuch as its
decisions were hased on the
needs of powerful groups
rather than the
working classes. In
in response
resnnnc^ to
t-« the
j
reduction
of labor representation in the Banco Popular
he stated:
call to attention all Costa
Rican labor leaders and rank
and
S
° that We may remain attentive to this
urldicT
a8ai St the juSt and human
interests of the
V
naMon i ™Z
The
nk t0day is a sim
P^ reflection of
Political^
political demagogue ry -e?
I

.

To say the very least,

the autonomous institutions do
not pro-

vide effective labor participation.

Apart from the fact that there

are dozens of institutions that
have never incorporated labor interests,

the small level of representation
that labor has had in the

public sector, has been reduced owing
to a process of centralization
that was undertaken in 1970.

In addition to the Consejo Nacional
de

Salarios, and the Consejo de Seguridad
e Higiene, labor organizations

have representatives in three tripartite
organs:

the Banco Popular,

the Consejo Nacional de Production,
and the Instituto Nacional de

Aprendizaje.

Where the INA and the CNP are concerned,
this represen-

tation is not guaranteed.

Furthermore, labor delegates in the CNP

have complained that the Junta Directiva is
composed of large agricul-

tural producers who serve either as representatives
of the state or

representatives of the patronal sector.
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At the same time, decision-

making in all the autonomous institutions has been
politicized through
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executive control over
appointments.

Owing to this control,
labor

leaders have attested that
there is no

l abor

repr esentation even in

those institutions that
incorporate labor delegates
inasmuch as labor
leaders who gain appoints
are expected to represent
the interests
of those who appoint
them, not the union that
recommended them.
For
this reason labor delegates
become divorced from the
interests of the

working classes.

If the decisions of the
autonomous institutions have

had a positive affect on the
working classes, it is clearly
not because of direct working class
63
pressure.

Nevertheless the lack of effective
labor participation has
given labor leaders cause to
assert that the autonomous
institutions,
as well as the tripartite
organs attached to the Ministry
of Labor,
have developed a commercial
orientation.

In institutions such as the

Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social
and the Institute Nacional de

Seguros this implies a reluctance
to make distributive payments.
In the Consejo Nacional de Salarios
this implies the constriction
of inflationary tendencies, and
in the Consejo de Seguridad E
Higiene
it implies the importation of
cheap machinery that lacks safety

devices.

Where the Consejo Nacional de Production
is concerned it

involves private sector control over the
price of basic foods, and

where the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje
is concerned it means
state control over the character and the
organization of the factors
of production.

One labor leader who had participated on the
direc-

tive bodies of several tripartite organs
lamented that the autonomous

institutions, as well as the tripartite organs attached to
the
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Ministry 0£ Labor

,

Winded people, „ ho ap00lnt
making posts.

„

are commercial organisns>

^^^^ ^

cially _ mlnded

614

^

comBerctaiiy _

^

Concluding RpinarVc
There are several
and bureaucratic organs.

p oints o£

contact betKeen

^

organlzations

First, and most importantly,
Costa Klcan

labor legislation requires
an intimate relatlonsblp
between labor and
the Ministry of Labor.
This relationship Is
characterized by regulation, control, and interference.
Secondly the decisionmaking
apparatus
in the Consejo Nacional
de Salaries and the Consejo
de Seguridad e
Higiene possesses structural
properties precluding iabor from
forcing
and effective counterweight
to patronal and state
representatives

"hose interests are most usually
confluent.

Furthermore, where the

Consejo de Seguridad e Higiene
is concerned, policy formation,
implementation, and enforcement are under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Labor.
The autonomous institutions on
the other hand function without

effective labor representation.

In those institutions that have
inte-

grated labor representation, participation
has been so confined as to
be ineffective.

Furthermore, inasmuch as labor delegates
are hand

picked by the Executive Power, participation
on the autonomous institutions has been a means by which labor
leaders have been divorced from
the labor movement and coopted by a
government apparatus whose actions

are most usually governed by commercial
interests.
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The fail ure of labor
organisations to achieve an
effective

representation in tripartite
orga„i 2 atio„s as Well
as labor's inability
*> acco m plish Labor Code reform
that would provide both
greater
liberty and .ore effective
guarantees are attributable
to a lack of
Political influence. This
win be the subject of the next
chapter
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VI

POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The structure of the
Costa Rican labor relations
system has
had several effects,
It has impeded normal
lahor development through

retirements on union formation
that leave labor organizations
vulnerable to patronal attacks.

It has placed labor
organizations at a

tactical disadvantage through
restrictions on union activity;
and,
owing to these restrictions,
it has subjected labor
union leaders and
rank and file .embers to
physical violence. All these
characteristics come together in the
process of collective conflict
resolution
during which Labor Code dispositions
first invoke the participation
of the Ministry of Labor and
then activate the prohibitive
mechanism
of judicial and public security
authority.

Each stage is accompanied

by an application of the power
corresponding to the state agency that
is drawn into the conflict.

Inasmuch as this conflict resolution
process is dictated by
the Labor Code,

labor groups,

legal reform has been a basic goal of
all Costa Rican

ideological and tactical orientation
notwithstanding.

Labor Code reforms have been recognized
as a basic and necessary first
step in the execution of all labor
organization functions intending
to

protect the socioeconomic well-being of the working
classes.

Several attempts have been made, through legislative
action, to change
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the structure of iuridir^l inh 0
juridical integration;
however, owing to a
lack of
strong and sustained
political in flu ence, all these
attests have
failed.
The reasons for these
legislative failures can he
found hoth
in constitutional articles
txcxes regarding
rPM r n inn the proper function
of labor

^

organizations and the struct-.,™
*
structure noff participation
in Costa Rica's major
political parties.
•

•

Prohibitions on Pol itical Activity
Owing to legal regulations,
direct labor involvement in
political matters has always been
a risky affair.
Article 61 of the Constitution states that:

T^^T^^^ - —

patrons as well as workers may
unionize liberally, for the
ving economic/social

This disposition prohibits
labor organizations from involvement
in any
form of political action.
Buttressing the prohibition, article
280

section a of the Labor Code states
that:
At the request of the Ministry
of Labor the Labor Tribunals will
always order the dissolution of unions,
when it can be proved
in politico-electoral affairs, when
tntv
they initiate religious struggles,
or when they maintain
activities contrary to the democratic
principles that are
established by the Constitution. 2

^^ning

Owing to these dispositions, labor
organizations have been
forced to cloak their contacts with
political parties and risk the

possibility of involuntary dissolution, or
remain on the sidelines
of political party determinations through
the maintenance of informal

-tacts.

The constriction of
labor

affairs has placed labor
at a

^^^^

^
dlsadvanta

^

Code refers unions
cannot effectively defend
the interests of the
working classes; et, the
y
political influence that
the accomplishment
of these reforms
retires, o b li g es unions to
run the risk of involuntary dissolution.
This contradiction has
invoked a heavy criticise,
from various lahor leaders
who view parties and unions
as complimentary structures.
Eduardo Nunez Carro, President
of the Costa Rican
Educators Union, expressed
the prevailing opinion
of labor leaders
when he stated that it is
impossible to separate economic
and political activities.
In a capitalistic system
in which employers participate actively in politics,
there is no reason why workers
should be
marginalized.
The relationship between
the two has been seen to
be
fundamental inasmuch as unions
cannot achieve important social
reforms
affecting the working classes,
except through political activity.

With regard to this point Alvaro
Jimenez Zavaleta, former Secretary
General of the National Railroad
Union, stated that:
to deny the right of unions
to analyse the platforms and programs that are proposed by the diverse
political parties that
participate in the electoral process in
search of popular support, and to make collective
pronouncements that condition their
support or justify their repudiation, is
to deny organized workers
the possibility of learning, becoming
educated, and participating
in a subject of great importance in
the development of Costa Rican
democracy, that is necessarily one of the
legitimate rights and
needs of social organizations."

What has confused and frustrated these and
other labor leaders
is

the prevailing expectation that labor
organizations should remain

.

ind^t

of either

^

or churches, that have
dedicated
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or organi.tions, be
they

Selves

parues

Co the same ends.

Wlth.
out strong and con stant
contact, and without the
authentic participation of popular
organUations such as iahor
unions, the political
part,
that puts itself forth
as a representative
organ of popular needs and
desires, cannot hut fail
to fulfill lta function
„ uh regard
this point Guido Nunez
Roman, Secretary General
of the Union of Electrical and Telecommunication
Workers, asserted that
prohihitions on
political activity are an
audacious attest to confine
labor activities.
An authentic participation
however, would take the form
of a
.

^

workers party or a party with
real social democratic
postulates.
All too frequently, Nunez
contended, those who called
themselves social
democrats, have had no genuine
interest in the problems of the
popular classes

5

The most steadfast supporter
of labor's legislative
objectives
has been the National Vanguard
Party, Costa Rica's communist
party.
The PVP had its origins in the
labor struggles against the United

Fruit Company in the 1930s.

Contacts between the party and labor

organizations have always been close,
although after the revolution
the PVP was involuntarily dissolved
by the military junta for having

formed the Block of Victoria with
Calderotl Guardia's National Republican Party.

The renovated PVP scarcely hides its
association with the

CUT, and for that reason, both run
the constant risk of being pro-

scribed by the Legislative Assembly or the
Labor Tribunals.
from this danger,

But apart

the PVP bears a form of hierarchical organization
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that is calculated to
stifflo dissension
stiffle
emanating from its base
organizations.
This state of circumstances
has caused aiam among
several labor leaders,
es P eciall y of social
democratic and Christian

orientations, „ho assert
that the integration of
labor organizations
into the party apparatus
has been characterized
more by control

th an

representation.

Labor and the PVP Structure
The PVP is divided into
five ascending structures:

Cells;

Assemblies, and Zone Committees;
Assemblies and Regional Committees;
Central Committee
n ii(-!„.i n
ttee anH
and p
Political
Commission; and the National
Congress.
As the basic structural organ,

the party Cell is organized

primarily in factories and is
formed by a minimum of three
people.
Regional Committees determine where
they will be created, how they
will be divided, when they will
have their meetings, and what
their
principal tasks should be. The chief
function of the Cell is to organize, mobilize, and orient the
masses-or more concretely, the

factory workers-according to the
political party line.

Specifically

this involves keeping workers
informed about problems that affect
them;
of

recruiting militants and affiliates; directing
the activities

the party militants,

and the labor organizations within their

radius in accordance with the directions
of superior party organisms;

and maintaining an ideological struggle
against opportunists and reactionaries.

6

According to this description of functions, it may
be

supposed that the purpose of the Cell is to organize
unions in

_
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loni2ed factorles

,

^

ln£iltrate and capture iabor
organi2ations

that have already been
formed, and to direct
activlties

^

with Instructions from
higher authorities.

The second organizational
structure, the Zonal organizations,
encompass all t he hase Cells
according t0 geographic or
institutional
sector.
Zonal Assemblies are formed
either by all the party militants,
or by delegates, according
to the Judgement of higher
authorities.
The Assemblies have the
responsibility of naming a Zonal
Committee

composed of between five and
eleven members, whose function
is to direct party activities within
its Jurisdiction, in accordance
with the
Plans and orientations of the
Regional Committee.
The committee also
decides which militants are to
be assigned to which areas, and
analyses
the activities of each militant. 7
The third organizational structure,
the Regional Assembly, is

formed by delegates from the Zonal
Committees.
to elaborate the general lines
of regional work;

Its functions are

approve or disapprove

the reports of the regional committee;
elect the Regional Committee

every two years; fill vacant posts or
remove members from posts when
they have failed to fulfill their
obligations; name candidates to

elective offices within its jurisdiction;
and to insure the correct

application of policies in lower levels of the
party organization.
Above the Regional Assembly is the Regional
Committee, an organ composed of fifteen or less members whose principal
responsibility is
to name an Executive Commission

which includes an Executive Secretary

and officers in charge of education and union
organization.

Other

.
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functions include:

exercising control over the
fulfilment of party

Policy and insuring the correct
application of policy that is
fixed
by higher organs; directing
the Zonal Committees and
Cells within their
jurisdiction; controlling the
functions of lower party organs;
directing the organizational
work of lower organs; and
combatting common
ideologies foreign to Marxism-Leninism.
The Secretary General of the
Executive Commission has the
responsibility of insuring the smooth
functioning of the Regional
Committee and the coordination of
different auxiliary commissions. 8
It would be worthwhile to
note at this

point that an important function
of the Zonal and Regional
organizations is to direct and discipline
local party militants.

The mili-

tants, by their part, constitute
the basic point of contact
between
the PVP and its client labor
organizations.

The highest organ of the PVP is
the National Congress, a deliber-

ative body composed of members of the
Central Committee, and delegates who are elected by the Regional
Committees and Assemblies.
The National Congress has four functions:
the reports of the Central Committee;

gram and statutes of the party;
of the party;

to

to understand and discuss

to approve and modify the pro-

establish the general political line

and to elect the Central Committee and name
Control

Commissions
The directive body of the Congress is the Central
Committee.
In addition to electing a Secretary General,

the Committee elects a

Political Commission whose principal task is ensuring the correct

application of the party line.

In order to accomplish this,

the
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Political Commission is rpsnnnQ^u *
responsible for appointing
Auxiliary and
Policy Control Commissions. 9
The combination of the
Secretaries of the Central
Committee,
and Secretary and Sub-Secretary
General constitute the Executive
Secretariat whose principal
responsibilities include: executing
the
resolutions of the Political
Commission; controlling and
coordinati ng
the Auxiliary Commissions;
approving or disapproving
appointments made
by the Regional and Zonal
Committees; and coordinating and
controlling
the operations of the Regional
Committees. 10

What exists in this organizational
scheme is a hierarchical
structure that concentrates power
in the higher levels of party
organization.
The lower organs in the
party, such as the Cells and Zonal

Committees, are given the task of
organizing and controlling base

organizations, or more concretely, labor
organizations.

The Regional

Committees in turn have the responsibility
of coordinating and controlling the functions of the Zonal
Committees and the individual
Cells.

Furthermore the regional organs have the power
to initiate

disciplinary action against anyone thought to
be spreading or even
supporting "common ideologies foreign to
Marxism-Leninism."

In prac-

tical terms this removes from the local units,
and ultimately labor

unions as well, any independence of action and places
them under the

authority of superior party organs.

Furthermore, party procedural

regulations cannot be seen to follow the strictest principals of

democratic organization.

That is to say,

the selection of represen-

tatives, in addition to having an electoral basis, requires the
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Executive Secretariat

Central Committee
National Congress
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Political Commission

Auxiliary Commissions,
e.g., Policy Control
Commission
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approval of higher party
oreanc,
P rty organs.

T
«
In

the case of the regional
units,
the approval of the
Executive
ve Secretariat
secretariat la
is required for all
appoint-

ments

.

In addition to its
regular organization, it
should also be
emphasized that PVP commissions
and committees also function
to coordinate and control activities
in the lower party organs.
The Policy

Control Commission, for
instance, is an organ appointed
by the Central
Committee that Stains a
constant vigilance not only
over the operations of the party militants,
but over the operations, it
might be
argued, of client labor
organizations.
Some of the functions of these

commissions include:

proposing the installation of new
cells to the

Executive Secretariat; guarding
the unity and discipline of
the party;
submitting reports on disciplinary
problems to the Central Committee
and proposing disciplinary
actions; observing, criticizing,
and sub-

mitting reports on the conduct of
local functionaries; and naming
special Policy Control Auxiliary
Commissions.

11

The functions of standing organs
such as the Zonal and Regional

Committees and the Central Committee and
Executive Secretariat, in

combination with the functions of special
organs such as the Policy
Control Committees, serve to emphasize the
authoritarian nature of
the PVP.

This system of multiple controls cannot
but reduce indepen-

dent union action inasmuch as directions
that proceed from the regional

units to the individual cells are eventually
communicated to client

labor organizations.
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Beyond this, the party
establishes Coordination
Committees
composed of party miiUants,
who along with the Zonal
Committees and
Cells, share the responsibility
for insuring a oorrect
application
of party policy in mass-or
more

specifically-labor organizat::ions

These structural characteristics
and the frequency with which
the
terms "control, coordinate,
and appoint," appear in
descriptions of
party organization, provide
further insurance that messages
will
flow down the party organization
where they will ultimately be
received
by client labor unions. Where
these labor organizations are
concerned,
there can be little doubt that
multiple control coordination mechanisms are calculated largely to
insure the rapid and correct application of party directions.
It should also be carefully
noted that party militants as well

as functionaries all along the
party hierarchy, are not necessarily

labor union people.

The party includes individuals from
various occu-

pations and socioeconomic situations.
The union affiliates of the CUT and the
PVP are separate organ-

izations, but, as a party dedicated to popular
interests, the PVP is

bound to maintain close relations with labor
organizations in order
to

effectively represent their interests.

All too often however, the

militant who is given the responsibility of recruiting
party supporters,
or organizing a labor organization, or directing
strike activities,

has had absolutely no connection with the affected
workers, or labor

organization.
classes,

While the PVP is supposed

to be

the arm of the working

it may be more appropriate to say that labor organizations

are the electoral arm of the PVP.
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This relationship has
been the source of both
criticism and
threats.
industrial leaders
accused

^

^

^^^

cal objectives, while
political leaders have accused
the PVP of author
itarian tendencies and have
threatened CUT affiliates with
involuntary dissolution; at the
same time, social democratic,
Christian
de m ocratic, and independent
labor leaders have accused
the PVP of

betraying the interests of
the working classes by
setting political
objectives above socioeconomic
interests.
Political, industrial,
and democratic labor leaders
have all contended that the
interests of
the PVP and the interests
of the working classes do
not correspond.
The party has been accused of
encouraging strikes at times when
they
have little opportunity for
success merely in order to
demonstrate a
power capability in a particular
sector of production, or even more
commonly, simply t0 emphasize the
principle of class conflict by re-

minding the workers of who their
enemies are.

In this connection,

PVP militants will direct strike
movements and in many cases incite

brawls with police simply for purposes
of publicity.
Be that as it may, PVP legislative
representatives have consis-

tently proposed or supported propositions
for Labor Code reforms.
These reforms have been recognized by all
labor organizations as basic
to

the effective defense of working class
interests.

However, PVP

representation in the Legislative Assembly is limited
to three deputies;

consequently, reform failures have been as common as
reform

proposals.

The reason for this has been the inability of
labor organ-

izations to gain sufficient influence in the majority
parties.
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Labor and the Majority

v*^..es

The vast majority of
legislative seats in the
National Assembly
belong either to the
National Liberation Party
or the opposition.
The coalition of opposition
forces has changed names
several times
since 1948.
Its most recent

^

^^

opposition forces have been
consistent in their failure to
include
labor representation.
The reason for this
probably derives from the
fact that the opposition
is little more than a
coalition of person-

alistic followings that lack
any kind of permanent
organizational

infrastructure.

Outside of the PVP the PLN
has been the only politi-

cal party that has made an
attempt to build labor
representation into
its organizational infrastructure.
The PLN has always maintained
contacts with the democratic labor
movement; however, the relationship,

until very recently, has been
largely informal.
to

This is due in part

the prohibition of union political
activity; but it is also attri-

butable, as the following section
will show, to a bourgeois orientation that became increasingly
apparent in PLN policy through the 1960s
and 1970s.

Labor and the Original PLN Structure
Until 1979 the PLN possessed a geopgraphic
form of organization that was conspicuous for its lack of
any formal labor representation.

District Assemblies were formed simply by the electors
in an

administrative district who belonged to the party.

These assemblies

were responsible for electing seven member Cantonal Executive
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Coatees

along „ lth flve delegates
tQ

^

provinciai

whose principal functlo
„ lncluded designating
candtdates
Posts, electing ten member
Provlnclal Executiye
ing ten delegates for
the National Assembly.
The m

a™

^

^

authority

of the party was the
National Assembly, a
representative body conp osed
of seventy m e n bers,
whose responsibility was to
elect a three
ber

M

Executive Committee cnat
that inrl„H
0H a
o d
included
President, Secretary and Treasurer.
In addition to this
regional representative structure,
the party
possessed a Political Action
Organization that was responsible
for
stimulating party organization
on the regional level.
Its lower organs consisted of a District
Electoral Committee, an Administrative
District Committee, and a Cantonal
Committee.
The functionaries of
these posts were named by the
Secretary General upon the approval
of
the National Department of
Organizations. The principal activity
of
the regional committees was to
organize auxiliary neighborhood

offices-especially during election periods;
but despite the fact that
it functioned on a grass roots
level to stimulate enthusiasm for party

policy, program, and candidates,

the Political Action Organization did

not formally incorporate labor
representatives.

Neither did the National Political Committee,
the party's highest decision-making body, incorporate
formal labor representation.
The members of this organ consisted of a
representative of the Execu-

tive Power, a representative of the PLN
delegation in the Legislative

Assembly, one representative of the National Assembly,
three members
of the National Executive Committee,

former Presidents of the Republic.

the Presidential Candidate and
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Besides these deliberative
bodies, the patty possessed
several
departs responsible f ot performing
administrative ot organizational functions. A
Department o £ Ednoation was
tesponsibie fot directing studies and encouraging
activities designed to
promote socialdemocratic doctrine. A
Department of Municipai
Affairs coordinated
policy on the local level.
Other departments included
Treasury, Popular Finance, and Accounting.
Besides these however, two
departments
were responsible for organizing
sectoral support. These two
departments included the Professional
Sectors and Production and
Guild
Affairs.
The responsibility of
the latter department was
to promote
social-democratic ideology in labor
and peasant organizations.
This department constituted
the only formalized point
of contact between labor as a group, and
the party structure.
The only other avenue
that could be used by labor
people to voice worker interests
was the
assembly system. These organs
however might be seen to have
dispersed
rather than encouraged effective
labor participation inasmuch as
the

majority of assembly seats belonged
to non-labor people.

In fact the

testimony of the progressive elements
within the PLN suggested that

working class representation declined
at each stage of the party hierarchy.

The highest party organs were occupied
by capitalists, techo-

orats, professionals and a few
intellectuals.
to bourgeois interests, while only

people with popular orientations.

Mid-level posts belonged

the base organs were occupied by

13

Apart from the fact that the party structure
contained no space
for formal labor representation, it should
be noted that the PLN,
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especially ln the early
years _

dominated

^

PoXitical leaders, lncluding
Jose
Daniel Oduber, who „ ere
inst

_

al

^

^

This cli q ue has had
an important in£luence

^
^
^^ ^^
^

a

^

^
^

^

only
tlon o £ the party
program , but ln the
determtnaUon o( party candidates
as well.
WhiXe all functionaries
ln an
party s deUberative
bodies were elected by
inferior party organs, the
PLN was largely a
eoalition of personalistic
forces.
Anyone who wished to rise in
the
Party hierarchy had to
conform to the guidelines
set by one of the
controlling party leaders.
On several occasions, new
leaders, who
attempted to rise through the
party's ranks in the hope of
becoming
presidential or legislative
candidates, were forced to leave
the
party, after realizing that
thelr future prQgress
be

^

,

^

the old elite.

^

For this reason it would
not be inaccurate to argue

that while the party's structure
corresponded to democratic principles
of organization, power in
the PLN essentially flowed
down.
Owing to

these two factors, authentic
labor participation in the PLN was
minimal.
Essentially, as many authors and
labor leaders have asserted,
the party siphoned off labor
leadership by opening up low level lead-

ership posts.

At the same time, while it was
declared to be a social

democratic movement, the party never
provided any form of sectoral
representation, nor did it encourage union
organization.

1

*
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National Political Committee

Executive Committee
National Assembly
1

Provincial Committees
Provincial Assemblies

Departments, e.g., Propaganda
Finance, Labor, Education,
etc

Political Action Organization
District
Electoral
Committee

District
Administrative
Committee

!

District Assemblies
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Cantonal Committees
.
.
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2.

Essential PLN Structure Before 1979
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For the most part, the
relationships between the party
and
labor have been maintained
through personal associations.
On this
informal level, the ties between
the PLN and labor, or at
least PLN
leadership and labor leadership,
were first made in the period
between
1945 and 1948.
During that period Rerum
Novarum became associated

with the opposition.

When hostilities broke out
Benjamin Nunez com-

mitted the support of the Catholic
unions to the revolutionary forces,
and took an active part in
front line activity. Relations
between
Rerum Novarum and the subsequently
created PLN remained close until
1968.

Between the early 1950s and the late
1960s the PLN demon-

strated its appreciation of labor
support by appointing Ministers of
Labor who had occupied leadership
posts in Rerum Novarum.
Benjamin
Nunez,

for instance, was Jose Figueres

first PLN administration.

'

Minister of Labor during the

Several other former labor leaders such as

Armando Aranz, Alfonso Carro, Otto Fallas

,

and Jorge Rossi, were also

given leadership posts during PLN administrations.

In addition, PLN

Presidents, such as Jose Figueres, made at least
an appearance of en-

couraging labor activity by making occasional visits
to Rerum Novarum

headquarters during general assembly meetings.
For several reasons these informal relationships did
not offer

labor an effective means for influencing party policy.
place,

In the first

labor leaders were forced to renounce their union offices
be-

fore accepting ministerial positions.

This had the effect of divor-

cing labor personnel from their base organizations.

Secondly, labor
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leaders were expected to
represent the opinions o£
those
figures who appointed
them.
ttls had the effect of
leaders to pl ace party
interests over onion
interests. A concrete,
and not untypical
expression of this phenomenon
occurred during
Benjamin Nunes's term as
Minister o £ lahor.
ne z as the ministry's
representative on the dunta
Directiva of the Consejo
Nacionai de
Salarios, proposed to fix
two minimum
salarloo*™ salaries,
a low minimum salary
that would apply tG
national producers> and a
higher m nimum
that would apply to the
foreign-owned banana companies.
The reason
for this was that the banana
companies were in a much better
position
to sustain the effects of
a higher minimum salary.
The proposition
was accepted by the Consejo
Nacionai de Salarios; but Nunez
was subsequently summoned to the presidential
residence where President

^^

M

,

,

i

.

Figueres explained that such a
policy would incur a strong
response
from the United States government,
a consequence that Costa
Rica could
ill afford.
After the meeting with Figueres,
Nunez withdrew his support for the separate salary scale.
Inasmuch as national producers
could not sustain the higher minimum
salary, the Consejo was com-

pelled to approve the lower salary.

16

Apart from cooptation, political
appointments had the effect
of absorbing all the time and energy
of labor leaders.

The inability

to attend to pressing matters in
represented labor organizations had
a disastrous effect on Catholic
unionism.

It was

during the years

of close party-labor relations that
Rerum Novarum practically

.

disappeared.

This was

partial*

a ttrlbutable t0 the

^

Qf

^

274

est of critical iahor
ieaders who had accepted
hlgh ran.ins poHtica!
appointments

Informal associations between
the PLN and Rerum Novarum
came
to be used as an avenue
of advancement for
labor leaders with ambition.
One labor leader noted
that union activity was
a sure way of
gaining the notoriety that
was necessary for political
advancement.
Labor organizations were, in
the fi rst place, training
grounds for
individuals with aspirations
of political careers. 17

Between the early 1950s and
the late 1960s Rerum Novarum
contacts in the PLN produced
little in terms of concrete
legislation.
Several Labor Code reform proposals
made during this time were

enthusiastically received by several
PLN deputies; however support
for code reform, a basic need
and desire of all labor
organizations,

was largely isolated and certainly
not strong enough to push through

legislation that would undoubtedly
alienate conservative support,
upon which PLN electoral success
greatly depended.

In 1958,

for in-

stance, Guillermo Villalobos Arce
introduced legislation intending to

reform article 28 of the Labor Code.

The reform would have pro-

hibited employers from firing labor leaders
at any time without proof
of just cause.

The project was approved by the Committee
on Labor

and Social Affairs, in which PLN deputy
Daniel Oduber presided.
ever, the reform was rejected by the Legislative
Assembly.

How-

18

In 1959, PLN deputy McRae Grant sponsored a
CCTRN legislative

proposal to reform article 366 of the Labor Code.

The reform would
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have reduced regulations
on strikes; however,
after floundering in
the legislature for two
years, it was finally filed
away.- In 1961
PLN deputy Con.alo
Fernandez Mora reintroduced
legislation intending'
to protect labor leaders
fro, anti-union attack;
however, once again
after floundering in the
Legislative Assembly for two
years, the
Project was filed away.0ne y£ar

^^

Bulgarelli reopened the debate
on protection for labor
leaders with
the same result.The matter was reconsidered
in 1967 when Jorge
Luis Villanueva Badilla
introduced a legislative proposal
entitled

"Accion Sindical de Reenganche

.

»

The proposal, in reforming

article 29 of the Labor Code,
would have accomplished the same
objectives as legislation introduced
earlier by Villalobos Arce.
The

project received the approval of
the Committee on Social Affairs,
but
died in the legislature two
22
years
later.

Several reform proposals had been
supported by PLN deputies;
however, the failure of the CCTRN
to affect legislative decision-

making was attributed by labor leaders
and progressive party members
to the combination of opposition
from the conservative coalition,

which occupied at least one-third of
the congressional seats in the
Assembly, and the lack of adequate support
from conservative PLN
deputies.

A frustration with their legislative failures,
combined

with what was seen to be a growing conservative
trend in the PLN,
caused a deterioration in labor-party relations.

This process was

accelerated between 1962 and 1966 during the administration
of PLN
conservative Francisco Orlich.

The Executive Power,

through the

3

.
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Ministry of Public Security,
was used extensively
during Orlich's
ten, of office to
persecute unions. Several
special investigations
were justified by the claim
that communist elements
were subverting
the labor union movement.
The CCTRN sustained the
brunt of this
persecution, and in 1 965 submltted
.

Organization of Workers (OIT)

^

^

2

The left-wing of the PLN,
and the most important labor
allies
in the party system, were
former union leaders Benjamin
Nunez, and

Alfonso Carro, Fernando Volio
and Daniel Oduber.

Supporters of this

group managed to win the
presidential nomination of Daniel
Oduber
in 1966.
In the subsequent election,
however, Oduber was defeated
by opposition candidate Jose
Joachim Fernandez Trejos.

The failure

of the progressives to win the
presidency was attributed to the reluc-

tance of conservative elements
to commit their full support
to the

Oduber campaign.

24

Even so, Oduber declared his intentions
to run

for office in the next elections.

The PLN left-wing and the CCTRN

were encouraged by a proposed labor
policy that included six basic
points:

the passage of a fuero sindical;

the intensification of

worker education programs and government
aid to labor unions; effective labor representation on all
government economic planning boards;

legal reforms facilitating collective
bargaining; support for the

labor unity movement; and the politicizat
ion of the labor movement.

25

However, during the Fernandez Trejos administration
between 1966 and
1970,

PLN conservatives under the leadership of
Francisco Orlich,

announced that they would not tolerate an Oduber candidacy
in the

1970 elections.

The subsequent declaratlon
Qf

^

^

^

for a second ter m of
office, having been repudiated
by the party leftwing, caused a reaction
that threatened to split
the party in two.-

Disaffection

of

Labor Allies

The concrete effects of
labor's disappointment with PLN
policy
was an attempt, on the part
of the democratic unions,
to constitute
a stronger,

larger, and more independent
labor union organization.

To accomplish this, CCTRN
unions merged with independent
unions in

1966 to form the CCTD.

At the same time,

the dissatisfaction of the

left-wing with the failure of the
PLN to live up to its social democratic principals caused an open
split which was expressed in a declaration that intended both to remind
the public of PLN principals and
goals, and warn the party leadership
of the consequences of conservatism.
In 1968,

the PLN progressive-wing convoked a
meeting for the

purpose of discussing the contradictions
between party principals and
goals, and party organization and policy.

The result was a document,

designated the "Patio de Agua" declaration, that
expressed the extent
of these contradictions.

The progressives declared that the goal of

political action must be the realization of the common
good.

The prin-

cipals of justice that had formed the basis of the PLN
program could
not be achieved unless the people were free of the spiritual,
cultural,
and economic privations that reduced the possibility and
capacity for

enjoying the superior values of life.

Patio de Agua called attention
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*

the fact that wh lle a
majority of Costa R ic ans
suffered

Private,
Privileges.

f rom

a saall

these

^

minority of people retained
a maximum amount of
The causes of this
circumstance

_^^^

&

ation of low economic and
human development, an unjust
social organization, and a political
process dominated by a
privileged caste.
The transformation of
Costa Rican society,

that the PLN had

originally hoped to accomplish,
had not come about because
political
situations in the parties had
effectively checked the participation
of
Progressive movements. Democracy
was asserted to be the most
just
form of political organization;
however, to succeed the system
must
Place power in the hands of the
people through a party system
that
authentically represented the
interests of the majority of
people.
The Costa Rican political system
was accused

of lacking this capacity

both because the political party
leadership was seen to represent the
interests of powerful economic sectors,
and government had acceded to
the pressures of conservative
interests.

Furthermore, the progressives

contended that those who had risen to
power in the name of social
reform, all too frequently adopted
the ideological motivations,

the

lifestyle, and the interests of the
dominant class.
The Patio de Agua group proposed
several recommendations, covering several areas,

that were viewed to be critical to the
transforma-

tion of Costa Rican society.
a fundamental right;

Private property was considered to be

however, reforms should be instituted that would

effectively impede the concentration of property.

At the same time,

all natural resources must be used to satisfy
the needs of the people.

279

In accordance with these
views, a gr i cul t ural
production should be
organized in a way that
would

facilitate increased production
while

Providing for a ju st
distribution of wealth.

While new types of land

tenure syste ms were heing
developed, the existing
pattern of private
ownership mu st be subjected
to reforms that would
involve the redistribution of accessible land
rather than the parceling out
of uncultivated land. P r i vate ownership
should be combined with
cooperative
ownership in putting agricultural
production in the hands of the

campesino.

Toward this end land
redistribution should be accompanied
by legislation fixing maximum
limits on land ownership.
In prefacing their labor
organization proposals,

the progres-

sives asserted that work was one
of the most important sources
of
human dignity and individual liberty.
It was a right that should
be
made available to everyone and a
duty that should be rewarded by
a

just form of renumeration

.

Just renumeration, according to the
pro-

gressives, in general terms should
permit a maximum access to the benefits of culture.

In specific terms,

this involved the combination of

higher salaries and the establishment of
profit-sharing programs.
The idea of the inevitability of class
conflict was rejected,

although it was recognized that class antagonisms
had become enflamed
in Costa Rica because of the existence
of a social and economic organ-

ization that encouraged division rather than
solidarity.

A more just

economic and social system required the existence of
a strong and

dynamic labor union movement; however, this was not seen
to be possible, given the capacities of existing Costa Rican
legal structures.
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ins classes to effectively
defend their socioeconomic
interests,

m

accordance with thesp
these Hor«
vxews, .-u
the progressives
proposed the establishment of effective labor
liberties.
This imp lied several specific

-for™.

Most importantly it

after fuero sindical.

i mp l ied

the passage of the long
sought-

Secondly, it involved the
establishment of

authentic and effective worker
representation in all state institutions.
Thirdly, it involved
initiating legislation that
would promote collective conventions
and facilitate an active
worker participation in the direction and
administration of businesses. Fourthly,
it involved passing
legislation that would guarantee
employer compli-

ance with social legislation
and the principals of labor
liberty.
Apart from these reforms, the
progressives proposed greater economic,
legal, and technical assistance
to unions, and the promotion
of labor

organizations in sectors of the economy
where workers had still to
develop a sufficient consciousness
of union action.
The Patio de Agua group concluded
its manifesto with a state-

ment expressing its frustration with
the structure and operation of
the PLN.

In an obvious reference to the
power that the old guard

exercised over the party machinery, they
contended that the PLN in
the past had constricted the liberal
play of ideas on all organiza-

tional levels.

In conformance with its principals, a
social democratic

party must be organized in a way that would permit
the unrestricted

confrontation of personalities and ideas.

The party must respect

the right of all affiliates to present nominations
to the appropriate

organs while party members
should be

^

pressure in the selection
of competent nominees.

Any attest to
underline the voluntary
choices of party members
for the purpose of
maintaining the power of a
elite, was contrary to sociai
demo-

^

cratic principals and must
he repudiated.

Suggesting that this

state of affairs was being
perpetrated by powerful economic
interests,
the progressives indicted
party leadership for its
conservative atti^
tude and argued that no
member of the party, fulfilling
. ieadership
position should be permitted
at the same time to be the
representatives of persons, businesses,
or interests that were in
conflict with
popular aspirations. 27
The Patio de Agua declaration
drew a variety of responses from
the PLN leadership.

Conservatives emphasized similarities
between

the attitudes of the Patio de
Agua group and communist ideology.

The progressives were accused of
promoting ideas leading to the liqui-

dation of the political party system and
the democratic alternation of
power.

They proposed prohibitions on the
inheritance of private

property, it was stated, and in general,
supported a position that

violated Constitutional provisions making
private property inviolable.
In an even more critical statement,

the conservatives asserted that

the Patio de Agua group would place control
of the factories, like

countries behind the iron curtain, in the hands of
the workers.

28

On the other hand, some political leaders approached
the manifesto with careful approval.

Fernando Volio Jimenez, PLN President

of the Legislative Assembly, argued that while the
document was
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divorced fro. reality,
serve to guide

U

possessed a series o f goais
that shooid

decisionals.

^

itself from Patio de Agua.
Aom
the party published
.

Officially however, the PLN
divorced

cu„
_i
Shortly

after the manifesto was
issued

^^

^^

^

reflected the thinking of the
PLN and that it should
not he considered to be an official
party document.
Suggesting subversive intentions among party radicals,
the letter went on to
reassert the opposition of the PLN to communist
attempts to infiltrate and
deform parties and political situations
in developing countries. 29

Enthusiasm for party reform
gradually subsided after the
Patio
de Agua declaration.
A few radicals renounced
their party membership,
but the majority of people in
the PLN felt that the further
pursuit

of fundamental reforms would
do more harm than good in
the long run.

As bourgeois as the PLN might
have been, it was the only viable
political party in Costa Rica that was
committed, at least in principle, to
the task of social renovation.

A party split would severely weaken

the PLN, but the possibility of
creating another social democratic

party, perhaps more committed in a
practical sense to social reform,

was seen to be remote.

Rather than wreck the party's chances of
suc-

cess in the 1970 elections, PLN
progressives preferred to maintain
their posts and let the Patio de Agua
manifesto stand as a critique
of party organization and policy that
might be used as a guide for

reform at some time in the future.

30

The Patio de Agua declaration nevertheless had several
important indirect effects.

Most importantly, it pointed out a widespread

^
^

interna! discontent that
possessed , t
serious spllt ln the

labor support.

M>

Qr
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g

_

Secondly, tt kept allve
the social

ations opon which the PLN
was based.

^
^^

^

^

^

Thirdly, lt exposed the

alistio nature of party
organization.

The PLN was still basically
an
electoral vehicle that serve,
only a few old gu ard
political leaders,
"hich for the most part
functioned only around election
periods.
This latter point was
extremely Important Inasmuch
as personalistic
politics was diametrically
opposed to the spirit that
gave birth to
the party.

Nevertheless, owing to the
combination of a lack of effective
representation within the PLN, the
numerical weakness of the PVP in
the Legislative Assembly,
the existence of a powerful
opposition that
had little interest in labor
problems, and the application of
pressure
from conservative institutions,
organized labor suffered a series of

legislative defeats which left intact
an ineffective legal mechanism
that formed the foundation of
union control and persecution.

Labor Code Reform Failures
In 1971 the CGTC,

through its PVP deputies, submitted
legisla-

tion intended both to protect union
members from anti-union patronal
action, and liberalize regulations covering
strike procedures.

Arti-

cle 29 of the code would be reformed to
say that in every case that
a

contract is ended either by patronal or employee
responsibility,

the patron must provide severance pay.

Article 263 would have stated
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a-« -cial
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right to
their socioeconomic
interests, out the ri ght
t0 express opinions
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have stated that Korkars
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one vear after the date
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required strike support
PPort to fifty-one
f-fft-,, ™«
percent, while article 371
would
have stated that e mp l oy
ers muSt pay lost
salaries in cases of legal
strikes.

Article 502 would have
prohibited anti-union patronal
actions fro, the moment that
a list of petitions
had been submitted;
and article 518 would have
been refold to state that
in the case that
a settlement could not
be reached through the
conciliation process,

labor organizations had the
right to declare

a

strike within twenty

days without a previous
declaration of legality and without
having to
repeat the voting process.
Furthermore, once this time period
had
expired, collective negotiations
could be reinitiated without
having
to repeat the entire collective
conflict process.- The CGTC proposal
took only four months to work
its way through the legislature
before

being rejected in the general
assembly.
This and other legislative proposals,
were usually accompanied
by immediate and critical responses
from industrial groups and the

national press that were calculated to
pressure legislators by diminishing public support for labor reform.
failure,

One year after the CGTC

the Costa Rican Socialist Movement
submitted a reform pro-

posal intending to liberalize strike regulations.

The Camara de

285
(

s t a ting
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lmedlat£ly

that lt dld not
correspond
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dramaticallv inrrpaao
increase the number of
strikes; and that it would
produce disastrous economic
effects.
Shortly after the Camara
declaration, La_Nacion published
an editorial warning
legislators that inasmuch as the reform strongly
affected employers, they should
listen
carefully to employer criticism
before taking action. - The
proposal
was subsequently defeated
in the general assembly.
i_

.

Between 1975 and 1976 two
more important reform projects
were
defeated in the Legislative
Assembly.
Concerning the first proposal,
La Naci ° n Polished an
editorial stating that
the concept of social justice
is so broad and elastic
that it
embraces, apart from labor
relations, juridical security and
the economics of the means of
production, and a concern for
the importance of not discouraging
the initiatives of private
business.
Justice must be equal for everyone. 33

One year later the Comite de
Unidad Sindical submitted a reform
pro-

posal that would have given unions
the right to declare strikes without exhausting the conciliation
process.

La Nacion responded with a

series of articles stating that the
reform would serve only to in-

crease needlessly the "violent fact" of
the strike.

All strikes,

whether just or unjust, were seen to be damaging
to private interests
and the public good.

Inasmuch as the state had the responsibility

of maintaining social peace,

it must involve itself thoroughly in

conflicts between labor and capital.

34
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In 1977, a law
project intending to reform
several Labor Code

articles received heavy
criticism from the Union
Costarricense de
Claras (Union of Costa Rican
Chafers). Changes in article
3 66 which
would have reduced retired
union support for strike
fro m
sixty percent to fifty-one
percent were seen to have
the potential
fur underlining the
Costa Rican economy by
increasing the possibmty

_nts

of strikes in the
agricultural sector.

According to the Camaras, pas-

sage of the refer, would
place the economic well-being
of the country
in the hands of irresponsible
labor leaders, who at a
moment's notice
could initiate a strike and
destroy an entire crop.
The same reform package
also intended to change legal
dispositions on temporary work
contracts, the right of public
sector unions
to demand collective
conventions, and patronal
responsibility for fired
workers. With regard to the
temporary employment question, the

Camaras stated that firm contractual
agreements would be severely

damaging to the private sector.

In the construction industry it
was

extremely difficult to contract
persons for specific jobs.

At the

same time, several agricultural
industries required only temporary

personnel increases.

The Camaras pointed out that most
industries

were required to make personnel adjustments
in order to meet demand
levels that fluctuated seasonally.

Concerning union rights in the

public sector, the Camaras stated that a
collective convention policy

would serve to undermine the efficiency and
correct management of the

autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions.

Furthermore it would

undermine legislative control over the budget inasmuch
as unions

.
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would be able to nepnt-i
negotiateQ and renegotiate
salaries several times
a year 3 5
=, t-

The Camaras claimed that
the proposal intending
to increase
patronal responsibility for
fired workers violated
constitutional
law.

It was the only portion
of the project to have
received the

approval of the Legislative
Assembly.

vetoed by PLN President Daniel
Ocuber.

Subsequently however, it was
Both the Camaras and La

Nacion applauded the presidential
initiative.

36

There is no doubt that labor
organizations have maintained

several dependable contacts not
only among PLN deputies but
opposition deputies as well.
These contacts had either
sponsored or supported legislation emanating from
labor confederations or alliances
of confederations such as the
CUS

.

Nevertheless, each legal project

has elicited the outspoken and
detailed criticism of conservative

institutions such as the Camaras and La
Nacion

.

Subsequent legisla-

tive decisions would point to the
conclusion that in the contest for

legislative recognition accompanying each
reform project, Costa Rican
legislators have been more prone to respond to
conservative publics
than to labor organizations.
Of particular importance where labor
influence in the PLN is

concerned is the labor policy of Daniel Oduber.

Radical party ele-

ments had devoted great energy to Oduber* s presidential
campaign in
the 1960s.

His 1966 electoral defeat, having been attributed to the

indifference of PLN conservatives, along with the unwillingness of
conservatives to accept another Oduber candidacy in 19 70, touched
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off the Patio de Agua
rebellion

Presidency in 1974

,

he brought

the PLN progressive wing.

.

men

^

Qduber finauy reached

^
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Nevertheless, the Oduber
administration

was distinguished by the
conspicuous abgence Qf ,
had won the applause of
labor organizations in
the 1960s.

Oduber
neither supported the Labor
Code reform presented by
the CUS in
1976, which corresponded to the
spirit of the labor policy he
had
earlier formulated, nor did
he support the judgement
of the Legislative Assembly in 1978
concerning patronal responsibility
for fired

workers.

Neither was Oduber indisposed
to using existing Labor and

Penal Code dispositions to
threaten or arrest labor leaders,
or to
using public security forces
to break up strike movements.
In fact the trend in
government labor policy in the last

twenty years ironically indicates
that government anti-labor activity
increased dramatically during the
Oduber administration.
Presidential
conduct, not only in the ICE strike
in 1978, but in other strike

movements occurring during the same
period, prompted democratic labor
leader Guido Nunez to state in 1977
that

it is my belief that labor
repression has been accentuated
recently, owing to the fact that in this
government, unions
cannot count on any protection. This is
a fact that patrons
have well noted and, as a result, have
effected repressive
measures without fear. 37

Similarly, former CGT labor leader Juan Rafael
Solfs Barboza argued
that beginning in 1974, executive, legislative,
and judicial author-

ity had been increasingly used to persecute
the labor union movement.
The Oduber government, much more than past governments
supported
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employer interests.

The exernH™
executive office issued
threats; Labor Code

reforms were reiectedjanri n,
Q
jected, and
the
judiciary
interpreted labor legislation in a way that was
damaging to labor interests. 38
•

•

Despite this criticism, Daniel
Oduber's labor policy should
not be construed to mean
that opposition forces have
been more responsive to labor interests.
Shortly after taking office in
1978, Unidad
President Rodrigo Carazo announced
that his government would not
negotiate collective conventions
with unions functioning in the
autonomous institutions." He
supported the use of public security
forces
to break up the Pozuelo strike
of 1979 and turned a deaf
ear on
labor's requests for executive
mediation.

Hardly had the Pozuelo

movement ended when a dock workers'
strike in Lim6n, probably the

bloodiest in Costa Rican history,
resulted in hundreds of injuries
and one death.

Furthermore, opposition legislative
deputies have,

on more than one occasion, introduced
Labor Code reform proposals in-

tending to extend prohibitions on union
activities and stiffen penalties for illegal strike movements.

On the other hand the PLN, as a

social democratic party, was instituted for
the purpose of giving concrete and clear expression to popular
interests.

It professed a

concern for labor problems, but maintained
only a pretense of labor

representation in its organizational structure.

More was expected

of the party, yet several PLN presidents
and PLN controlled Legisla-

tive Assemblies, had produced no more for labor
than the opposition.
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Structural Reform
The contradiction between
party structure, operation,
and
Policy, and party principles
and goals was thought to
be the major
reason for the P LN electoral
defeat of 1978.
Even before then however, progressive party
elements had begun a process
of self-

criticism that took form in
seminars, study groups, and
research
projects, all of which intended
to point out the deficiencies
of PLN
organization, and suggest ways by
which party structure could be
made
to correspond to party
principles.
In 1976 Luis Alberto Monge
compared the PLN to the structure
and operation of other social
democrat!
parties, such as Venezuela's
Democratic Action Party, and complained
that the PLN had still to incorporate
labor interests in a way that

could be considered adequate for a
social democratic party.

Monge

noted that the party was structured
purely for electoral purposes.
The reasoning behind this form of
organization was that it seemed to
be the most effective way of competing
with large supposedly conserva-

tive electoral vehicles that confronted
the PLN at each election.

However, while this structure facilitated
electoral success, it did
not leave the party in a position by which
it could compete on an

ideological level with parties of the extreme left.

Ideological com-

petence was viewed to be an urgent necessity, as well
as an objective

requiring a structural reorganization that redistributed
party repre-

sentation according to professional sector.

1+0

After the PLN electoral defeat in 1978, during

a

typical ser-

ies of PLN seminars, Enrique Obregon Valverde suggested
the necessity

.

of a close party-labor

associate

by asserting that nothing
„ ould

be .ore agreeab!e to
the traditional owners
of the me ans of production than tc perpetuate
the separation of la bor
and politics.
This

would leave conservative

invests

and, while maintaining
nrng rhe
the

«
n *j«„
f lc
tion

alone to manage party
operations
ofc popular representation,
to

Place their own representatives
in positions of power.
Obrego
gon
Valverde contended that Latin
American social democratic
parti
parties
were
created by oligarchical and
Intellectual groups that were,
In one
«ay or another committed tc
conservative Interests and that
as long
as labor organizations
remained at the margin of
political activity,
these parties were dominated
by powerful economic groups.
It must be
affirmed, Obregon Valverde added,
that as long as the working
classes,
as organizations, as unions,
were not thoroughly integrated
into social
democratic parties, they would continue
to be instruments of the

oligarchy

4

1

During one PLN labor conference,
Benjamin Nunez took the

occasion to level a more direct criticism
by arguing that the party
had at many times been dominated by
anti-labor forces whose plans and

actions had frequently had disastrous
effects on labor.

This situa-

tion prevailed despite the fact that
the PLN, at least in its early
stages, professed a commitment to labor
interests.

In Costa Rica, as

well as other Latin American countries,
social democratic parties contained anti-popular elements that manipulated
popular bases while

placing themselves in strategic government posts.

1*

2
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Conservative interests within
the PLN had always opposed
labor
integration; however, after
the defeat of 1978 it was
largely accepted
as an electoral necessity,and in 1979 several i.portant
structural
changes were finally instituted
that dramatically altered the
relationship between party and labor
organizations.

Labor and the New PLN Structure
Since 1979 the PLN has maintained
a geographic organizational

form that was adapted to include
sectoral representatives.

The struc-

ture is divided into Cantonal,
Regional, Provincial, and Nacional

Assemblies.

Regional Assemblies are composed of
two delegates from

each canton, regional PLN public
functionaries, and one representative

from labor, business, professional,
youth, and feminine action sectors.

Provincial Assemblies are formed by five
delegates from each canton
as well as sectoral delegates.

The most important representative

function of the Provincial Assemblies

is

to name delegates to the

Plenary Assembly.
The Plenary Assembly is composed of ten
provincial delegates,
the National Political Directorate, eight
delegates from each of the

five sectors, five delegates from the Parliamentary
Fraction and ten

Cantonal delegates.

The Assembly's most important functions include

nominating candidates for the Legislative Assembly, analysing previous
political events, approving the decisions of the National Political
Directorate, electing the members of the Executive Committee, electing
the members of the Political Directorate, and ratifying the presiden-

tial candidate.
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The National Political
Directorate is co.posed of
the Executive
Committee, former presidential
candidates, eleven memb ers of
the
Plenary Asse mb l y the
representative of the Parliamentary
Fraction,
and one representative from
the youth and feminine
action sectors.
Its most important functions
include executing the decisions
of the
Plenary Assembly and the
National Congress, directing the
operations
of the party, defining
political action tactics, expressing
the
,

party's position on national
and international political
events, and
approving the organizational structure
and methods of the party.
The National Congress is
composed of the members of the Plenary

Assembly, the members of the Ethical
and Disciplinary Tribunal, the

members of nine Secretariats, the
members of debating forums, the

members of the Election Tribunal, the
members of study commissions,
members from student and feminine actions
organs, the Parliamentary
Fraction, and three delegates from
Cantonal Political Committees.
The principal function of the Congress
is to define the party's ide-

ological norms, to reform the party's Carta
Fundamental, and to modify
and or approve the program of government
upon which the Carta

Fundamental is based.
In addition to these bodies a National Convention,
which meets

only before elections is composed of representatives
from the regional
bodies,

the sectoral representatives, Parliamentary Fraction
represen-

tatives from the Municipalities and the Legislative Assembly,
as well
as ex-party public functionaries.

The only function of the Convention

is to nominate the presidential candidate.

^
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Apart from this organization
the party created a series
of
functionally oriented departments
that include a Secretariat
of Sindical Affairs that functions
in conjunction with a
Secretariat of Sectoral Organization in developing
labor organizations and recruiting
party support. The members of
these Secretariats are elected
by
the National Political
Directorate and are given representational

status in the National Congress

.

The advantages of the new party
structure, although clear,

have been accompanied by several
disadvantages that have produced a

guarded optimism among democratic
labor leaders.

On the one hand,

the party now guarantees some form
of labor representation in most
of
its structures.

Labor organizations are not only
represented in the

Regional Assemblies, they are also guaranteed
representation in the

Plenary Assembly.

The Plenary Assembly is a critically
important

body inasmuch as it has the responsibility
of nominating legislative

candidates, ratifying the presidential candidate
and electing the

National Political Directorate.

Besides the Plenary Assembly, repre-

sentatives in the Secretariat of Sindical Affairs have
representational status in the National Cogress

.

The Congress is an equally

critical body inasmuch as it is responsible for forming the
party's

ideological guidelines and the program of government.
On the other hand democratic labor leaders have criticized
the lack of representation in the National Political Directorate.

Since this body is responsible for approving or modifying the internal

structure of the party, its importance should not be underestimated.

Furthermore, the National
Political Directorate

^

aiso respongibie
for electing the labor
representatives who sit in the
Secretariat of
Sindical Affairs. Secretariat
representatives are thus chosen
by
Party functionaries who
may not be associated
with labor organizations.
The function of the
Secretariat is much the same
as the

Coordinator of Sindical Affairs
in the PVP.
ture was used as a model.

In fact the PVP struc-

The members of the body
are responsible for

creating nuclei in centers of
work, organizing unions,
recruiting
supporters in already existing
unions, and in general,

party doctrine and policy.

transiting

Nevertheless, party interference
in the

internal affairs of labor
organizations gives cause to expect
that
one of the Secretariat's
functions will be to transmit
party directives

Internal interference in union
affairs is a critical drawback in
the
party's new relationship with labor.
Like the PVP, the PLN intends
to penetrate union organizational
structures with teams of militants

who will be directed by superior
party organs.

Furthermore, the man-

ner in which party militants relate
to labor leaders as well as the

statutes governing the relations between
the unions and the party, can
only be changed with the approval of
the National Political Directorate, a body which lacks labor representation.

1

*

5

Most importantly, the distribution of sectoral
representation
in the most critical party organs places
labor at a disadvantage.

The Plenary Assembly is composed of over
eighty-four members, depending on the number of PLN ex-presidential
candidates that occupy posts
in the National Political Directorate.

Ten of these members are
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representatives from the Provincial
Assemblies, who may be either
professionals, i.portant industrial
leaders or workers. However,
the distribution of
representation in the Provincial
Assemblies would
indicate that delegates to
the Plenary Assembly would
largely be
chosen by a non-labor constituency.
It is thus likely
prQ _

^^

vincial Assembly representatives
in the Plenary Assembly would
not
have a very great appreciation
for labor problems.
In addition,
nineteen Plenary Assembly members
come from the National Political
Directorate, none of whom are labor
representatives.
Sixteen members
come from the patronal and
professional sectors. Sixteen other members come from the youth and
feminine action sectors, while five
and
ten members come respectively from
the Parliamentary Fraction and

Cantonal representatives.

Labor on the other hand possesses only
its

designated eight member sectoral delegation.

The problem with this

structure is that labor representation may
be made ineffectual by a

possible confluence of interests between the
business, provincial,
National Political Directorate, and Parliamentary
Fraction delegates;
or for that matter any other combination of
delegations.
In a similar structural arrangement, the National
Congress

incorporates over 140 members from ten different social or
corporate
sectors.

Only eight of those members represent labor organizations.

The function of the Congress has yet to be tested thoroughly;
however,
a

confluence of interests among any combination of sectors would not

be difficult to imagine.

Democratic labor leaders have viewed this

structural scheme with a certain degree of skepticism.

On the one

hand, CATD leadership
has resigned

effective rep rese„ taion
„

m

^^^ ^^^
^

take more

CCTD leaders, „ ho remember
che outcome o£
»ith
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_

^

^
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party organization might

infringe upon labor
independence.

^

^^
^

possiMy

Above ail they assert, labor
organ-

izations must not once
again fall tat0 the trap o£
servlng party
terests and sacrificing
labor leaders to political
careers."' It
should also be carefully
noted that the restructuralization
of the
PLN did not destroy the
power of personalistic
political figures.

^

Even more importantly, the
conservative elements that had
thwarted
popular interests so many times
in the past did not disappear
with
the party's old organization.

These elements might be expected
to

oppose Labor Code reforms as
vigorously as they had in the past.

Concluding Remarks

Constitutional prohibitions on union
political activity have
compelled labor organizations to cloak
their associations with political parties.

The close connections between the
CUT and the PVP have

been maintained at the risk of involuntary
dissolution.

Moreover the

assertions of democratic labor leaders
gives cause to wonder whether
the nature of the association between
the PVP and labor has served to

advance labor interests or party interests.
On the other hand political activity prohibitions
along with

electoral considerations, were important reasons for
the PLN failure
to incorporate labor in its original
organizational structure.

The

299

informal relationship
that subseouently merged
between the PLN and
Reru, Novarum and later
,
the CC TO> we re not
sufficiently strong to
produce any i mp ortant
legislative results,
the case of
Novaru*, the incorporation
of important labor
leaders into the party
hierarchy and the distribution
of i mp ortant governs
posts as a
form of political payment
n rP riMf,^
y menc » Precipitated
a protracted decline in
confederation me.bership and
influence.
In the case of the CCTD
informal political contacts
in both the PLN and various
opposition parties produced little in
terms of basic legal reform.

m

Re™

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s
the efforts of progressive PLN
leaders to defend labor interests
have been complicated by the
persistence of conservative power
that had been used to prohibit
the

nomination of progressive presidential
candidates, to impede the implementation of Labor Code reforms,
and to postpone the integration
of labor into the party's
organizational apparatus.

The new PLN organ-

izational framework represents a step
forward in organized labor's

endeavor to find political representation;
however, the advantages of
the new structure are accompanied
by as many disadvantages that have

given rise to a continuing skepticism among
participating labor leaders
concerning the willingness of the party to
serve labor interests.
Ultimately,

these skepticisms will be either vindicated or
laid to rest

in the Legislative Assembly where democratic
labor leaders will test
the quality of their political influence with
proposals for Labor

Code reform.
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With regard to labor's
legislate
e n ~+
legislative fortunes,
the Popular
Vanguard Party has consistently
supposed Labor Code reform
„o„ever, PVP strength
llmlted to three

U

^

^

^

Without a much firmer
commitment to Labor Code
reform, from either
the PLN or tbe opposition
Unity Coalition, a more
libera! labor relations system and greater
worker representation in the
autonomous institutions will be an impossibility.
Between these two parties, the
PLN is in a much better
position to accomplish this
objective.
The
party seems to be poised for
a dramatic shift in labor
policy, but
this will not be confirmed
until the new legislature convenes
in 1982.

3
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CHAPTER

VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From a

historical standpoint the development
of labor unionism

in Costa Rica might be
understood to have passed through
five periods.
In the first period,
corresponding to the end of the
19th century and
the beginning of the 20th
century, guild associations, or
professional

organizations, marked the beginning-as
in other Latin American coun-

tries-of an incipient trade union movement.
to call

It would be premature

these associations full fledged
labor organizations, inasmuch

as they were inspired by a concern
for professional competence and

mutual aid, rather than by an awareness
of any contradictions between
the factors of production.

The only conflict-oriented groups marking

this period in Costa Rican history were
the anarcho-syndicalist groups
that were formed by European immigrants
involved in the construction
of the Atlantic railroad.

Anarcho-syndicalism never had a profound impact on Costa Rican
labor unionism, but on the other hand, contact with
European immigrants

helped to create an awareness of the mechanisms of capitalist
exploitation, at a time when the concentration of coffee production
released

large numbers of small landowners from isolated rural life and created
a growing class of agricultural laborers and unemployed urban workers.

This development corresponds to the second period of Costa Rican labor
305
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unions,

during which guild
assoclations finaUy becme
organlzationai
bases for collective
conflicts between workers
and employers. At the
same time, the participation
of non-unioni 2 ed unemployed
workers in the
subsequent strike campaigns
should not be overlooked inasmuch
as it
underscored the degree
deerpp to
t-n whxch
irh-i^K
workers had developed a
collective
consciousness. Where labor
relations was concerned, it was
during
this period that the
relationship between organized
labor and government, if not yet formalized
by legislation sanctioning
collective
action, was at least standardized
by a high level of government
involvement, and in many cases direct
executive involvement, in the
i

settlement of labor disputes.

Public security forces were
invariably

dispatched to break up worker
demonstrations.

Subsequent audiences

between labor, management, and the
Executive Power became an informal
means by which labor organizations
could bring their demands to the
attention of a public authority.

On the other hand, they also pro-

vided occasion for the establishment of
patrimonial bonds between the
state and the working classes which,
while perhaps serving immediate

economic interests, nevertheless contravened
long term organizational
interests inasmuch as state intervention
represented a challenge to
the influence of labor leaders.

The pattern of action characterized

by patrimonial controls and rewards, or carrot
and stick tactics, was
a fundamental part of conflict resolution
processes that became a

premise upon which the Costa Rican labor relations system would
be

built
Owing to economic circumstances and demographic changes, the

degree of class antagonisms rose during the decade of the 1930s.
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A corresponding decline
in the Catholic inspired
social refo rm movement of Jorge Volio was
paralleled by an increasing
working cl ass interest in Marxian solutions
to economic misery, that
culminated in the
establishment and temporary
predominance of a communist labor
union
movement.
This development might
also be seen to have occurred
despite an increase in anti-union
measures taken during the administration of President Le6n
Cortes in the late 1930s.
Economic difficulties caused by the world
economic depression and the
destruction of
the banana industry in the
Atlantic region required the state
to take
a

variety of initiatives.

These initiatives, having been
intended to

induce an economic recovery, were
also accompanied by stricter controls on labor union activities,
which at that point in time, were

generally viewed as subversive.
A decrease in the acceptability of
collective action in the

1930s was followed in the 1940s by a dramatic
turnaround in govern-

ment attitude toward the problems of the
working-classes, and the

feasibility of labor organizations as mechanisms
of socioeconomic selfdefense.

This third period of Costa Rican labor unionism,
having

been marked by the emergence of a strong Catholic
labor union movement, was also characterized by the coexistence and
alliance of the
two fundamental, and historically antagonistic
strains of Costa Rican

developmental theory:

Catholic social reformism and Marxian Socialism.

The Catholic reform movement was sparked by a reaction to anti-

clerical

legislation undertaken by liberal governments in the

nineteenth century.

It

declined for a period around the beginning
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an almost parallel
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have an impact on th
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idMs

in Cesta Rica at
tne beginning o£ the
cenCury>

they

i930s

Mora established the
Blo q ue de Obreros
y Campesinos.
Both ideological
tendencies had succeeded,
at different timas,
in dominating the Costa
Rican social reform
With the

_nt

re-

.

e^ergence of Catholic
alternatives to social change
in the 19,0s, the
labor union movement
divided itself into two
ideological camps of
roughly equal strength; but
unlike past associations
between Catholic
and Marxist organizations,
ideological and organizational
leaders of
both tendencies minimized the
importance of their historical
antagonisms and deeply rooted
conceptual differences and
emphasized their
common tactical objectives:
ests of the working classes.

the defense of the socioeconomic
inter-

Some of the results of the
subsequent

alliance Included the erection of
organizational structures Intended
to coordinate an Intense
process of union organization.

The effect of

this was a dramatic increase in
the number of workers belonging
to
one of the two major confederations.
The years between 1940 and 1948,
in this third period, were

most critical in the development of
Costa Rican labor unionism, not
only in terms of the organizational
gains that were made, but also,

and perhaps even more Importantly, in
terms of the political repercus-

sions that were precipitated by a
Catholic-Communist alliance.

promulgation of legislation guaranteeing labor
rights and the

The
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subset

creation of . Labor Code>
u£re monunentai accompUshments
that gave tre mendous
impetus both t0 the prQcess
rf
tion and to the coalition
~<
coaHf<n« of
opposition forces. Progressive
legislation coding about as .
result o£ CathoUc . CoMist
cooperation
a drive train of onion
develops that aggravated conservative
an-

^

.

tagonist.

.

Similar ly , the strong and
increasing influence of colon-

ist party functionaries
in Costa Rlcan government
became a serious

source of concern for conservative
capitalist groups, and an incipient
group of social democratic
reformers, both of which doubted
the commitment of Calderon Guardia and
Manuel Mora to democratic principles
of government.

Where the question of labor
liberties is concerned, the promul-

gation of the Costa Rican Labor Code
did not represent a dramatic
redefinition of the conflict resolution
procedures that had been
established over two decades earlier.

While it did threaten the patri-

monial relationships that had existed
between patrons and their employees, it did not discourage the
patrimonialism of the state.

Never-

theless, in relation to previous legislation
that had been concerned

either directly or indirectly with working-class
collective action,
the code represented a tremendous labor
victory that culminated a

forty year struggle during which labor
organizations had no rights

whatsoever.

This accomplishment, which might be viewed as a
revolu-

tionary change, at least in terms of the society and
politics of the
1940s, played not a small part in the creation of an opposition
coali-

tion committed to the removal of Calder6n Guardia et al
tions of power.

.

,

from posi-
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The reactionary
aspects of eh. rebellion
that accomplished
this objective became
apparent in the fourth
period of Costa Rican
labor unionism. The e
execution, imprisonment,
and exile of communist
leaders, the proscription
of the PVP and the
involuntary dissolution
of the CTCR are all
illustrative of the de ree
to which a fear of
g
communist influence motivated
opposition forces in 1Ma
And Khlle
perhaps the progressive
^,^1 Ademocratic elements
gressxve social
of the opposition
had committed themselves
to the protection of
working-class interests,
the subsequent association
between the PLN and Rerum
Novarum was characterized by a preeminent
concern for party interests.
What amounted

xe™n™

•

.

to a patron-client
relationship served to divorce
important labor

leaders from their base
organizations and coopt them into
the party
machinery.
The rapid decline of Catholic
unionism along with the
destruction of communist unionism
in the late 1940s and
1950s attests
to the fact

that the political coalition
responsible for the 1948

rebellion, although not anti-labor
in its entirety, maintained a

complacence toward labor organizations
that caused a precipitous decline in the number of unionized
workers.
While the labor legislation of the
preceding decade had been
left intact,

the patrimonial ties between the
state and labor organ-

izations were frequently used against labor.

Labor unionism and com-

munism formed an equation that called for the
use of

a

variety of

control mechanisms ranging from the pressures
of the Ministry of Labor
during conciliation proceedings, to the distorted
judicial interpretation of the labor laws,

to the application of physical violence.
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Several labor campaigns
during th is period brought
important economic
gains; but like the strike
m ove ments of the 1920s,
settlements between
labor, management, and
government, frequently left labor
at a disadvantage in terms of the devices
that employers would be able
to employ
in order to discourage
union activity. While the use
of carrot and
stick tactics to reward and
punish organized labor was still
a fundamental part of Costa Rican labor
relations, anti-labor patronal campaigns, that were carried out
with impunity despite protective
Labor
Code clauses, played an important
part in the deunionization of the

Costa Rican labor force in the
1950s.
The contemporary period of Costa
Rican labor unionism, which

might be seen to date back to the late
1960s, is characterized by
many of the attributes that marked the
preceding period.

The Ministry

of Labor has used its powers to initiate
special investigations of

labor organizations thought to be subversive
in tactics and ideological orientation; ministry participants in
conciliation proceedings pres-

sure labor leaders to accept patronal offers,
while during collective
conflicts,

the same representatives frequently exploit
ideological

divisions among organizations; state subsidization of
the democratic
labor union movement that proceeds via the Ministry of Labor
creates

commitments that confine independence of action; distorted judicial

interpretations severely limit labor union activities; and anti-labor

patronal actions continue to impede the normal development of the
labor union movement.
The distinctions between the 1950s and the contemporary period

can be found in the dramatic increase in the number of unionized
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workers and in the prolif
eration of conf ederationg
to population increases,

.

0wing

the expansion of the Costa
Rican state, the

injection of large amounts of
American capital, and the expansion
of
agricultural and industrial
production, the number of unionized
workers, especially in the
public sector, has multiplied
several times
These increases have enabled
labor organizations, much more
than in
the 1950s,

to make use of Labor Code
provisions obliging employers

negotiate collective conventions.

to

Accordingly, the number of collec-

tive agreements put into operation
since the late 1960s has increased
in proportion to increases in
the number of unionized workers.

Along
with this important development,
however, the strength of the Costa

Rican labor union movement is still
limited by a relatively low level
of unionization, and a labor movement
that is characterized by frag-

mentation and irreconcilable ideological
division.

Whereas most of

the unionized work force in the
pre-rebellion period belonged to one
of

two confederations, whose relationship was
most characterized by

cooperation, the contemporary labor union movement
supports four
large confederations, several important independent
federations, and

numerous smaller independent unions.

Fifty percent of the unionized

work force in Costa Rica fits into the latter two categories.

Fur-

thermore, the relationship among the four confederations is
distin-

guished by suspicion and hostility.

The creation of the Marxist

oriented CUT and its democratic counterpart the FTD reflects

a

con-

tinuation of the traditional antagonism of Costa Rica's communistic
and democratic strains of developmental theory, an antagonism that
was overcome only once in Costa Rican history.

313

Despite dramatic increases
in the number of unionized
workers,
and corresponding increases
in the number of collective
agreements,
the Costa Rican labor
relations system is characterized
by control
and government interference.
Conciliation periods, involving
the
participation of the Ministry
of Labor are a required
part of the
conflict resolution process.
In the event that tripartite
negotiations fail to produce a
settlement, matters must be
brought before the
labor courts where judgements
are rendered concerning the
legality of
strike movements.
Inasmuch as the Labor Code
precludes most categories of workers from utilizing
the strike, the vast majority
of

judicial judgements are negative.

If either of the two parties
in the

conflict refuses binding arbitration,
the collective conflict terminates, and the labor union must
begin the difficult and time-consuming

process of collective convention proceeding
all over again.

Knowing

that their collective conflict will
be rejected by the courts, most

unions prefer to initiate strikes without
exhausting the conciliation
process.

This, however, places the union in an
extremely vulnerable

position inasmuch as the combined weight of
patronal and public
authority is brought to bear against the labor
organization in question.

Physical violence, prison, and arbitrary firing become
personal

risks while the loss of juridical personality and
involuntary dissolu-

tion may become collective risks.
This sequence of action points to the conclusion that the con-

flict resolution process is characterized by the application
of ascending controls.

In the first place, collective conventions require the
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support of thirty percent
of

product!*,.

an

the „ orkers

^

a

factory

Even during direct
negotiations bet „ een labor

—t.

^

^

of

^

representatives fro* the Ministry
of Labor are nsnaliy present.
More importantly, patrons
are at liberty to launch
anti-labor attacks
against obstinate labor leaders
or organizations.
Patronal pressures
are combined with pressure
from the Ministry of Labor in
the subsequent
conciliation process. Finally,
and apart from Labor Code
prohibitions,
petitions for strike authorization
require the support of at least
sixty percent of the workers
in a factory or area of
production.
Patronal, bureaucratic, judicial,
and eventually police pressures
are
all used, at different times, or
all together, to discourage collective action,

The Costa Rican Labor Code, while
having been thought to be a

mechanism that would accomplish the
liberation of the working classes,
has had an opposite effect.

But if the code has served more to con-

fine and regulate rather than encourage
labor activity and union or-

ganization, its effects have not been offset by
other political and

bureaucratic structures which ostensibly have a
representative function.

In this connection the relationship between
labor and the Minis-

try of Labor has been a hindrance to union activity
and union forma-

tion.

A wide variety of functions including the inspection of
labor

organization budgets, operating procedures, and tactical and
ideological orientations, underscore the ministry's responsibility to
police
the labor union movement rather than to guarantee the constitutional

right of freedom of association.

With regard to the tripartite

councUs attached

to the

Ministry of

^^

Power places an inordinate
amount o£ declslon . making
hands of

governor
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^

^
^ ^

representatives, .any of „„o n
are required to be

funotionaries of the „i„ istry
of Labor.

Consequently, tbe input of
labor organizations in
matters concerning salaries
and working conditions is negligible.

A similar type of situation
has obtained in those autonomous
institutions where space has
been provided for labor
representatives.
In the four institutions
considered in this analysis which,
it might
be noted, constitute only a
small fraction of the total number
of

autonomous public agencies functioning
in Costa Rica, worker influence
in decision-making bodies was
never strong.

Even so, the representa-

tion that labor organizations have
had, has either been reduced or

removed altogether, owing to a
centralization process that has given
even greater discretion to the executive
authority.

But besides re-

ductions in the number of labor people in
directive organs, and certainly as importantly, authentic worker
representation in the autono-

mous institutions has been made

impossible by methods of delegate

selection and delegate replacement processes,
both of which increase
the discretional powers of the executive
authority.

Inasmuch as dele-

gates and delegate replacements in all the autonomous
institutions,
as well as the tripartite councils attached to
the Ministry of Labor,

are selected from large pools of applicants, appointments
have become
a form of political payment and a means by which labor
leaders can be

bought from their base organizations.

Many labor leaders have
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^plained

that the best way to
insure complacency is to
offer a labor
leader a high paying, high
prestige job in see public
institution.

Along with these considerations,
it would be worthwhile
to reemphasize the role of the Ministry
of Labor in every activity
that
has involved labor.

Apart fro m the fact that the m
inistry has been

Placed in a key position in terms
of labor relations, authorization
of
union formation, regulation of
union operating procedures, and
the
removal of juridical personality,
it also participates heavily
in the

decision-making bodies of most
tripartite agencies and councils where
labor has been given representation.
The extent of the Ministry's
influence is most clearly revealed in
the structure and operation of
the Consejo de Seguridad e Higiene
where delegate selection and re-

placement, as well as the authorization and
enforcement of Consejo
decisions, are all under the ministry's
discretion.

Similar powers

are given to the ministry in the Consejo
National de Salarios, while

representative space is reserved for ministry officials
in most autonomous institutions where labor delegates are present.

When it is con-

sidered that matters concerning occupational safety
and base salaries are settled through organs attached to the
Ministry of Labor,

this

participation can be seen to have encouraged the removal of a variety
of questions from the domain of labor-management
negotiations.

Along

with these questions, it ought to be noted that sickness and invalidity

benefits, accident insurance, pensions, and worker training pro-

grams are all matters that are decided in the autonomous institutions.
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There can be little doubt
that the role of labor in
deciding
matters that effect its Mediate
and long term future depends
greatly on the ability of labor
organizations to influence the policies of the political parties.
Regulations on union formation and

operation as well as collective
convention and collective conflict
procedures and prohibitions are
specified by the Labor Code.
require legislative action.

Changes

Changes in the structure and operation

of the tripartite ministry organs
also require legislative approval.

At the same time, ministry functionaries,

the directors of the autono-

mous institutions, and the composition
of autonomous institution directive bodies all depend upon the executive
authority.

Who these

people are, what they do, and how they are
chosen are all questions of
key importance to labor organizations.

They are also matters that

are affected by the activities of political
parties.
The only two Costa Rican parties that have
ventured to inte-

grate labor, either structurally or informally, have
produced very

little in terms of concrete reforms.

On the one hand, the PVP sup-

ports an organizational structure that is intended more
to direct

activities in the CUT than to provide an effective means of interest
articultation; but be that as it may, the party has consistently sup-

ported Labor Code reforms and authentic labor representation in the
autonomous institutions, although its influence in the Legislative

Assembly has not been sufficient to accomplish either of these objectives.

On the other hand, the powerful social democratic PLN has un-

til recently rejected sectoral representation, preferring instead to
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ma:
Untain informal labor-party
contacts,

which have served to suppr
ppress

labor interests by subordinating
the™ to the electoral interests
of
the party.
This situation has been
complicated by the existence of a
powerful conservative faction
and an increasingly conservative
orientation
that precipitated serious
internal confrontations in the
1960s.
But
apart from the fact that PLN
deputies have not been firmly committed
to the legislative interests
of labor organizations,
appointments to

party and government posts have
had the effect of draining labor or-

ganizations of their top leaders, divorcing
them from their base organizations; and subordinating them to
the broader interests of the party.

These informal relationships have been
complemented recently
by a reorganization of the party
structure that is ostensibly intended
to provide client labor organizations
with a greater voice in policy

determinations and candidate selections.
ever,

is similar to that of

the PVP.

The new party structure, how-

Party cells established in each

factory have the responsibility of imparting an
appreciation for party

principals and goals and, in practical terms, of coordinating
labor

activity with party activity.

There is some question however, about

whether the party determines what labor's initiatives will be, and if
that is the case, whether labor representatives in the party's initiatives will be.

There can be little doubt that the new party struc-

ture has opened up many important and previously closed decision-

making structures to labor organization representative.

At the same

time, however, effective labor representation in the PLN is absolutely

.

essential, espec la l ly now
ln llght o£ the pa „
y

,

s

rf

^

organizational infrastructure
of its client organizations,
this
connection there are several
deficiencies with the new
organization
that have accounted for
a guarded opti m is m
a.ong participating labor
leaders

m

What ought to be e mp hasized
is that a labor-party
relationship
in the PLN that suppresses
rather than encourages the
articulation of
labor interests would be mu
ch more damaging to immediate
labor interests than the same type of
situation
in the PVP.

That is to say, the
PVP, despite its organizational
deficiencies, has always defended

labor's interests in the Legislative
Assembly.

On the other hand,

the conservative interests that
played such a key role in sabotaging

the initiatives of progressive
PLN functionaries cannot be supposed
to have disappeared.

While the PVP has basically one
constituency,

the PLN has several, and it would
not be too far-fetched to expect
the new party to be primarily concerned
with maintaining the coali-

tion of forces that has made it a majority
party.

This will un-

doubtedly involve compromises, the extent of
which will determine

whether or not formal structural mechanisms of
integration will be
added to informal personal relationships in
suffocating the interests
and demands of labor organizations associated with
the PLN.
It

is too early to tell how effectively labor
organizations

will be able to participate in the determination of party
policy or
in the selection of party candidates.

At the time of this writing

PLN militants were only beginning to take their places in unions
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Conse q uen t ly , labor

o rganizatlOTS
whether the y have bee
„ asS oci a ted „ lth the PLN
or the pvp, have been
forced to weather tne
the ettects
efferi-<= of
o
i
of a
regulative
Labor Code, required
,

and burdensome bureaucratic
contact* and ^token
contacts,
representation in
the autonomous institutions.
,

The existence of these
problems however, should not
suggest

that workers, labor leaders,
and unions in Costa Rica
suffer from the
same harsh circumstances that
prevail in other Central or South
American nations.
Despite similarities in the
way labor has been integrated

juridically and politically, one
cannot overstate the material
differences between the conditions of
the working classes in Costa
Rica
and their counterparts in the
rest of Latin America.

To repeat a dis-

tinction made in the introduction of
this research, Costa Rican laborers enjoy much higher salaries,
better working and living conditions,

and better health care benefits
than workers in most Latin American

countries.

While labor leaders and unions suffer
from patronal and

even government persecution, there have
been no incidents of assasin-

ation since the rebellion of 1948.

Labor leaders and strike organizers,

who might be interned for illegal activities,
always survive.

This

important difference, which is acknowledged and
applauded by workers
and labor lawyers despite their frequent
complaints, continues to make

Costa Rican labor relations unique among Latin American
nations.

,

.
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Even so, it would be
posslble tQ

sjjy

^^

Lons in

Costa Rica are characterized
by the coexistence of two
different organizational concepts that have
been combined in a way that
has been
disadvantageous to the labor
union movement. On the one
hand,
the

way that labor has been
integrated Juridically cannot
but be considered
to be patri.onial in nature.
It is virtually impossible
for labor to
function without state
authorization. While this relationship
has at
times served labor interests
more than business interests,
at least
in the short run, undue obstinacy
usually incurs stiff penalties.

What is considered to be obstinate
depends of course on the disposition of the executive authority.

At the same time, broad state
respon-

sibility for labor-related matters
encourages workers to look to the
government for the protection of their
socioeconomic interests, rather
than to labor organizations.
On the other hand, the relationship
of labor to bureaucratic
and political institutions cannot be
considered to be corporatistic
if one means by corporatistic a system:

in which all sectors of the economy, labor
and capital, would
be organized and 'harmonized' into exclusive,
monopolistic
associations responsible for the management of matters
within
their respective sectors, in which the various
corporate groups
were integrated into a hierarchy of 'syndicates' and
representational bodies culminating at the top in a series of
'corporations' for each of the nations major social, political,
and eco-

nomic sectors

Such a situation obtains, to a greater or lesser degree, in several

Latin American countries where the functions of various institutions
such as political parties or government ministries make the existence
of parallel associations a practical impossibility.
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The Ideologies! basis
o, these corporate forms
of organisation
conforms to a Catholic,
organicist, and patrimonial
conception o,
social life in „ hlch the
activities of the constituent
units of
society are regulated in
order to serve the common
good.
The Labor
Code that ties Costa Rican
labor organizations to the
state, as well
as the peculiarities of
Costa Rican conflict resolution
procedures,
is unquestionably based
upon these conceptions; but
on the other hand,

the structure of the Costa
Rican labor movement is unmistakeably
plural.
In fact the abundance of
ideological orientations, and tactical
dis-

positions, as well as a tendency
toward organizational fragmentation,
have been serious weaknesses
that most confederations have
recognized
and attempted to overcome.
There is little doubt that the Ministry
of Labor has tended to
favor certain labor organizations,
especially during PLN governments,
but such favoritism has not had the same
effect on the Costa Rican

labor movement that PRI favoritism has
had on the Mexican labor movement.

There is also little doubt that the Ministry's
power of union

authorization has been used to impede the development
of movements
thought to be politically subversive, but neither
has this prohibited
the emergence of parallel unionism.

Attempts to mold the Costa Rican

labor movement have hardly reached a point at which
purges have become
a

regular occurrence.
At the same time,

the relationship between labor and the parties

has been characterized by a conspicuous absence of formalized struc-

tural ties.

The reasoning behind this has been that political parties

.
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should represent individuals
rather than social or occupational
categories, a decidedly liberal
conception of political organization.
What has thus emerged in
Costa Rica, is the coexistence
of a patrimonial labor relations system,
that has served to limit
independent
action, and a liberal political
party structure that has ignored
labor's demands to permit a
greater degree of liberalism in
labor

relations
Without question, this blend of
conceptions has been much more
to the advantage of labor than
the coexistence of patrimonial
labor

relations systems and corporatistic
organizational structures that can
be found in more authoritarian
countries.

But at the same time, it

should be carefully noted that Costa
Rican legal and bureaucratic structures possess characteristics that could
easily facilitate the develop-

ment of a much more authoritarian labor
relations system.

Current

union formation and conflict resolution
procedures frequently do not
make full use of repressive legal and bureaucratic
mechanisms.

De-

spite the number of illegal and economically damaging
strikes that

have been carried out; despite the clear and close
association between
the CUT and the PVP, and now the democratic unions
and the PLN; and

despite the widespread claim that many strike movements are
politically

motivated, labor organizations have been involuntarily dissolved only
a handful of times in Costa Rican history.

But this is not to say

that the labor courts and the Ministry of Labor, perhaps during more

economically difficult or politically sensitive times, might not impose a more effective repression of labor activities.
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In this connection
it ought to be pointed
out, if one may speak
in such genera! terms,
that the Costa Rlcan

^^

#

strong tradition of
individualism tha t is reflected
in tbeir unswerving faith in the
parliamentary system of government.
Communism, In
the view of a great many
Costa Ricans, represents a
serious threat
to this system; and
inasmuch as the labor movement
was originally
inspired by Marxist thinking,
unionism and communism have
come to be
synonymous. One of the dangers
of this analogy arises from
the effects
that increasingly strong
Central American revolutionary
movements have
had on the thinking of Costa
Rican leaders. There is a growing
concern that Costa Rica will
eventually be surrounded by totalitarian

Marxist governments that will not
hesitate to subsidize radical elements that have made no bones about
their desire to construct a Cuban
or Nicaraguan style political and
economic system.

Should such a

situation obtain, one would have to
wonder how much it would tax the

equally strong Costa Rican tradition of
political tolerance.
Costa Rican leader ominously commented:

As one

"it could be that we may have

to take the stick once again to the
communists."

Owing to the short-

sightedness of public authorities and capitalist
sectors in many Central American countries, such questions
may not have to be postponed
too long.
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